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INTRODUCTION 
Behavioral finance is a relatively new field in economics, which uses findings from 
psychology and sociology for explaining investor behavior or market anomalies when rational 
models provide no sufficient explanations (Glaser et al., 2003). Traditional decision making 
models in economics rest on the premise that the world is populated by rational, calculating, 
and unemotional utility maximisers, called homo economicus. However numerous empirical 
and experimental studies demonstrated that investors’ behavior does not fit into this 
rationality framework. 
Overconfidence is one of the psychological biases, which can cause deviations from rational 
behavior. The concept of overconfidence is based on the large body of evidence from 
cognitive psychological research. Studies conducted by psychologists demonstrate that most 
people are overconfident about their abilities, knowledge, precision of their personal 
information, and are unreasonably optimistic about their future. Interest of economists in the 
consequences of investor and market overconfidence has generated a large body of literature. 
The research evidence suggests that overconfidence in financial markets can manifest itself 
through high volumes of trade, excessive price volatility, dissemination of speculative 
bubbles, etc. On the individual level overconfidence results in higher trade aggressiveness, 
portfolio undiversification, risk underestimation and suboptimal performance.  
This thesis takes a closer look at the imperfections of human nature and their impact on 
behavior in economic situations, by conducting a laboratory experiment in a financial market 
setting. The aim of this research was twofold: first, to investigate the role of market 
overconfidence in the occurrence of bubbles in asset prices and the emergence of other stylized 
facts of financial markets (excessive trade, excessive price volatility); second, to investigate the 
influence of behavioral factors, namely the degree of overconfidence and risk aversion, on 
financial decision making of economic subjects. This is a challenging research topic, 
especially in the face of devastating economic consequences of the recent real estate bubble. It 
is important to improve the knowledge of the causes lying behind the formation of bubbles 
and their subsequent burst, and get a better understanding of the motivation and reactions of 
market participants. Ability to grasp the role of psychological biases on the functioning of 
financial markets could result in the development of the mechanisms and implementation of 
policies that could, if not hinder the occurrence of the speculative price bubbles, at least 
enable control of their magnitudes. 
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In real-world situations no direct way to assess the degree of market overconfidence exists. It 
is also a troublesome task to guess who of the investors is overconfident and how strong her 
degree of overconfidence is. Not to mention their informational, financial, and preferential 
heterogeneity. Necessity to control for too many factors in the field data was the reason to 
choose laboratory experiments for the purpose of data collection. Experimental simulations of 
financial markets are of high value to research, as they allow isolating the effect of a 
particular bias on individual behavior. Moreover according to Friedman and Sunder (1994) 
experimental data are relatively easy to interpret. Biais et al. (2005) point out that study of 
controlled environments allows more confident inferences about cause and effect relations. 
Laboratory market setting also enables overcoming several problems, existing in 
determination of the fundamental asset value, namely estimation of expected dividends on the 
asset through the time period, determination of the terminal asset value and discount rates for 
calculation of the present value. These components can be controlled in the laboratory asset 
market, and thus favorable conditions for observing subjects’ behavior are created.  
This thesis consists of three papers. In Chapter 1 an instrument is developed that is later used 
in economic experiments to measure subjects’ overconfidence. Chapter 2 analyzes the 
connection between overconfidence, stock market bubbles and other stylized facts (high trade 
and volatility) from an aggregated market perspective. In Chapter 3 economic consequences 
of overconfidence and risk aversion are being assessed at the individual level. Each chapter 
begins with motivation of the research issue and review of the related literature. After that 
description of the experimental design is presented and research objectives are formulated. 
Then data analysis follows. Finally conclusions are drawn. Experimental instructions are 
provided in the Appendixes to the papers.  
Prior to running the economic experiments, described in Chapters 2 and 3, subjects’ degree of 
overconfidence had to be measured. However in economic experiments no conventional 
method of overconfidence measurement exists. Various proxies, tests and tasks applied for 
this purpose do not always offer measures that are satisfactory. These considerations were the 
basis upon which the first chapter of this thesis was built. This chapter is aimed at the 
development of an instrument (test) that would enable the construction of a comprehensive 
measure of individual overconfidence for the use in economic experiments. The developed 
instrument should enable assessment of the differences among subjects with respect to their 
degree of overconfidence and minimize the measurement error. The final test, consisting of 
18 general knowledge questions, was obtained in a two-stage procedure. In the first 
experimental phase a pilot test, consisting of fifty general knowledge questions of unknown 
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difficulty, was conducted. It enabled grouping of items into three difficulty categories: hard, 
average-difficulty and easy questions. The second phase was aimed at verification of the 
results’ replicability. Statistical tests supported the existence of the hard-easy effect, verified 
the success of categorization of questions into three levels of difficulty, and showed that 
gender was not associated with overconfidence in the developed instrument. Compared to the 
tests used in previous studies, the obtained test is believed to result in improved measurement 
quality of overconfidence.  
In Chapter 2 relationship between market overconfidence and occurrence of the stock prices’ 
bubbles is investigated. Stock price bubbles are defined as deviations from asset’s 
fundamental value, which equals the present value of the dividends’ stream that an owner 
expects to receive. An interesting question is: Why paying a price for the asset which exceeds 
the expected value of its dividends? Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) state that overconfidence 
is the main factor that makes people pay higher prices than the underlying fundamental value 
of an asset. In this experiment, sixty participants traded in ten computerized asset markets of 
two types: rational and overconfident. Markets were constructed on the basis of subjects’ 
overconfidence, measured in the administered pre-experimental psychological test sessions. 
The most overconfident subjects formed overconfident markets, and the least overconfident 
rational markets. The empirical evidence presented in the paper refined differences between 
market outcomes in the experimental treatments and suggested the connection between market 
overconfidence and market outcomes. Prices in rational markets tended to track the 
fundamental asset value more accurately than prices in overconfident markets, and were 
significantly lower and less volatile than the average overconfident prices. Strong positive 
correlation between market outcomes and overconfidence measures drew to conclusion, that 
increase in market overconfidence was associated with increase in average price and trading 
activity. Large and significant correlation between bubble measures and measures of 
overconfidence provided additional evidence that overconfidence had significant effect on 
price and trading behavior in experimental asset markets.  
Baker and Nofsinger (2002) point out that, investors can do serious harm to their wealth, if 
they allow psychological biases and emotions to affect their investment decisions. While 
overconfidence is one of the biases, which can induce deviation from rational economic 
behavior, degree of individual risk aversion is another personality trait, determining investment 
choices and strategies. In Chapter 3 influence of these behavioral factors (overconfidence and 
risk aversion) on financial decision making of economic subjects is analyzed. In order to 
achieve this purpose two kinds of experiments were conducted: the first one was the asset 
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market experiment, whereas the second was aimed at the individual risk aversion 
measurement. In previous studies overconfident and rational traders interacted in the same 
asset market. In contrast, in present experiment these two types of subjects were separated 
from each other by assigning them to the different types of markets: rational and 
overconfident. In each market session six subjects of the same type (rational or 
overconfident) took part. Data, collected from ten experimental sessions, revealed that 
individual performance and trading activity were overconfidence dependent. Even small 
variations in miscalibration among players of the same type, comprising each of the asset 
markets, were sufficient to cause this effect. In the second part of experiment, post hoc 
assessment of risk aversion was implemented in a sample of former participants of the asset 
market experiment (32 persons). The presented evidence suggests that risk aversion was not 
among the factors that had influence on individual engagement in trading activity or 
performance. It is concluded that in the sample, for which risk aversion measurements were 
obtained, experimental market outcomes were overconfidence and not risk aversion driven.  
I hope that this work and its conclusions could be of benefit to the policy makers. According 
to Gervais, Heaton, and Odean (2003) most economic theories assume that people behave 
rationally and optimally. However evidence, presented in this thesis, indicates that 
psychological bias of overconfidence has important impact on asset market prices, their 
volatility and bubble formation, and can be harming investors’ wealth. Thus danger arises 
from adopting assumption of subjects’ rationality into policy implications. In this context, I 
would like to emphasize the role of investment education in mitigating the negative effects of 
subjects’ overconfidence. Equipping individuals with better investment knowledge could be 
one of the ways to correct their market behavior. Keeping in mind, that “financial 
intermediaries profit from exploitation of investor biases” (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh, 
2002), additionally individuals could receive investment advice from financially disinterested 
governmental agencies. 
REFERENCES 
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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
A large body of economic literature presents results of experiments on overconfidence. The 
concept of overconfidence is based on the evidence form cognitive psychological research, 
which suggests that human-beings overestimate their knowledge, abilities and precision of 
their information. As example Bar-Hillel (2001) points out that, when subjects are P% sure that 
they have answered a question correctly in fact they are right on average less than P% of the 
time. There is plenty of evidence for people to be in general overconfident, and phenomenon of 
overconfidence has been found in many different samples of the population, e.g. students 
(Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein,1977; Koriat et al., 1980; Zakay and Glicksohn, 1992), 
members of the armed forces (Hazard and Peterson, 1973), CIA analysts (Cambridge and 
Shreckengost, 1978), entrepreneurs (Baron, 2000), clinical psychologists (Oskamp, 1962), 
bankers (Staël von Holstein, 1972), executives (Moore, 1977), negotiators (Neale and 
Bazerman, 1990), managers (Russo and Schoemaker,1992), lawyers (Wagenaar and Keren, 
1986), and civil engineers (Hynes and Vanmarcke, 1976). Overconfidence is already present in 
children (see Powel and Bolich, 1993; Allwood, Granhag, and Jonsson, 2006), and boys are 
found to be more overconfident than girls (e.g. Sieber, 1979; Newman, 1984; Allwood et al., 
2006). However, in adult samples no differences between both genders in overconfidence
1
 are 
observed (e.g. Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1981; Gigerenzer et al., 1991). 
In economic experiments, there is no conventional method of measurement of the inborn level 
of subjects’ overconfidence. For this purpose various proxies, tests and tasks are used, that not 
always offer a satisfactory measure of individual overconfidence. The need for this research is 
stimulated by the fact that previous experiments have drawbacks in the way they measure 
overconfidence, and thus overconfidence might have been caused (to some extent) by other 
reasons than the imperfection of human nature, but rather by the mistakes in the tests’/ tasks’ 
construction. Findings from psychological research indicate that the observable biases in 
judgment are often result of the inappropriateness of the task, e.g. a task is unclear to subjects, 
one gender finds task more difficult than the other, or there is not enough motivation for 
active participation. Thus development of the overconfidence test was implemented with the 
following assumptions in mind. First of all, most of the foregoing researchers followed the 
famous work by Russo and Schoemaker (1992) and used interval elicitation tasks to assess 
overconfidence. However, these tasks are prone to produce extreme overconfidence (see 
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 Assessed via sets of general knowledge questions.  
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Klayman et al., 1999). Second, previous authors used tests that were neither balanced to the 
hard-easy effect nor country or gender balanced. Yet, unbalanced tests can artificially create 
high levels of under- or overconfidence either in the whole group, or in parts of it. Third, 
overconfidence was often assessed based on the insufficient number of assignments or test 
items; psychological studies of overconfidence use amounts of items that are much higher. 
And last but not least, many of the tasks and tests were either not administered, or were not 
(financially) rewarded.  
This paper presents the results of the two experiments, aimed at the development of the 
instrument (test) that would enable construction of a comprehensive measure of individual 
overconfidence for the use in economic overconfidence experiments dealing with: 1) the role 
of overconfidence in occurrence of stock-prices’ bubbles, and 2) impact of overconfidence 
and risk aversion on economic behavior of individual traders. Test is intended for the 
detection of potential experimental subjects with high and low degrees of overconfidence and 
their subsequent grouping into two types of asset markets: rational and overconfident. Hence, 
a well-designed instrument should allow assessment of differences between the subjects with 
respect to their overconfidence and minimize the measurement error.  
The developed test differs from those used in prior economic experiments in some important 
respects. First, another test format was chosen, namely multiple choice discrete propositions’ 
task format, which is clearer to subjects and is not inherently prone to production of extreme 
overconfidence levels. Second, test was balanced to the hard-easy effect, by the inclusion of 
an equal number of questions of three difficulty levels (hard, medium-difficulty and easy). 
Third, in construction of the test it was controlled for the possible country and gender bias, 
e.g. no inclusion of questions that might be easier to one gender. And finally, compared to 
some studies, the test is expanded to include more items. Instrument was obtained in a two-
stage procedure in which a pilot test was used to assess questions’ difficulty, based on the 
group accuracy in answering every item of the 50 initial. Then six questions of each of the 
three difficulty types were chosen for the inclusion in the final test. The second experimental 
phase was aimed at verification of replicability of results, namely of the average degree of 
group overconfidence, the obtained categorization into three difficultly levels and of 
controlling for the gender bias. Both experiments were conducted with the students enrolled 
into different disciplines of social sciences. Experimental sessions were administered and 
subjects were offered a reward, on the basis of competition in test accuracy. The final 
instrument consists of 18 general knowledge questions unrelated to economics, financial 
markets or experiments. Questions are not connected to economics, as otherwise they could 
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cause biased results if the same test is used with a heterogeneous pool of subjects
2
. Evidence 
was found for the significant effect of the question difficulty on the overconfidence measure 
and existence of the gender bias. Compared to medium and easy questions, which resulted in 
under-confidence, hard questions produced significantly higher levels of overconfidence. The 
three types of questions also significantly varied from each other in terms of the produced 
confidence and accuracy. This result verified the success of categorization of questions into 3 
levels of difficulty in the created overconfidence measurement test. In the initial instrument as 
much as 16% of variance in accuracy and 7% of variance in confidence was explained by 
gender. In the final test gender is not associated with overconfidence, and there is almost no 
variance in confidence and accuracy that is gender dependent.  
Paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1.2 a review of the findings of psychological 
overconfidence literature are presented. In Section 1.3 findings from the theoretical and 
empirical research on overconfidence in finance are introduced, and ideas, on how 
overconfidence was measured in the previous experimental research, are presented; in closing 
of this Section a problem statement with the ideas about research improvement are provided. 
In Section 1.4 methodology of the test construction is described. In Section 1.5 statistical data 
analysis is presented. In Section 1.6 findings from the experiment with the final 
overconfidence measurement instrument are analyzed, and, finally Section 1.7 concludes. 
1.2 OVERCONFIDENCE IN PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 
Our life is full of uncertainty, and many decisions are based on beliefs concerning the 
likelihood of uncertain events (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982). These beliefs can be expressed 
in numerical form as subjective probabilities. Question of generation of these probabilities is 
one of the most important topics in the area of cognitive psychology (Bar-Hillel, 2001). Bar-
Hillel (2001) suggests that subjective probabilities are not just imperfect or inaccurate 
versions of objective probabilities, but rather are governed by cognitive principles of their 
own. To generate subjective probabilities, people rely on a limited number of heuristic 
principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to 
simpler judgmental operations. In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes 
they lead to severe and systematic errors (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982), and thus to non-
optimal judgments (see Russo and Schoemaker, 1992, for the description of the heuristics 
employed by people for assessment of probabilities). Use of heuristics for generation of 
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 Deaves et al. (2004) also motivate their choice of non-economic questions by the attempt “to avoid giving 
either group of participants a relative advantage because of subject content”. 
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subjective probabilities is a cognitive cause of overconfidence. Overconfidence is 
characterized by the tendency to overestimate one’s skills, prospects for success, the 
probability of positive outcomes or the accuracy of one’s knowledge, and arises from not 
knowing the limits of one’s knowledge (Conger and Wolstein, 2004). 
1.2.1 DEFINITION OF THE OVERCONFIDENCE BIAS 
In financial literature there are several findings that are often summarized under the concept 
of overconfidence: miscalibration, the better than average effect, illusion of control, and 
unrealistic optimism. The issue of whether these notions are related is mainly unexplored
3
 
(Glaser and Weber, 2007). In psychological research, however, only miscalibration is defined 
as overconfidence.  
Miscalibration  
Miscalibration is a cognitive bias that rests on the fact that people tend to overestimate the 
precision of their knowledge. In the experiments on calibration, participants answer a series of 
(general knowledge) questions and stipulate their confidence of being correct for each answer. 
Calibration is tested by comparing the percentage of questions that a participant has answered 
correctly with the participant’s average confidence in the answers to these questions. 
Individuals are considered to be well calibrated if the following condition is satisfied: over the 
long run of those responses made with confidence P, about P% should be correct (Adams, 
1957). However most of the people are not well-calibrated and demonstrate overconfidence 
(miscalibration), which manifests itself through a systematic deviation from perfect 
calibration and is defined as an “unwarranted belief in the correctness of one’s answer” 
(Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips, 1977). Typically, for all questions the proportion of 
correct answers is lower than the assigned probability (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips, 
1982). In a second strand of psychological literature, where overconfidence is measured by 
asking subjects to state for a series of questions with unknown numerical answer an upper and 
lower limit such that a subject is X% sure that the real answer would fall into that interval, the 
usual finding is that subjects’ probability distributions are too tight (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, 
and Phillips, 1982). E.g. when subjects are asked to state 90% confidence intervals for some 
uncertain quantity, the percentage of true values that fall outside the interval, is higher than 
10% (the percentage of surprises of a perfectly calibrated person). In the study of Alpert and 
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 Oberlechner and Osler (2003), Glaser, Langer, and Weber (2005), Glaser and Weber (2007) found no 
significant correlation between miscalibration and better than average effect measures.  
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Raiffa (1982) 50% intervals included the true quantity only about 30% of the time; 98% 
intervals included the true quantity only about 60% of the time. 
Better than average effect  
Inclination of people to exaggeration of their talents embodies itself in the better than average 
effect. Taylor and Brown (1988) document in their survey that people have unrealistically 
positive views of the self, i.e. they think about themselves as possessing above the average 
abilities (e.g. with regard to skills or positive personal traits) compared to other people. One 
of the most cited works by Svenson (1981) states that 82 percent of a group of students rank 
themselves among the 30 percent of drivers with the highest driving safety. Sümer et al. 
(2006) also found better than average effect among drivers in their sample, resulting from 
exaggerated ratings of self-reported driving skills. 
Illusion of control and unrealistic optimism 
Illusion of control is linked to the exaggeration of the degree to which one can control one’s 
fate. Subjects prone to the illusion of control, tend to underestimate the role of chance in 
human affairs and to misperceive games of chance as games of skill (Kahneman and Riepe, 
1998). Langer (1975) in her pioneering work defines this phenomenon as “an expectancy of a 
personal success probability inappropriately higher than the objective probability would 
warrant”. The phenomenon of unrealistic optimism about future life events is a cognitive bias 
that is strongly related to the illusion of control (Weinstein, 1980). Johnson, McDermott, 
Barrett, Cowden, Wrangham, McIntyre, and Rosen (2006) point out that numerous empirical 
findings confirm “that mentally healthy people tend to exhibit psychological biases that 
encourage optimism, collectively known as “positive illusions”. According to Kahneman and 
Riepe (1998) “most people’s beliefs are biased in the direction of optimism”. Griffin and 
Brenner (2005) note, that “optimistic overconfidence” represents overestimation of the 
probabilities of the events that are advantageous to the subject. Probabilities of the 
unfavorable events are underestimated by optimists; even in cases when they have no control 
over them, e.g. Kahneman and Riepe (1998) note “most undergraduates believe that they are 
less likely than their roommates to develop cancer or to have a heart attack before the age of 
fifty”.  
1.2.2 MEASUREMENT OF OVERCONFIDENCE  
There are two types of calibration assessment techniques used in the psychological 
experiments: making probability judgments about discrete propositions, and the calibration of 
probability density functions assessed for uncertain numerical quantities (the fractile method). 
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Measurement of Calibration with Discrete Propositions’ Task  
To measure overconfidence with the discrete propositions, subjects are suggested to answer a 
series of questions and state their confidence for each question that their answer was correct. 
Discrete propositions can give no alternatives for an answer, or suggest one, two, or multiple 
answer choices.  
Calibration can be expressed through several various measures (e.g. Calibration curve, Brier 
score). However a convenient measure, enabling discrimination between under- and 
overconfidence, is the bias score. The bias score is calculated as the difference between the 
average confidence level across all questions and the proportion of correct answers. A 
positive bias score represents overconfidence, and a negative bias score represents 
underconfidence. A bias score of zero indicates an accurately calibrated (neutral) person. 
bias score = average % confidence – average % correct      (1.1) 
Or as in Pulford (1996): 
1
1
/ ( )
T
t t t
t
over underconfidence n r c
N 
        (1.2) 
Here, T is the total number of response categories used, nt is the number of times the response 
rt was used and ct is the proportion correct for all items assigned probability rt.  
Measurement of Calibration with the Fractile Method 
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips (1982) note that uncertainty about the value of an 
unknown continuous quantity (e.g. what is the air distance from London to Tokyo) “may be 
expressed as probability density function across the possible values of that quantity”. The 
assessor has to state values of the uncertain quantity that are associated with a small number 
of predetermined fractiles (quantiles) of the distribution, i.e., as mentioned before, to state, for 
a series of questions with unknown numerical answer, upper and lower limits such that she is 
X% sure that the real answer would fall into that interval. There are two calibration measures 
for continuous items: interquartile index and surprise index. Interquartile index is the 
percentage of items for which the true value falls inside the interquartile range (i.e., between 
the 0.25 and 0.75 fractiles) (Lichtenstein et al., 1982). Interquartile index of a perfectly 
calibrated person is 0.5. Surprise index is the percentage of true values that falls outside the 
most extreme fractiles assessed. Lichtenstein et al. (1982) write that when the most extreme 
fractiles are assessed as 0.01 and 0.99, the surprise index of the perfectly calibrated person 
should be 2. Large surprise index shows the inability of the assessor to state confidence 
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bounds wide enough to include as much as possible of the true values. This indicates 
overconfidence.  
1.2.3 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DEGREE OF OVERCONFIDENCE  
Keasey and Watson (1989) identified four factors that have an impact on the accuracy-
confidence relationship: task complexity, amount of feedback, subjects’ level of motivation, 
and their skills.  
Hard-Easy Effect  
The degree of overconfidence is connected to the complexity of the task. This is called the 
“had-easy” effect. This effect occurs when the degree of overconfidence increases with the 
increase in the difficulty of the questions, where difficulty is measured as the percentage of 
correct answers (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, and Kleinbölting, 1991). Lichtenstein et al. (1982) 
suggest that “the most pervasive finding in recent research is that people are overconfident 
with general-knowledge items of moderate or extreme difficulty”. Many studies have 
supported this conclusion, e.g. Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein (1977), Koriat, Lichtenstein 
and Fischhoff (1980), Nickerson and McGoldrick (1965), Cambridge and Shreckengost 
(1978), Arkes, Christensen, Lai, and Blumer, (1987), Ronis and Yates, (1987), Sniezek, 
Paese, and Switzer, (1990) and etc. The degree of overconfidence is the highest with the tasks 
of high difficulty (e.g. Clarke, 1960; and Pitz, 1974); as tasks get easier, overconfidence is 
reduced (Lichtenstein et al., 1982).  
Motivation and Feedback 
The two ways of increasing subjects’ calibration are: motivation through reward for their 
assessment to be more precise, and outcome feedback (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips, 
1982).  
Motivation, according to Bohner et al. (1998) is one of the factors that encourage people to 
abandon the use of effort minimizing heuristics in favor of more effortful probabilities’ 
estimation strategies; thus it has an impact on the accuracy-confidence relationship. 
Motivation through reward is named to be a tool, helping to improve subjects’ calibration, by 
Lichtenstein et al. (1982). This finding is supported by the paper of Hoelzl et al. (2005) who 
have discovered a significant change in overconfidence pattern depending on the existence or 
nonexistence of the monetary reward.  
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips (1982) state, that receiving outcome feedback after every 
assessment is the best condition for successful training to be better calibrated. Adams and 
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Adams (1958) have found modest improvement in subjects’ calibration after five training 
sessions where they were given feedback on their performance. Fischfoff (1982) reports some 
successful training exercises, mostly using large amounts of well-structured feedback. 
Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1980) studied the impact of extensive, personalized calibration 
feedback on two groups of subjects. Perceptible improvement in calibration was reported, 
however no improvement was found in probabilities’ assessment by fractile method. In 
general, improvement in the accuracy of estimates is difficult to achieve (see e.g. Ferrell and 
McGoey, 1980; Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1980; Koriat et al., 1980), and there are reasons to 
be pessimistic about how well training transfers across time or tasks (Camerer, 1995). 
1.3 OVERCONFIDENCE IN FINANCIAL LITERATURE 
1.3.1 FINDINGS FROM THE RESEARCH 
Following psychological research in overconfidence, interest in the consequences of 
economic subjects’ overconfidence on financial decision making, functioning of markets and 
economic outcomes has occurred in behavioral economics. Findings of behavioral finance 
have an important value in understanding various anomalies and stylized facts found for 
example in the stock market. Overconfidence research in economics is developing in two 
directions: theoretical modeling and empirical testing of these models.  
Theoretical models about the impact of overconfidence on the processes in financial markets 
and the behavior of investors are based on the initial assumption of traders’ overconfidence, 
whose decision-making is modeled according to this premise. Behavioral finance models 
predict that overconfidence causes excess trading volume (De Bondt and Thaler, 1984; 
Shiller, 2000; Benos, 1998; Caballé and Sákovics, 2003), and excess price volatility 
(Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003; Benos, 1998, Daniel et al., 1998); it induces occurrence of the 
speculative price bubbles (Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003) and increases the market depth 
(Odean, 1999; Kyle and Wang, 1997; Benos, 1998); it makes markets underreact to abstract, 
statistical, and highly relevant information and overreact to salient, but less relevant 
information (Odean, 1998); it makes returns of financial assets predictable (Daniel et al., 
1998, 2001; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003). Overconfidence increases investors’ tendency to 
herd (Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam and Titman, 1994) and makes them choose riskier and 
undiversified portfolios (Odean, 1998, 1999; Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1992), 
overconfident investors trade more aggressively, i.e. their trading activity is too high (Odean, 
1999; Gervais and Odean, 2001) and their expected utility is reduced (De Long et al., 1991; 
Odean, 1998). 
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There are not so many empirical and experimental studies testing the assumptions of the 
abovementioned theories of the impact of overconfidence on financial decision making, 
functioning of the markets and economic outcomes. Empirical findings support the premise of 
theoretical models, that overconfidence results in high trading volume in the market (Statman, 
Thorley, and Vorkink, 2006; Kim and Nofsinger, 2003); it also increases the probability of 
bubbles’ occurrence4 (Oechssler, Schmidt and Schnedler, 2007). A higher degree of 
overconfidence reduces traders’ performance/ welfare (Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2003; Biais, 
Hilton, Mazurier, and Pouget, 2005; Odean, 1999; Barber and Odean, 2002; Nöth and Weber, 
2003), and causes mistakes in financial decision making (Biais et al., 2005); unrealistically 
positive self-evaluation increases trading volume (Glaser and Weber, 2007). There is no clear 
conclusion about how overconfidence may influence markets’ reaction to new information: 
e.g. Loughran and Ritter (1995) found that markets overreact to new information, and studies 
by Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990), Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995) detected 
underreaction. There is no clear relationship between the degree of overconfidence, and the 
degree of professionalism: in the studies by Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) and Glaser and 
Weber (2007) overconfidence increases with experience, whereas studies of Menkhoff, 
Schmeling, and Schmidt (2006) and Biais et al. (2005) find the reverse dependence.  
1.3.2 MEASUREMENT OF OVERCONFIDENCE IN EMPIRICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL 
STUDIES 
As mentioned above, there are a few empirical and experimental studies designed to test the 
impact of overconfidence on financial decisions, market outcomes and subjects’ performance. 
Some of them present only an indirect evidence of such impact, as they measure 
overconfidence via various proxies and it is not always clear who of the subjects and how 
strong are overconfident. Other studies measure the inborn level of subjects’ overconfidence 
via the different tasks and tests, related or non-related to economics and finance. Such tests 
usually enable construction of the overconfidence measure for each individual. Most often 
these tasks are related to confidence intervals’ estimations in the spirit of the work by Russo 
and Shoemaker (1992). 
Proxies for Overconfidence 
Papers that use proxies for overconfidence do not allow for the numerical measurement of the 
degree of overconfidence. E.g. Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) test the hypothesis of 
                                                 
4
 Top-rank belief variable “has a positive and significant effect on the probability of bubbles” (Oechssler et al., 
2007). 
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interdependence of overconfidence and high trading volume for the USA stock market. As a 
proxy for the degree of overconfidence authors suggest using high past returns. They argue 
that after high past returns posterior volume of trade will be higher, as successful investment 
increases the degree of overconfidence. The same proxy for overconfidence (i.e. high past 
returns) was utilized by Kim and Nofsinger (2003) for the Japanese stock market.  
Barber and Odean (2001) use gender of the trader as a proxy for overconfidence. Their 
assumption is that, based on the psychological literature, women are less overconfident than 
men, thus they are going to trade less than men. In their study men are actually found to trade 
more than women. In another paper Barber and Odean (2002) employ as a proxy of 
overconfidence changes in the trading patterns and performance of the 1607 investors who 
switched from the phone-based trading to online trading between 1992 and 1995. They 
present evidence that these investors traded more actively and speculatively, and performed 
subpar.  
Blavatsky (2008) measures overconfidence by the taken choice in a simple task: subjects can 
either bet on their knowledge or on the equivalent lottery. Those who choose an option to bet 
on their own knowledge are classified to be overconfident (others are underconfident). Under 
this measurement procedure, subjects, on average, exhibit underconfidence about their own 
knowledge, and their confidence does not depend on their attitude towards risk/ ambiguity. 
Overconfidence Measured via Tests and Tasks 
In comparison to the studies that use various proxies to measure overconfidence, 
questionnaire studies enable direct assessment of each subject’s under- or overconfidence.  
Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) investigate overconfidence within the context of an 
experimental asset market. Miscalibration of subjects is measured before each trading period, 
with the help of the two price prediction tasks: point prediction with the confidence in 
forecast, and 98% confidence interval prediction. Results presented in their paper indicate that 
in some periods participants demonstrate overconfidence and in others underconfidence, thus 
they are not generally prone to overconfidence. Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) also show 
that higher degree of overconfidence is negatively correlated with the earnings of the 
participants of their experiment. 
Fenton-O’creevy, Nicholson, Soane, and Willman (2003) examine the impact of illusion of 
control on the performance of traders in four investment banks. They use a computer-based 
task measurement of the illusion of control to execute measurement of overconfidence: 107 
participants had to raise an index on the computer screen by pressing keyboard-buttons and 
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rate their success in doing so from 1 (not at all successful) to 100 (very successful). The index 
in reality was modeled as random walk process with an upward trend, and thus the button had 
no influence on its development.  
Biais, Hilton, Mazurier, and Pouget (2005) conduct an experiment to check if overconfidence 
has impact on subjects’ trading performance (trading activity and profits). They use the scale 
adapted from Russo and Schoemaker (1992) to measure the degree of overconfidence in a 
group of 245 students. Their test consisted of 10 general-knowledge questions with known 
numerical answers for which subjects had to state 90% confidence intervals. Several weeks 
later, after the students’ overconfidence was measured, they participated in the experimental 
asset market. Questions that were used to measure subject’s miscalibration had nothing to do 
with financial markets, yet they affected strategies and performance in the experimental 
market; this points at the robustness of the psychological construct independent of the context 
in which the questions are asked (Biais et al., 2005). 
In their stock market experiment Deaves, Lüders, and Luo (2004) are testing for premises that 
overconfidence leads to an increase in trading activity, and that gender influences trading 
activity through differences in overconfidence. They measure overconfidence of their subjects 
using a calibration based approach prior to conducting the experiment. Compared to the tests 
used in the other studies, their test contains more (up to 20) items. Each of the general 
knowledge questions in their test had a known numerical answer for which subjects had to 
state upper and lower bounds of 90% confidence interval in which the real answer would fall. 
Their choice of the non-economic questions is motivated by the attempt to avoid giving either 
group of participants a relative advantage because of subject content (Deaves et al., 2009).  
Stotz and von Nitzsch (2005) in their paper investigate the extent of analyst overconfidence in 
their abilities to forecast prices and earnings. 112 bank analysts had to answer two questions: 
one asked them to rank their skills with regard to their price or earnings estimates in 
comparison to their colleagues, and another asked to estimate what percentage of analysts 
produce work superior/ inferior to them. Two types of coefficients, measuring subjects’ 
overconfidence, were then calculated: overconfidence coefficients for earnings and in price 
targets. Results presented in their paper suggest, that overconfidence increases with an 
increasing perception of control. 
Glaser and Weber (2007) asked a sample of approximately 3000 individual investors with 
online broker accounts to answer an online test, which enabled the authors to measure several 
manifestations of overconfidence: miscalibration, better than average effect, illusion of 
control, and unrealistic optimism. To measure miscalibration they asked subjects to state 
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upper and lower bounds of 90% confidence interval to the five economy-related questions
5
 
and five stock price predictions. Only 114 investors answered all their economy-related 
questions, and 165 – stock price prediction questions. By correlation the obtained measures of 
overconfidence and trading volume Glaser and Weber (2007) explored the connection 
between them.  
Glaser, Langer, and Weber (2005) surveyed 123 professional traders and investment bankers, 
and compared results to a student control group in order to analyze whether professionals are 
prone to judgmental biases to the same degree as lay men. They measured overconfidence of 
their subjects by the means of four tasks: 1) subjects stated 90% confidence intervals for 20 
knowledge questions (ten general knowledge and ten economics and finance knowledge); 2) 
subjects had to assess their performance in the knowledge task (how many right answers?) 
and assess own performance compared to others (how many right answers compared to the 
others?); 3) make 15 stock market forecasts by stating 90% confidence intervals, and 4) 
predict a trend in stock prices forecasting via confidence intervals. In most tasks the degree of 
overconfidence of professionals was significantly higher than of the student group. 
To analyze the effect of professionalism on investment decisions Menkhoff, Schmeling, and 
Schmidt (2006) conducted a survey of approximately 500 subjects, consisting of professionals 
and lay men. Alongside with other aspects in their survey, they measured overconfidence via 
two questions on the “appropriate self-evaluation” (in other words better than average effect) 
in which subjects had to estimate their performance and information compared to the other 
investors. They find that, among other control variables, portfolio turnover is related to lower 
risk aversion and higher overconfidence. 
Menkhoff, Schmidt and Brozynski (2006) surveyed 117 fund managers in order to detect an 
impact of experience on overconfidence, risk taking, and herding behavior. Their survey 
measures overconfidence via three tasks that enable assessment of the three manifestations of 
overconfidence: 1) evaluation of the own performance compared to the other fund managers 
(better than average effect), 2) 90% confidence estimation of the DAX index forecast 
(miscalibration), and 3) a third task is aimed at measurement subjects’ illusion of control 
(subjects are asked to rate the statement: economic news are not surprising to me). They find 
that experienced fund managers tend to exhibit herding behavior to a lesser extent than 
inexperienced ones; while evidence concerning the impact of experience on risk taking and 
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 However they call them “general knowledge” questions.  
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overconfidence is mixed: positive-self evaluation and illusion of control are increasing with 
experience, whereas miscalibration on the contrary decreases. 
In their paper Oechssler, Schmidt, and Schnedler (2007) study whether bubbles can occur in 
the experimental markets that pay no dividends on assets. To measure overconfidence in their 
experiment they asked subjects, prior to each round, to rank themselves among the 60 subjects 
of a treatment in terms of payoff of that round. For each period the percentage of subjects who 
ranked themselves to be better than median (rank 30 or higher) was compared to the expected 
number of 50%. Overconfidence in their experiment was modest as merely 54% of the 
subjects thought to be better than the median. They have also constructed a second variable – 
“top-rank belief” – that measured, for each round, the number of subjects who thought they 
would be the best in terms of payoff. This construct has positive and significant effect on the 
probability of bubbles’ occurrence in their experimental market. 
1.3.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This paper is aimed at the development of the instrument (test) that would enable construction 
of the comprehensive measure of individual overconfidence for the use in two economic 
experiments dealing with: 1) the role of overconfidence in occurrence of stock-prices’ 
bubbles, and 2) impact of overconfidence and risk aversion on economic behavior of 
individual traders. A well-designed instrument will allow assessing differences of the subjects 
with respect to their overconfidence and minimize the measurement error.  
In my opinion previous works have drawbacks in the way they measure overconfidence, and 
thus in prior experiments overconfidence might have been caused (to some extent) by other 
reasons than the imperfection of human nature, i.e. by the mistakes in the tests’/ tasks’ 
construction
6
. Thus development of the overconfidence test was conducted with the following 
assumptions in mind: 
From the review above one can see that overconfidence in financial settings is estimated 
either with the help of some assignments (e.g. estimate what percentage of analysts produce 
work superior to you?) or by the means of interval elicitation tests. However, overconfidence 
is often assessed based on the insufficient number of assignments or test items. Thus it raises 
doubts that these instruments actually offer a comprehensive measure of overconfidence of an 
individual. This fact is mentioned in the work of Menkhoff et al. (2006), who measured 
overconfidence with three assignments; Barber and Odean (2002) use only two assignments. 
                                                 
6
 Not to mention the studies in which overconfidence was never measured directly. For a review see Glaser and 
Weber (2007). 
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In comparison, the psychological studies of overconfidence use the amount of items that is 
much higher, and the minimum number of items for a reliable test is ten (Kline, 1993).  
Most of the foregoing researchers followed the famous work by Russo and Schoemaker 
(1992) and used interval elicitation tests to assess overconfidence. However, interval 
estimation tasks are prone to produce extreme overconfidence (see e.g. Klayman et al., 1999). 
One reason to that is that subjects do not really understand the nature of these intervals and 
“what they are being asked to come up with” (Deaves et al, 2004). Also use of these instruments 
to measure the improvements in calibration, when the test is conducted before and after the 
experiment, is useless as this method does not allow for the improvement in calibration after 
training sessions; on the other hand subjective probability elicitation for the discrete items, 
combined with financial reward, can be improved (Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1980).  
Findings from psychological research show that overconfidence is the most pronounced for 
the hard questions (few people know the right answer) and the least pronounced for the easy 
ones (most of the people know the correct answer). However, the abovementioned papers did 
not make use of the balanced to hard-easy effect tests. This could have artificially created 
high levels of under- or overconfidence, e.g. in the experiment of Deaves et al. (2009) none of 
the subjects got close to the perfect calibration measure, and even the best calibrated 
participants exhibited rather high degrees of overconfidence.  
Connected to the hard-easy effect are country and gender biases. Country bias rests on the 
fact, that some questions might be easy in one country, but in another one they might be hard. 
Gender bias is produced by the choice of questions for the test that could be easier for men 
than women (e.g. sports, masculine hobbies) and vice versa. This could result in the 
inappropriate levels of under- or overconfidence for one gender compared to the other, or in 
one country compared to the other. Nevertheless, previous authors used tests that were not 
country or gender balanced, e.g. Deaves et al. (2009), used the same test in several locations. 
Finally, many of the tasks and tests discussed above were either not administered (e.g. Glaser 
and Weber (2007) conducted their survey via internet, and subjects might have used other 
sources than their own knowledge for answering the test), or were not (financially) rewarded.  
Based on the abovementioned analysis, the developed instrument for measurement of 
overconfidence in the planned stock market experiments will differ in some important 
respects. First, another test format is chosen, namely multiple choice discrete propositions’ 
task format, which, due to its simplicity, is clearer to subjects and not inherently prone to 
production of extreme overconfidence levels. Second, a pilot test is conducted to assess 
questions’ difficulty and to single out easy, medium and hard questions. Then an equal 
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number of questions of the three difficulty levels are included in the final test. Third, in 
construction of the test it is controlled for possible country and gender biases, e.g. I have tried 
to avoid questions that might be easier to one gender than the other. Forth, to check if the 
categorization into three difficultly levels and controlling for gender bias is successful, final 
instrument is pre-tested with the target group of students, namely those who are enrolled in 
different disciplines of the social sciences. Fifth, overconfidence measurement phase of the 
experiment is administered and financially rewarded. Moreover it is rewarded on the 
competition in the test accuracy basis, which should discourage sharing the results among 
students and thus increase the reliability of the measurement. And finally, compared to some 
of the authors, my test is expanded to include more questions.  
1.4 METHOD 
Procedure and Subjects 
A pilot test, whose purpose was to select questions for the final questionnaire, was conducted 
on the 19
th
 May, 2008 at Christian-Albrechts University of Kiel. Subjects were given 
approximately 30 minutes time to fill in the 50 questions test at the end of the lecture on 
Social Politics. Three monetary prizes were offered for those participants who got the most 
questions right. A reward on the basis of competition in test accuracy was chosen in order to 
decrease the desire of subjects to share answers, and thus increase reliability of the obtained 
individual bias scores. Only fully completed tests were considered for the prize. A total of 96 
tests were completed, of them 44 by males, and 52 by females. Most of the students were 
German (91 subjects). After the initial analysis 12 partially incomplete tests were not included 
in the further analysis. From the remaining 84 tests 50 were chosen randomly – 25 of men, 
and 25 of women. Participants of the test aged from 20 to 29 years (M = 24.32, SD = 0.31), 
and have studied from 3 to 11 semesters (M = 6.98, SD = 2.11). All participants were students 
of social sciences; of them 40% studied management, 38% were economics students, and 22% 
subjects were enrolled into other social studies. Average age of male subjects was 24.48 years 
(SD = 2.43), and their average duration of study was 7 semesters (SD = 2.27). Average age of 
female subjects was 24.16 years (SD = 1.97), and their average duration of study was 6.96 
semesters (SD = 1.99). For information about participants’ age and duration of studies refer to 
Appendix 1.D.  
Design and Materials 
For the pilot test 50 general knowledge questions were selected from the German quiz web-
page http://wissen.de. Questions on this web page have four short (one or two-word) multiple 
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exclusive answers. In the test, only three possible answers to each question were left, as one 
of the choices would usually be clearly incorrect. In choosing test questions I have tried to 
avoid the gender bias, which could result in inappropriate levels of under- or overconfidence 
for one gender, i.e. no questions that could be easier for men than women (e.g. sports, 
masculine hobbies) and vice versa were chosen. In the test students were asked to answer 
each of the 50 questions, and state their level of confidence in the correctness of their answer. 
Any number between 33% and 100% could be used to express subjects’ confidence, where 
33% meant that subjects did not know the correct answer, and were guessing, and 100% 
corresponded to being absolutely certain that the answer was correct.  
In addition to measuring how well the subjects were calibrated, some personal data were 
collected: name, age, educational background, duration of studies, and nationality. In the final 
test students could also mark if they wanted to take part in the further experiments and, if 
answer was positive, submit their email. At the beginning of the pilot participants were 
informed that their personal data would be treated confidentially, and their identities would be 
used by the experimenter only for the purposes of determining the three winners. Thus, 
subjects’ identity was revealed to other students only in the case of being one of the winners of 
the quiz, which was an honor to students. Test’s instructions and design are based on the 
samples that were obtained from Dr. Briony Pulford (University of Leicester, School of 
Psychology) and Dr. Sabina Kleitman (University of Sidney, School of Psychology). 
Based on the analysis of the pilot-test outcomes, a final test (test-18) was constructed from the 
18 questions of the three difficulty levels: six hard, six medium difficulty, and six easy 
questions. Items were differentiated according to their difficulty on the basis of the number of 
correct answers to each of them from the whole group that participated in the pilot study. This 
methodology is described in the article of Pulford and Colman (1997), who suggest assigning 
questions to three difficulty categories, based on the total accuracy of the group in answering 
each question: 0-33% accuracy - hard questions, 34-66% - moderate difficulty, 67-100% easy 
questions. After the initial division, four questions have fallen in the category of hard 
questions (average accuracy 17.5%), 10 questions into category of medium difficulty 
questions (average accuracy 55.2%), and 36 of 50 questions turned to be easy (average 
accuracy 88.5%). As the category of hard-questions had not enough items, based on the idea 
that overconfidence is the most pronounced for hard questions (see Clarke, 1960; and Pitz, 
1974), average overconfidence ratio over each of the medium difficulty questions was 
calculated and the two, having the highest overconfidence coefficient, were chosen to be 
included into hard-questions category. Thus six hard questions rather than four were obtained. 
23 
Characteristics of the final test in terms of the confidence, accuracy and the bias score are 
presented in the Table 1.1. Translation of test-18 and instructions are included in Appendix 1.H. 
Table 1.1: Average confidence, accuracy and bias score for the three levels of question 
difficulty of the final overconfidence test (test-18) 
  
  
Hard Medium Easy 
M SD. M SD M SD 
Confidence 67.90 6.64 65.01 9.01 97.43 2.12 
Accuracy 26.00 16.00 62.33 2.34 100.00 0.00 
Overconfidence 41.90 18.24 2.68 7.48 -2.57 2.12 
1.5 RESULTS 
Consistent with previous research, on average, subjects have proved to be overconfident: the 
bias score of the group on the test-50 pointed at slight overconfidence (M = 4.47, SD = 7.34); 
recalculation of the bias score for the test-18
7
 has increased the average overconfidence 
measure (M = 14.11, SD = 10.63). Appendix 1.F presents data on the bias score and accuracy 
of all participants who took part in the pilot test for both test-50 and test-18, and men and 
women separately. Average overconfidence of men for test-50 is 3.33 (SD = 5.96), and for 
test-18 it is 14.11 (SD = 10.70). Average overconfidence of women for test-50 is 5.63 (SD = 
8.47), and for test-18 it is 14.12 (SD = 10.79). Noteworthy is the fact, that whereas for the 
complete test-50 average overconfidence of men was slightly lower than that of women, after 
recalculating the overconfidence ratio for the questions chosen to comprise the final test (test-
18), average bias score for both groups practically equalized. For the test-50 correlation 
between accuracy and the bias score is found to be strong and significant, pointing at the 
decrease in overconfidence with the increase in accuracy (Pearson correlation (48) = -0.629, p < 
0.01, one-sided); for the test-18 this relationship is even stronger (Pearson correlation (48) = -
0.823, p < 0.01, one-sided).  
Overconfidence and experience 
After obtaining the bias score for each individual participant of the pilot test, a check of the 
proposition that overconfidence of subjects changes with experience was conducted. The two 
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variables that were used as a proxy of subjects’ experience are age and duration of study at the 
university, measured in semesters. From the graphical analysis of the scatterplots (Appendix 
1.B) no conclusions about linear relationship between the measures of experience and the bias 
score could be drawn for both test-50 and test-18. Pearson’s correlation analysis also has not 
detected any significant linear relationship between the variables of interest (see Appendix 
1.C). Based on these findings, I conclude that students of different age groups and being at 
different levels of progress with their studies can be recruited for the participation at the 
planned economic experiment. 
Test-50 vs. Test-18: Accuracy and Confidence  
Analysis of the accuracy of the group for test-50 revealed that even 72% of the questions have 
fallen in the category of easy questions (67-100% accuracy). See Figure 1.1(a). This test is 
distinguished by high precision, and inadequate to that precision confidence, consequently 
58% of questions resulted in average underconfidence (see Figure 1.1(b). Appendix 1.A (a) 
confirms, that the distribution of accuracy per question for the test-50 has more mass on the 
right tail (skewness = -1.31), and the distribution of overconfidence per question is left-
skewed (skewness = 1.86). This example illustrates the dangers of using the unbalanced to 
hard-easy effect test in economic research: by using test-50 one can artificially create high 
levels of underconfidence in ones subjects
8
.  
a.        b. 
Figure 1.1: Distribution of accuracy (a) and overconfidence per question (b) in test-50 
                                                 
8
 Tests skewed in the direction of hard questions, can artificially create group overconfidence. 
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a.                                                                            b. 
Figure 1.2: Distribution of the bias score of participants per test: a. test-50 and b. test-18 
24% of subjects who completed test-50 were found to be underconfident (see Figure 1.2(a); 
for test-18 this number decreases to 8% (see Figure 1.2(b). Alongside with the decrease in the 
percentage of underconfident subjects, an increase in the range of the bias score of the 
participants is observed (from 38.60 to 47.23). There is also improvement in the symmetry of 
the distribution of the bias score (test-50: skewness = 0.73; test-18: skewness = 0.53). See 
Appendix 1.A (b). The increase in bias score range is important for the future experiments as 
it leaves more room for finding subjects whose degree of overconfidence differs significantly. 
1.5.1 STATISTICAL TESTS  
In this section results of the statistical tests are presented that verify the success of 
categorization of the questions into three levels of difficulty for the test-18, and provide a 
sufficient basis to conclude that overconfidence is a robust phenomenon and not an artifact 
(Bar-Tal et al., 2001). 
Confidence 
I start by analyzing differences in the confidence levels of the subjects for the three difficulty 
levels of questions. On average subjects had the highest confidence for answering easy 
questions – 97.43%; the average confidence level for the hard questions was 67.90%, and for 
the medium questions – 65.01%. The performed Kruskal-Wallis H Test showed that the three 
levels of question difficulty resulted in significantly different from each other confidence 
levels (Chi-square(2) = 11.617, p < 0.01), pointing out, that at least two of the three difficulty 
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levels were characterized by unequal confidence levels. Effect size is η2 = 0.856, which 
means that 86% of the variance in the confidence assessments is due to the difficulty of the 
questions. Pairwise Mann-Whitney U tests revealed that there is no significant difference in 
the confidence for the medium and hard questions (U = 13.500, p = 0.470, two-sided); 
confidence in answering easy questions is significantly higher than in answering medium (U 
= 0.00, p < 0.01, one-sided) and hard questions (U = 0.00, p < 0.01, one-sided).  
Accuracy 
Average accuracy levels for the test-18 were: 26% for hard questions, 62.33% for medium, 
and 100% for easy questions. Kruskal-Wallis H Test indicates that the difficulty level of 
questions significantly affected accuracy of the answers (Chi-Square (2) = 15.760, p < 0.001, 
two-sided); effect size is η2 = 0.926. A series of Mann Whitney U tests were carried out. 
These tests show that there is a significant difference in accuracy for answering three 
categories of questions: medium questions tend to outperform in accuracy hard questions (U = 
0.00, p < 0.01, one-sided); accuracy for answering easy questions significantly exceeds the 
accuracy of medium (U = 0.00, p < 0.01, one-sided), and hard questions (U = 0.00, p < 0.01, 
one-sided). These results prove that the division of questions into three difficulty levels is 
successful. 
Overconfidence 
Table 1.1 demonstrates that participants exhibit overconfidence for two levels of question 
difficulty (hard questions: BS = 41.90; medium questions: BS = 2.68) and underconfidence for 
the third one (easy questions: BS = -2.57). This is in line with the previous research that found 
hard questions to be the most prone to overconfidence, and easy questions to be often subject to 
underconfidence. The bias scores for easy and hard questions differ significantly from zero 
(easy questions: Wilcoxon signed rank test T = 2.097, p < 0.05, two-sided; hard questions: 
Wilcoxon T = 2.097, p <0.05, two-sided). However, for the medium difficulty questions the null 
hypothesis of the equality of the bias score to zero cannot be rejected (Wilcoxon T = 0.419, p = 
0.675, two-sided). It can be concluded that the medium difficulty questions produced on 
average the bias score which was the most indistinguishable from the perfect calibration score 
of zero. To examine the existence of the hard-easy effect I first test a joint hypothesis of the 
equality of the levels of overconfidence generated by three levels of questions’ difficulty versus 
the alternative, that some difficulty levels produced more overconfidence than the others. The 
null hypothesis is rejected at a high level of significance (Chi-Square(2) = 12.117, p < 0.01). 
Effect size is η2 = 0.783. Mann-Whitney U test, performed on each pair of the three levels of the 
bias score, confirmed the existence of the hard-easy effect. Subjects showed significantly higher 
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overconfidence for the hard questions than for the medium (Mann-Whitney U = 0.00, p < 0.01, 
one-sided) and easy ones (Mann-Whitney U = 0.00, p < 0.01, one-sided); overconfidence for 
the medium questions was slightly higher than for the easy questions (Mann-Whitney U = 9.50, 
p < 0.1, one-sided). 
Gender Differences 
Test-50:  
Males were slightly less overconfident than females for the test-50 (men BS: M = 3.33, SD = 
5.96; women BS: M = 5.63, SD = 8.47), however this difference was not significant (t(48) = -
1.109, p = 0.27, two-sided; effect size η2 = 0.025) (see Appendix 1.F). Male subjects achieved 
higher accuracy for the test-50 than female subjects (men: M = 78.80, SD = 5.45; women: M 
= 73.52, SD = 6.72), and this difference is significant (t(48) = 3.053, p < 0.01, two-sided). 
Effect size is η2 = 0.163, which points out that 16.3% of the variance in accuracy was gender 
dependent. Male subjects have also shown higher confidence in answering questions of test-
50, than female subjects (men: M =82.13, SD = 4.93; women: M = 79.07, SD = 6.70), this 
difference is found to be significant (t(48) = 1.840, p < 0.05, one-sided); effect size η2 = 
0.069. The fact that about 16% of variation in accuracy and 7% in confidence is gender 
dependent is not satisfactory because there is more gender bias in the overconfidence test than 
it was expected. Correlation between overconfidence and accuracy is strong and significant 
for both genders (men: Pearson’s Correlation (23) = -0.630, p < 0.01, one-sided; women: 
Pearson’s Correlation (23) = -0.625, p < 0.01, one-sided).  
Test-18:  
Both genders have shown almost equal overconfidence for the test-18 (male BS: M = 14.11, 
SD = 10.70; female BS: M = 14.12, SD = 10.79; t(48) = -0.002, p = 0.998, two-sided; effect 
size η2 = 0.00) (see Appendix 1.F). Overconfidence for the test-50 was significantly lower 
than for the test-18. Male subjects have slightly higher accomplishments in terms of accuracy 
than female subjects (men: M = 63.78, SD = 9.64; women: M = 61.78, SD = 10.43), although 
this difference is found to be insignificant (t(48) = 0.704, p = 0.485, two-sided); effect size η2 
= 0.010. Male subjects were slightly more confident in answering questions of test-18 (men: 
M = 77.40, SD = 5.21; women: M = 74.87, SD = 5.20), however this difference is 
insignificant (t(48) = 1.37, p = 0.176, two-sided); effect size η2 = 0.037. Compared to test-50, 
test-18 has very low amount of variation in confidence and accuracy that is gender dependent. 
Test of the difference in overconfidence between men and women for the three levels of 
question difficulty has shown that both groups have expressed similar biases in answering the 
test and that the encountered differences were not significant (hard questions: t(48) = 0.085, p = 
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0.933, two-sided; medium questions: t(48) = 0.354, p = 0.725, two-sided; easy questions: t(48) 
= 0.737, p = 0.465, two-sided). Correlation between overconfidence and accuracy is strong and 
significant for both genders (men: Pearson’s Correlation (23) = -0.847, p < 0.01, one-sided; 
women: Pearson’s Correlation (23) = -0.810, p < 0.01, one-sided). 
1.6 SECOND EXPERIMENT 
To check if the results obtained by using test-18 were replicable, namely the average group 
degree of overconfidence, the obtained categorization into three difficultly levels and 
controlling for gender bias, the experiment was repeated with the students of the target group: 
those enrolled into different disciplines of social sciences. In this subsection I will also 
estimate the reliability of my scale.  
A second experiment was conducted on the 14
th
 June, 2008 at Christian-Albrechts University 
of Kiel. Subjects were given approximately 15 minutes time to fill in the final, 18 questions, 
overconfidence test (test-18) at the end of the lecture on Economics of Risk and Uncertainty. 
As in the pilot test, three monetary prizes were offered for the participants who got the most 
questions right. A total of 37 tests were completed, of them 3 had no personal information and 
were not included in the further analysis. Participants of the test aged from 22 to 31 years (M 
= 26.06, SD = 2.62), and have studied on average 9.10 semesters (SD = 2.60). Of the 34 
participants 21 were males (age: M = 25.95, SD = 2.64), and 13 were females (age: M = 
26.23, SD = 2.68). The majority of the subjects were Germans (86%). All participants were 
students of social sciences, of them 26 studied economics, seven studied management, and 
one other social sciences. For information about subjects’ age and duration of studies refer to 
Appendix 1.E. Consistent with previous research, on average, subjects were prone to 
overconfidence (M = 10.41, SD = 9.26). Average group overconfidence on test-18 obtained 
from the experiment on the 6
th
, June and on the 19
th
, May did not significantly differ from 
each other (t(82) = 1.649, p = 0.103, two-sided; size effect η2 = 0.032). Men on average were 
slightly more overconfident (M = 10.68, SD = 9.81) than women (M = 9.98, SD = 8.68), 
however this difference was found to be insignificant. Appendix 1.G presents data on the bias 
score of all participants who took part in the pilot, and men and women separately. Just as in 
the pilot test, correlation coefficient between age and overconfidence (Pearson coefficient 
(32) = 0.189, p = 0.142, one-sided), and semester and overconfidence (Pearson coefficient 
(32) = -0.054, p = 0.388, one-sided) is small and insignificant. Correlation between the 
accuracy and the bias score is strong and significant, pointing at the decrease in 
overconfidence with the increase in accuracy (Pearson correlation (332) = -0.731, p < 0.01). 
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After division of questions into three difficulty levels characteristics of each category, in 
terms of confidence, accuracy and the bias score, were calculated (see Table 1.2). 
Table 1.2: Characteristics of the three levels of question difficulty of the test-18 from the 
experiment on 14.06.09 
 
 
Accuracy 
Subjects’ average accuracy level for answering hard questions was 22.35%, 52.94% for 
medium and 95.38% for easy questions. Kruskal-Wallis H Test shows that the difficulty level 
of questions had significant impact on the accuracy of answers (Chi-Square (2) = 15.065, p < 
0.01, one-sided); effect size η2 = 0.920. Pairwise comparisons, performed using the Mann-
Whitney U test, revealed that the accuracy for answering the medium difficulty questions 
significantly exceeds the accuracy for answering hard questions (U = 0.50, p < 0.01, one-
sided); accuracy for answering easy questions significantly exceeds accuracy for medium 
questions (U = 0.00, p < 0.01, one-sided) and hard questions (U = 0.00, p < 0.01, one-sided). 
Confidence 
On average subjects had the most confidence for answering easy questions 93.52% (SD = 
8.74); confidence levels for the hard and medium difficulty questions were correspondingly 
55.75% (SD = 7.67) and 53.95% (SD = 11.67). The Kruskal-Wallis H Test demonstrated that 
the three difficulty levels differed significantly from each other with regard to confidence 
(Chi-Square (2 ) = 12.158, p < 0.01, one-sided) (see Appendix 1.G). Effect size is η2 = 0.824, 
which means that 82% of the variance in confidence assessments is due to the difficulty of 
questions. Pairwise comparison revealed that the confidence for easy questions was 
significantly higher than the confidence for medium and hard questions (both: Mann-Whitney U 
= 0.00, p < 0.01, one-sided); however there was no significant difference in the confidence 
levels for the hard and medium questions (Mann-Whitney U = 15.00, p = 1.00, two-sided). 
  
  
Hard Medium Easy 
M SD M SD M SD 
Accuracy 22.35 12.06 52.94 9.49 95.38 7.76 
Confidence 55.75 7.67 53.95 11.67 93.52 8.74 
BS 33.40 19.24 1.01 11.38 -1.86 2.42 
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Overconfidence 
The overconfidence level for the hard questions was the highest (M = 33.40, SD = 19.24), the 
medium difficulty questions produced almost no overconfidence (M = 1.01, SD = 11.38), 
whereas easy questions resulted on average in underconfidence (M = -1.86, SD = 2.42). The 
three difficulty levels of questions differed significantly in terms of the produced bias score 
(Chi-Square (2) = 9.079, p < 0.01, one-sided), size effect η2 = 0.659. Mann-Whitney U 
analysis showed subjects showed significantly higher overconfidence for the hard questions 
than for the medium (Mann-Whitney U = 2.00, p < 0.01) and easy questions (Mann-Whitney 
U = 0.00, p < 0.01), which is in line with the previous research. Overconfidence levels for 
medium and easy questions, on average, were not significantly different from each other 
(Mann-Whitney U = 18.00, p = 0.334, one-sided). The bias score for the hard questions was 
significantly higher than zero (Wilcoxon Signed Rank T = 2.097, p < 0.05, one-sided); for the 
easy and medium difficulty questions the null hypothesis of the equality of the bias score to 
zero cannot be rejected (easy questions: Wilcoxon Signed Rank T = 1.606, p = 0.108, two-
sided; medium questions: Wilcoxon Signed Rank T = 0.00, p = 1.00, two-sided). For this 
group of the participants, easy and medium difficulty questions produced on average the bias 
score which was the most indistinguishable from the perfect calibration score of zero.  
Gender differences 
No significant difference between male and female participants in terms of overconfidence 
was found (t(32) = 0.211, p = 0.834, two-sided; effect size η2 = 0.001) (see Appendix 1.G). 
Although men, on average, were less accurate than women this difference is not significant 
(t(32) = -0.524, p = 0.604, two-sided; effect size η2 = 0.009). The difference in average 
confidence across all items of the test between male and female participants is insignificant 
(t(32) = -0.53, p = 0.600, two-sided; effect size is η2 = 0.009). No significant difference in 
overconfidence is found between male and female subjects for the three levels of question 
difficulty (hard questions: t(32) = 0.042, p = 0.967, two-sided; medium questions: t(32) = -
0.357, p = 0.723, two-sided; easy questions: t(32) = 1.468, p = 0.152, two-sided). Correlation 
between overconfidence and accuracy is strong and significant for both genders (men: 
Pearson’s Correlation (19) = -0.653, p < 0.01, one-sided; women: Pearson’s Correlation (11) 
= -0.883, p < 0.01, one-sided).  
Reliability 
According to DeCoster (2000), a scale can be called reliable (possess internal consistency) “if 
repeated measurements under the same circumstances tend to produce the same results”. A 
common way to estimate reliability of an instrument is to calculate Cronbach’s alpha. Moss et 
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al (1993) state, that a generally acceptable value of coefficient alpha equals 0.6; however the 
more recognized threshold is 0.7. These values of alpha are considered to be optimal for the 
use in social research. For my instrument three values of alpha were estimated: alpha for the 
test confidence equaled 0.79, alpha for the test accuracy – 0.54, and alpha for the bias score – 
0.68. Values of the calculated alphas were either close or exceeded the threshold values. A 
somewhat lower degree of alpha for the accuracy dimension resulted from low variance in 
answering easy questions. Easy questions cannot be removed from the test, in the desire to 
improve its reliability, as a good instrument should not only have a reasonable internal 
consistency (reliability) but also a “meaningful content coverage” (Schmitt, 1996). Based, on 
the calculated values of Cronbach’s alpha, it can be concluded that the developed instrument 
possesses good internal consistency (reliability).  
1.7 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper results of the two experiments, aimed at the development of the instrument (test) 
that would enable the construction of the comprehensive measure of individual 
overconfidence, are presented. Desired instrument, which is to be used in economic 
overconfidence experiments, should allow assessment of the differences between the subjects 
with respect to their degree of overconfidence and minimize the measurement error.  
After carrying out the analysis of some of the instruments used in foregoing experimental 
research, there were good reasons to suspect that overconfidence was previously measured 
inadequately. The principal steps needed to improve the instrument (test) were: 1) choice of 
another test-format (multiple choice discrete propositions’ tasks instead of confidence 
intervals estimation), 2) balancing the test for the hard-easy effect, and 3) controlling for 
gender and country bias. Instrument was obtained in a two-stage procedure in which a pilot 
test was used to assess questions’ difficulty, based on the groups’ accuracy in answering each 
of the initial 50 items. Then six questions of the three difficulty types (hard, medium, and 
easy) were selected for the final test. The second experimental phase was aimed at verification 
of replicability of results, namely of the average degree of group overconfidence, the obtained 
categorization into three difficultly levels and of controlling for the gender bias. Both 
experiments were conducted with the students enrolled into different disciplines of social 
sciences. The two experimental sessions were administered and subjects were offered a 
reward, on the basis of competition in test accuracy. As in previous experimental work, 
subjects on average proved to be overconfident. 
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Evidence was found for the significant effect of the question difficulty on the overconfidence 
measure and for the existence of the gender bias. Hard questions produced significantly 
higher levels of overconfidence than medium-difficulty and easy questions, which in turn 
resulted in underconfidence. Analysis of the groups’ accuracy on answering initial test (test-
50) revealed that even 72 percent of the questions fell in the category of easy questions. Thus, 
by using initial test-50 to measure subjects’ overconfidence, one would artificially create high 
levels of underconfidence in ones subjects. Statistical analysis confirmed that in both 
experimental sessions the three types of questions, that comprised the final test, significantly 
differed from each other in terms of the produced confidence, accuracy and overconfidence. 
This result verified the success of categorization of questions into three levels of difficulty in 
the overconfidence measurement instrument. Average group overconfidence measures on 
test-18, obtained from both experimental sessions, did not differ significantly from each other. 
Instrument’s internal consistency (reliability), assessed as the value of the Cronbach’s alpha, 
was found to be good and acceptable for the use in social research.  
Combining all levels of questions’ difficulty, both genders expressed overconfidence that did 
not differ significantly from each other. It can be concluded, that for the created instrument 
(test-18), gender is not associated with overconfidence: first, there were no significant 
differences between male and female subjects’ bias scores and, second, no significant 
difference in overconfidence was found between male and female subjects for the three levels 
of question difficulty. There was also almost no variance in confidence and accuracy that was 
gender dependent. By contrast, for the initial instrument (test-50) as much as 16 percent of 
variance in accuracy and 7 percent of variance in confidence was explained by gender.  
Based on the analysis of the data obtained from both phases of the instrument construction, 
and in the light of the importance of employment of a reliable measure to assess subjects’ 
overconfidence for the validity of the results of economic experiments, it can be concluded 
that a better instrument was developed for the use in planned experiments, suitable for 
evaluation of individual differences in terms of the degree of overconfidence.  
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APPENDIX 1.A:  
a: Skewness of the accuracy parameters and overconfidence scores per question for the test-50 
 
  Accuracy BS 
N  50 50 
Skewness -1.310 1.855 
Std. err. of skewness 0.337 0.337 
Range 92.00 91.40 
Min 8.00 -22.80 
Max 100.00 68.60 
Percentiles:                    25  63.50 -4.60 
                                      50  84.00 -1.10 
                                      75  94.50 11.60 
 
 
b: Comparison of test-50 and test-18 in terms of overconfidence 
 
  BS50 BS18 
N  50 50 
Mean 4.47 14.11 
SD 7.34 10.63 
Skewness 0.726 0.525 
Std. err. of skewness 0.337 0.337 
Range 38.60 47.23 
Min -10.40 -5.56 
Max 28.20 41.67 
Percentiles:                 25 0.35 7.54 
                50 3.70 11.95 
                75 9.60 20.70 
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APPENDIX 1.B: SCATTERGRAMS OF THE EXPERIENCE MEASURES RELATIONSHIP TO 
OVERCONFIDENCE (a. test-50 and test-18 age vs. bias score, and b. test-50 and test-18 semester 
vs. bias score). 
a.
b.
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APPENDIX 1.C: PEARSON’S TEST (DF. = 48) FOR CORRELATION RESULTS 
   Semester Age 
OVE50 
Correlation Coefficient -0.045 0.148 
Sig. (one-sided) 0.377 0.152 
OVE18 
Correlation Coefficient 0.078 0.194 
Sig. (one-sided) 0.312 0.088 
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APPENDIX 1.D: AGE AND STUDY DURATION INFORMATION OF THE PILOT TEST ON 19.05.2008 
 
 N M SD Min Max 
Age 50 24.32 2.20 20 29 
Male age 25 24.48 2.43 20 29 
Female age 25 24.16 1.97 21 27 
Semester 50 6.98 2.11 3 11 
Male semester 25 7.00 2.27 3 11 
Female semester 25 6.96 1.99 4 11 
 
APPENDIX 1.E: AGE AND STUDY DURATION INFORMATION OF THE PILOT TEST ON 14.06.2008 
 
 N M SD Min Max 
Age 34 26.06 2.62 22 31 
Male age 21 25.95 2.64 22 31 
Female age 13 26.23 2.68 22 30 
Semester 30 9.10 2.60 4 15 
Male semester 20 9.10 2.97 4 15 
Female semester 10 9.10 1.79 6 11 
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APPENDIX 1.F: INFORMATION ON OVERCONFIDENCE AND ACCURACY OF THE PARTICIPANTS OF 
PILOT ON 19.05.2008 
Overconfidence 
Pilot Test 50 
OBS Group Mean SD Mini Max 
50 All 4.48 7.34 -10.40 28.20 
25 Female 5.63 8.47 -8.40 28.20 
25 Male 3.33 5.96 -10.40 13.00 
 
Male vs. female 
diff. 
-2.298 
   
(0.273) 
Pilot Test 18 
OBS Group Mean SD Min Max 
50 All 14.11 10.63 -5.56 41.67 
25 Female 14.12 10.79 -5.56 41.67 
25 Male 14.11 10.70 -3.89 36.11 
 
Male vs. female 
diff. 
-0.007 
   
(0.998) 
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APPENDIX 1.F - CONTINUATION: 
Accuracy 
Pilot Test 50 
OBS Group Mean SD Min Max 
50 All 76.16 6.61 58 90 
25 Female 73.52 6.72 58 84 
25 Male 78.80 5.45 66 90 
  
Male vs. female 
diff. 
5.28 
   
(0.004) 
Pilot Test 18 
OBS Group Mean SD Min Max 
50 All 62.78 9.99 38.89 83.33 
25 Female 61.78 10.43 38.89 77.78 
25 Male 63.78 9.64 44.44 83.33 
 
Male vs. female 
diff. 
2.00 
   
(0.485) 
 
 46 
APPENDIX 1.G: INFORMATION ON OVERCONFIDENCE AND ACCURACY OF THE PARTICIPANTS OF 
PILOT ON 14.06.2008 
Overconfidence 
OBS Group M SD Min Max 
34 All 10.41 9.26 -6.28 30.00 
13 Female 9.98 8.68 -3.44 28.94 
21 Male 10.68 9.81 -6.28 30.00 
  
Male vs. female 
diff. 
0.700 
      
(0.604) 
 
Accuracy 
OBS Group M SD Min Max 
34 All 60.46 9.35 38.89 77.78 
13 Female 61.54 9.48 38.89 77.78 
21 Male 59.79 9.45 38.89 77.78 
  
Male vs. female 
diff.  
-1.750 
      
(0.834) 
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APPENDIX 1.H: TRANSLATION OF TEST-18 
General Knowledge Questionnaire  
Below you will be presented with some general knowledge questions. Imagine that you are 
taking part in a game, like “Trivial Pursuit” or “Who wants to be a Millionaire?”, and you 
have to choose the correct answer from the three given alternatives. A person who answers 
the most questions right will get a 30 EUR prize. The second place will be awarded by the 20 
EUR prize, and the third place by 10 EUR. You will be paid next week! 
1) Please circle ONLY ONE of three given answers. Only one of them is correct.  
2) When you have made your choice and have circled your answer, we would like to 
know how sure/confident you are that your answer is correct. Since there are three 
alternative answers and only one of them is correct you have a 33% chance of giving a 
correct answer. Therefore 33% means that you are guessing and do not know the 
correct answer, and 100% corresponds to absolute certainty. 
You can use any number between 33% and 100% to indicate your confidence that 
your answer is correct.  
Enter your confidence for every answer in the gap in the question after every test item:  
How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
Please answer all questions. Even if you have to guess everything, you could answer 33% 
correct by chance. You are not allowed to consult anyone else, or copy the answers from 
somebody. 
NOTE: Please answer all questions, one after another in order in which they are presented in 
the questionnaire. Guess any answers you do not know. Do not jump around the questions, 
and do not return to already answered questions to change your answers; we are interested in 
your first answer. 
You will be paid the money only if you have filled in the WHOLE questionnaire! Don’t leave 
unanswered questions or unfilled gaps! 
Please ask questions if something is unclear to you. 
Thank you for your patience in completing this questionnaire. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Your personal data will be treated confidentially. 
Surname, Name: ____________________________________________ 
Gender: ___________________________________________________ 
Age:_______________________________________________________ 
Nationality:_________________________________________________ 
Field of Study:_______________________________________________ 
Semester:____________________________________________________ 
 
Would you like to participate in another experiment, in which you can also win money? 
Yes  
E-Mail: _________________________________________________________ 
 
No  
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1. How does one still call an instant camera? (circle one)  
Canon camera   Polaroid camera   Minolta camera  
  
How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
  
2. Where do flounders mostly live? (circle one)  
in coral reef               dug on the ground     in the reed  
  
How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
  
3. What does the rollmops consist of? (circle one)  
herring filet                              pork                          salmon filet 
  
How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
 
4. Which land does the Nobel Prize winner in Literature Gabriel García Márquez 
come from? (circle one)  
Colombia                 Spain    Venezuela  
  
How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
 
5. Which style movement does anacreontics belong to? (circle one)  
Rococo    Romanticism   Realism  
  
How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
 
6. What is a hot chili sauce? (circle one)  
Tabasco               Curacao                 Macao  
 How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
 
7. How many letters does the Russian alphabet consist of? (circle one)  
40  33                  26  
  
How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
 
8. "Tosca" is an opera from ...? (circle one)  
G. Puccini    G. Verdi     A. Vivaldi  
  
How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
 
9. What s the name of the Greek Goddess of wisdom? (circle one)  
Pallas Athena      Nike                  Penelope  
  
How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
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10. Which is the most abundant metal on the Earth? (circle one)  
iron               aluminum    copper  
 How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
 
11. How does one call an unknowing person? (circle one)  
Ignatius   ignorant    ideologue  
 How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
 
12. Who flew for the first time with an airship around the Eiffel Tower? (circle one)  
Santos-Dumont   count Zeppelin    Saint-Exupéry  
 How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
 
13. How is the snow shelter of Eskimos called? (circle one)  
wigwam               igloo                 tipi 
 How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
 
14. Which enterprise does Bill Gates belong to? (circle one)  
Intel                Microsoft     Dell Computers  
 How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
 
15. How is the fasting month in Islam called? (circle one)  
Sharia               Ramadan                Imam  
 How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
 
16. Which language does the concept "Fata Morgana" come from? (circle one)  
Italian                Arabic     Swahili  
 How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
 
 
 
17. How many days does a hen need to incubate an egg? (circle one)  
21 day    14 days     28 days  
 
 How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
 
18. What is ascorbic acid? (circle one)  
apple vinegar               vitamin C               vitamin A  
 
 How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Many different factors are continuously contributing to the changes in stock prices. As a 
consequence stock-prices’ bubbles might occur. Although different definitions of the stock 
price bubble notion exist, one thing is common to all of them: bubbles are deviations from the 
fundamental value of an asset. Fundamental asset value equals the present value of the stream 
of dividends that owner expects to receive, and therefore dividend is the only driving force of 
the asset prices. There exist several problems in determining the fundamental value of an 
asset, namely estimation of dividends on the asset through the time period, determination of 
the terminal asset value and discount rates for calculation of the present value. All these 
components can be controlled in the laboratory asset market. 
A question arises, why people pay for an asset a price that differs from its fundamental value? 
According to Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) overconfidence is the main factor which makes 
people pay higher prices, than the underlying fundamental value of an asset. Overconfidence 
is one of the psychological characteristics, stipulating deviations from rational behavior. The 
concept of overconfidence is based on the large body of evidence from cognitive 
psychological research, which suggests that human-beings overestimate their own knowledge, 
abilities and precision of their personal information. Although the beginning of 
overconfidence research lies in psychological works, the effect of overconfidence on financial 
decision making, functioning of financial markets and economic outcomes is a widely 
researched topic in behavioral economics.  
Most of the theoretical overconfidence papers are based on the initial assumption of traders’ 
overconfidence, which is modelled as overestimation of the precision of private information 
that manifests itself via underestimation of the variance of the private signal that subjects get. 
Theoretical models of overconfidence predict that overconfidence causes excess trading 
volume and excess price volatility, as well it induces occurrence of the speculative price 
bubbles. There are a few empirical and experimental studies designed to test whether 
cognitive bias of overconfidence affects financial decisions, market outcomes and subjects’ 
performance. Market experiments which are the closest in spirit to mine are by Biais, Hilton, 
Mazurier, and Pouget (2005), Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002), Deaves et al. (2009). All 
these experiments analyzed relation between measures of overconfidence and trading 
behaviour, however only Deaves et al. (2009) explore the impact of overconfidence on the 
market-level. Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) run a multi-period experimental market and 
analyze development of overconfidence of the participants in the course of the experiment. 
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Their results indicate that participants of the experiment were well-calibrated in certain 
periods, and under- or overconfident in other periods. Biais et al (2005), use psychological 
questionnaire to measure the degree of overconfidence via interval estimation tasks in a group 
of 245 students. The main conclusion of the authors is that miscalibration does not lead to an 
increase in trading activity. On the contrary, Deaves et al. (2009) in their paper report that 
greater overconfidence leads to higher trading volume. They found no evidence that 
overconfidence and trading activity are gendered.  
My experiment was constructed with the following assumptions in mind. First, previous 
experiments were not aimed at discovering the connection between the phenomenon of 
overconfidence and occurrence of stock-prices’ bubbles. Second, there were no papers that 
previously used the suggested procedure of markets’ formation, based on the participants’ 
inborn level of overconfidence, and have managed directly connect changes in markets’ 
overconfidence to the experimental outcomes. Third, previous experiments provided 
participants by private information with differences in signal quality, which itself creates 
potential for trade; in my experiment all subjects are given the same information. Fourth, to 
measure subjects’ overconfidence I use a specially tailored test, weighted for the inclusion of 
easy, hard and medium difficulty questions, which is also gender-balanced; none of the 
previous experiments makes use of such test. However, unbalanced to hard-easy effect tests 
might artificially create high levels of overconfidence; the same is valid for gender bias. Fifth, 
I use the second construct to measure markets’ overconfidence: a price-prediction task (in 
each period subjects submit their forecast of the next period’s average market price and their 
confidence in this prediction). This design also enables following the evolution of market’s 
overconfidence in the course of experiment. Both pre-experimental test and price prediction 
assignment are financially rewarded. 
In this paper results of the experiment, designed to investigate the role of market overconfidence 
in the occurrence of bubbles in the asset prices and in the emergence of other stylized facts of 
the financial market (excessive trade, excessive price volatility), are reported. Additional 
interest is paid to the examination of the extent to which such relationship exists, i.e. 
determination of the linear relationship between price bubbles and the prevailing degree of 
market overconfidence, measured as the bias score. The design of the experiment follows 
Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) and is extended by a new feature, in which markets are 
constructed on the basis of subjects’ overconfidence, assessed in pre-experimental studies. For 
the participation in the experiment two types of subjects are invited: those who have low bias 
score (rational subjects) and those who have high bias score (overconfident subjects). Of them 
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in the experiment two types of markets are formed: rational and overconfident. When there are 
no asymmetries in information and all traders have identical assets’ and currency endowments, 
and all of them are “homogenous … with statistically rational dividend and price expectations” 
(Gilette et al., 1999) a theory predicts that either no trading should occur or some marginal 
trading at the prices around the fundamental value. I assume that overconfident traders 
overestimate the probability of the occurrence of the maximum dividend value, thus they 
erroneously perceive possible future dividend income and optimistically overestimate the 
probability of existence of other traders (“greater fools”) ready to pay for the asset an even 
higher price. This results in that the participants are taking excessive risk and trade at prices 
above the fundamental asset value. Thus bubbles in the asset’s price occur. These bubbles 
usually burst several periods before the end of the experiment; research on overconfidence 
showed that overconfidence is decreasing with the task repetitiveness. Thus my second focus is 
to investigate changes in markets’ overconfidence towards the end of the game.  
Main findings from my experiment can be summarized as follows. In the ten sessions of this 
experiment, it is observed that, higher market overconfidence is accompanied by the higher 
average market prices and larger deviations of the security prices from fundamental value. 
Prices in rational markets tend to track the fundamental asset value more accurately than the 
prices in the overconfident markets, and are significantly lower than the average 
overconfident prices. Moreover, bubble and burst pattern was observed in the aggregated 
overconfident market, whereas in the rational market no sudden drop of the aggregated 
market price to the fundamental value occurred. Volatility of the prices and trade volume 
proved to be significantly lower in the rational market, as it was hypothesized. 
Overconfidence measure of the first part of the experiment is, in most markets, lower than that 
of the second part and this difference is significant. This finding could serve as an explanation 
why bubbles burst close to the end (or in some cases middle) of the experiment. Analysis of 
the bubble measures revealed that in the markets formed of overconfident subjects bubbles are 
more likely to occur and that they are significantly larger in magnitude than in rational 
markets. Large and significant correlation between bubble measures and measures of 
overconfidence provide additional evidence that overconfidence has significant effect on price 
and trading behavior in experimental asset markets. 
Paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2 a brief overview of the findings of psychological
9
 
and financial literature on overconfidence are given; along analysis of the similar work and 
                                                 
9
 A detailed discussion of the relevant literature is provided in the working paper “Development of the 
overconfidence measurement instrument for the economic experiment”. 
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discussion of the paper’s contributions is presented. In Section 2.3 the research hypotheses are 
listed. In Section 2.4 details of the pre-experimental overconfidence measurement are 
provided. Section 2.5 provides description of experimental design. In Section 2.6 data 
analysis is presented, and, finally Section 2.7 concludes. 
2.2 OVERCONFIDENCE 
2.2.1 OVERCONFIDENCE IN PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 
The beginning of the overconfidence research in finance and economics lies in psychological 
works. In psychological research overconfidence is defined as a prevalent tendency to 
overestimate one’s skills, prospects for success, the probability of positive outcomes or the 
accuracy of one’s knowledge. Phenomenon of overconfidence has been found in many 
different samples of the population, e.g. students (Fischhoff et al.,1977; Koriat et al., 1980, 
Zakay and Glicksohn, 1992), members of the armed forces (Hazard and Peterson, 1973), CIA 
analysts (Cambridge and Shreckengost, 1978), entrepreneurs (Baron, 2000), clinical 
psychologists (Oskamp, 1962), bankers (Staël von Holstein, 1972), executives (Moore, 1977), 
negotiators (Neale and Bazerman, 1990), managers (Russo and Schoemaker,1992), lawyers 
(Wagenaar and Keren, 1986), and civil engineers (Hynes and Vanmarcke, 1976); 
overconfidence is already present in children (see Powel and Bolich, 1993; Allwood, 
Granhag, and Jonsson, 2006). 
Confidence and uncertainty In our life, many decisions are based on beliefs concerning the 
likelihood of uncertain events (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982). These beliefs can be expressed 
in numerical form as subjective probabilities. Subjective probabilities are the probabilities that 
people generate in their own minds to express their uncertainty about the possibility of the 
occurrence of various events or outcomes (Bar-Hillel, 2001). If over the long run, for all 
predictions made with some specific confidence, the actual proportion of correct outcomes 
equals the probability assigned, a person is considered to be well calibrated. Overconfidence, 
or miscalibration, concerns the fact that people overestimate how much they actually know: 
when they are P-percent sure that they have answered the question correctly or predicted (the 
outcome) correctly, they are in fact right on average less that P-percent of the time (Bar-
Hillel, 2001). Optimistic overconfidence is a specific form of overprediction, based on 
overestimation of the probability of events thought to be beneficial to the judge (Griffin and 
Brenner, 2005). Most of the people are not well-calibrated and demonstrate overconfidence. 
Overconfidence can also be defined with respect to subjective confidence intervals (Kirchler 
and Maciejovsky, 2002). The assessor has to state values of the uncertain quantity that are 
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associated with a small number of predetermined fractiles of the distribution. The usual 
finding is that the subjects’ probability distributions are too tight. In the study of Alpert and 
Raiffa (1982) fifty-percent intervals included the true quantity only about 30 percent of the 
time; 98 percent intervals, only 60 percent of the time.  
The degree of overconfidence is connected to the complexity of the task, and is the highest 
with the tasks of high difficulty (e.g. Clarke, 1960; and Pitz, 1974). As tasks get easier, 
overconfidence is reduced (Lichtenstein et al., 1982). Russo and Schoemaker (1992) note that 
being well calibrated is a teachable, learnable skill, which is demonstrated by the example of 
weather forecasters, who significantly improved accuracy of their forecast predictions and 
became one of the best ever calibrated group of subjects. Lichtenstein et al., (1982) conclude 
that continuance, repetitiveness of the task and the fact that, the outcome feedback for weather 
forecasters is well defined and promptly received, have high impact on accuracy of their 
predictions. There are two ways to achieve better subjects’ calibration, which according to 
Lichtenstein et al. (1982) are motivation through reward for their assessment to be more 
precise, and outcome feedback
10
.  
2.2.2 OVERCONFIDENCE IN FINANCIAL RESEARCH AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
Following the psychological research in overconfidence, interest in the consequences of 
economic subjects’ overconfidence on financial decision making, functioning of markets and 
economic outcomes has occurred in behavioral economics. Theoretical models of 
overconfidence predict that overconfidence causes excess trading volume (De Bondt and 
Thaler, 1985; Shiller, 2000; Benos, 1998; Caballé and Sákovics, 2003), and excess price 
volatility (Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003; Benos, 1998, Daniel et al., 1998); it induces 
occurrence of the speculative price bubbles (Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003) and increases 
market depth (Odean, 1999; Kyle and Wang, 1997; Benos, 1998); it makes markets 
underreact to abstract, statistical, and highly relevant information and overreact to salient, but 
less relevant information (Odean, 1998); it makes returns of financial assets predictable 
(Daniel et al., 1998, 2001; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003); overconfidence increases investors’ 
tendency to herd (Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam and Titman, 1994) and makes them choose 
riskier and undiversified portfolios (Odean, 1998, 1999; Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 
1992), overconfident investors trade more aggressively, i.e. their trading activity is too high 
(Odean, 1999; Gervais and Odean, 2001) and their expected utility is reduced (De Long et al., 
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 Moreover, receiving outcome feedback after every assessment is the best condition for successful training 
(Lichtenstein et al., 1982). 
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1991; Odean, 1998). Most of these papers are based on the initial assumption of traders’ 
overconfidence, which is modelled as overestimation of the precision of private information 
that manifests itself via underestimation of the variance of the private signal that subjects get, 
or, in other words, too tight confidence intervals for the value of the risky asset (Glaser and 
Weber, 2007).  
There are a few empirical and experimental studies designed to test the impact of 
overconfidence on financial decisions, market outcomes and subjects’ performance. Some of 
them present only an indirect evidence of such impact, as they measure overconfidence via 
different proxies and it is not always clear who of the subjects and how strong are 
overconfident. For example Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) test the hypothesis of 
interdependence between overconfidence and high trading volume for the USA stock market. 
As a proxy for the degree of overconfidence authors suggest using the high past returns, i.e. 
they argue that after high past returns posterior volume of trade will be higher, as successful 
investment increases the degree of overconfidence. These conclusions are supported by Kim 
and Nofsinger (2003) for the Japanese stock market. Barber and Odean (2001) proxy 
overconfidence by the gender of the trader, i.e. their proposition is that, based on the 
psychological literature, women are less overconfident than men, thus they are going to trade 
less than men. In their study men were actually found to trade more than women.  
A much clearer results are obtained through test-studies, enabling direct observation whether 
an examined person overestimate their knowledge, or underestimate variance of sock returns 
etc. For example, Menkhoff, Schmidt and Brozynski (2006) surveyed 117 fund managers in 
order to detect an impact of experience on overconfidence, risk taking, and herding behavior. 
However, only experiments enable a direct test of the hypothesis that a certain degree of 
overconfidence leads to a specific market outcome, expressed as some of the market 
parameters, e.g. average price, or trade volume. Market experiments which are the closest in 
spirit to mine were conducted by Biais, Hilton, Mazurier, and Pouget (2005), Kirchler and 
Maciejovsky (2002), Deaves et al. (2009). All these experiments analyzed relation between 
measures of overconfidence and trading behaviour.  
Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) run a multi-period experimental market and analyze 
development of overconfidence of the participants in the course of the experiment. 
Miscalibration of subjects was measured before each trading period, via the two price 
prediction tasks: point prediction and interval prediction. Their results indicate that 
participants of the experiment were well-calibrated in certain periods, and under- or 
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overconfident in other periods. They also find that higher degree of overconfidence is 
negatively correlated with the earnings of the participants of the experiment.  
Biais et al (2005), use psychological questionnaire to measure, among other psychological 
traits, the degree of overconfidence via interval estimation tasks in a group of 245 students. 
Several weeks later after the students’ overconfidence was measured they participated in an 
experimental asset market. The main conclusions of the authors are, that although 
miscalibration does not lead to an increase in trading activity it reduces trading performance 
of the subjects, and miscalibrated traders show “excessive confidence in their assessment of 
the value of asset”, which eventually causes mistakes in financial decision making. 
Miscalibration reduces profits for men, whereas has no significant effect on women.  
Deaves et al. (2009), conduct their experiment in order to test premises that overconfidence 
leads to an increase in trading activity, and that gender influences trading activity through 
differences in overconfidence. Compared to the two abovementioned experiments Deaves et 
al. (2009), instead of a multi-period experiment, conduct a battery of 12 single-period markets 
per experimental session and they use an increased up to 20 questions test consisting of the 
interval estimation tasks. To some of their sessions subjects were assigned based on their 
gender, and to some based on the overconfidence measure (OC). The values of OC measure 
used in the experiment of Deaves et al. (2009) show that all their subjects were extremely 
overconfident
11
. The main finding reported in their paper is that greater overconfidence leads 
to higher trading volume and leads to reduced earnings, but there is no evidence that 
overconfidence and trading activity are gendered.  
My experiment was constructed with the following assumptions in mind: 
First of all, most of the previous experiments concentrate on the connection between 
overconfidence and high market trade volume, and none of them was aimed at discovering the 
connection between the phenomenon of overconfidence and the occurrence of the bubbles in 
asset prices.  
Second, there were no papers that previously used suggested procedure of markets formation, 
based on the participants’ inborn level of overconfidence, and have managed directly connect 
changes in traders’ psychological characteristics to the experimental market outcomes. 
Although Deaves et al. (2009), as mentioned above, run several sessions to which subjects 
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 In the experiment of Deaves et al. (Deaves et al. (2004) OC measure is constructed so as to vary in the interval 
[0, 1], where 1 points at extreme overconfidence. A well-calibrated person’s OC score is 0.1, and values below 
point at underconfidence. However none of their subjects comes close to 0.1, the lowest OC being equal to 0.45. 
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were assigned by the degree of overconfidence, the issue of association of overconfidence 
with price-bubble was not in their focus, and therefore not explored. Not to mention, that they 
utilized a different overconfidence measurement methodology, and opted for different market 
structure (a battery of one-period markets per session vs. one multi-period market). 
Third, previous experiments provided participants by private information with differences in 
signal quality, which according to Glaser et al. (2007) already creates a potential for trade
12
. 
E.g. in the experiment of Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) half of the participants had no 
information about the dividend distribution, and the other half had complete information. 
Experimental approach of Biais et al. (2005) relies on the asymmetric information trading 
game, where traders observe different private signals: bullish, bearish, and neutral. Deaves et 
al. (2009), also supply their subjects with different, in terms of quality, signals that depend on 
the results of the pre-experimental test. Moreover they try to manipulate the subjects’ beliefs 
so that they think that their signals are more accurate. I do not create artificial belief in being 
better or possessing a piece of a more qualitative information. Instead all subjects are given 
the same information and I believe that only such approach enables the refinement of the pure 
differences between the two experimental groups.  
Fourth, economic experiments on overconfidence measure the inborn level of subjects’ 
overconfidence via the different tasks and tests, and in previous experiments overconfidence 
might have been caused (to some extent) by other reasons than the imperfection of human 
nature, namely by mistakes in the development of tests/tasks. E.g. findings from the 
psychological research show that overconfidence is the most pronounced for the hard 
questions (few people know the right answer) and the least for the easy (most of the people 
give a correct answer) questions. However, none of the abovementioned papers makes use of 
the balanced to hard-easy effect tests. This could have artificially created high levels of under- 
or overconfidence. For example in the experiment of Deaves et al. (2009) none of the subjects 
gets even close to the perfect calibration measure, and even the best calibrated participants 
exhibit rather high degree of overconfidence
13
. I created the specially tailored test, weighted 
for the inclusion of easy, hard and medium difficulty questions (also accounting for the 
possible gender bias) that was pre-tested and used with students enrolled in different 
disciplines of the social sciences. Compared to some of the authors, my test is expanded to 
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 If investors receive different pieces of private information about the uncertain value of the risky asset, there is 
heterogeneity between investors and thus a potential for trade (Glaser et al, 2003). 
13
 This also raises doubts in the validity of their division of subjects in low and high overconfidence markets.  
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include more questions. Both overconfidence test and price prediction assignment are 
financially rewarded, which increases reliability of the overconfidence measurements.  
And last but not least, I use two constructs to measure subjects’ overconfidence: a general 
knowledge based, and based on the stock-price prediction task. Biais et al. (2003) and Deaves 
et al. (2009) use only general-knowledge tasks, where overconfidence is being estimated via 
the interval estimation tasks. In the experiment of Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) a pre-
experimental overconfidence measurement did not occur, but rather, overconfidence was 
measured in the course of the experiment via the price prediction task. My design makes 
possible not only the evaluation of the students’ pre-experimental degree of overconfidence, 
and based on that, division of students into two different types of market, but also the 
construction of the measure of the change in the markets’ overconfidence from the first half of 
the experiment to the second. This enables more confident inference about the connection 
between the development of overconfidence and the bubble burst.  
2.3 HYPOTHESES 
Investment decisions in the experimental market are based on beliefs concerning the 
likelihood of the two kinds of independent uncertain events: 1) size of dividend at the end of 
the period and 2) probability to resell to the party willing to pay even more. I assume that 
subjective probabilities generated by overconfident traders make them overestimate the 
probability of the occurrence of the maximum dividend value, thus traders erroneously 
perceive possible future dividend income and optimistically overestimate the probability of 
existence of the irrational traders (“greater fools”) ready to pay for the asset an even higher 
price. This results in that the participants are taking excessive risk and trade at prices above 
the fundamental asset value, and are even higher than the maximum possible dividend value. 
Both these reasons create a fertile field for the occurrence of the bubble in the experimental 
asset’s price. Following this discussion the first hypotheses is formulated:  
H1. Trade in the two types of constructed markets will follow such patterns: 
1. Rational market: 
 No trade or trade around the fundamental value (average expected dividends)  
 Investors trade relatively infrequently (low trading volume) 
 Prices are not too volatile relative to fundamentals 
 No bubble-crash pattern observed 
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2. Overconfident (irrational market): 
 Trade at prices around maximum possible dividend value and trade at irrationally 
high prices i.e. exceeding the maximum possible dividend value. 
 Excessive trade volume. 
 Observed bubble and burst pattern  
The second hypothesis is based on the work of Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) and 
findings from psychological literature. Experiments by SSW (1988) showed that bubble/burst 
pattern is persisting scenario in the markets with inexperienced agents. Usually bubbles burst 
several periods before the end of the trading game. Research on overconfidence showed that 
overconfidence is decreasing in experts or with the task repetitiveness (see Sieber, 1974; Pitz, 
1974; Lichtenstein et. al., 1980; Russo and Schoemaker, 1992). Also optimism diminishes with 
experience (Fraser and Green, 2006). Thus a second hypothesis is postulated: 
H2: Reduction in overconfidence causes bubbles’ crash. Overconfidence is reduced with 
experience. 
As mentioned earlier subjects can be trained to be better calibrated by motivating them 
financially to be more precise in their predictions, and by giving them feedback on their 
predictions’ results. These both conditions are fulfilled in the experiment. Thus in the course 
of the trading game participants gain experience in it, and supported by market information 
about the results of their repeated actions turn into being “experts” of the game. Expertise 
should improve calibration of the subjects and bring about changes in their trade patterns (e.g. 
decrease in trading volume and price), causing stock price bubble’s crash. Thus bubble bursts 
as participants turn being better calibrated, and correct their subjective probabilities 
downwards. 
2.4 PRE-EXPERIMENTAL OVERCONFIDENCE MEASUREMENT 
Pre-experimental psychological test sessions were conducted during several lectures on 
economics at the Chriatian-Albrechts University of Kiel. In each of the chosen classes, 
students were announced that they had an opportunity to take part in the short experiment on 
the voluntarily basis, for which a general knowledge quiz had to be filled out. For this activity 
15 minutes were given. Participants of each pre-experimental session competed for the three 
prizes of 30, 20 and 10 EUR, which were awarded to those who answered the most questions 
right. Before the students started with the tests, a planned market experiment was advertised, 
and those subjects who were eager to take part in the economic experiment were encouraged 
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to mark their interest on the tests by ticking the “I’m interested in participation in further 
experiments” option and leaving their contact in the form of an e-mail address.  
The pre-experimental quiz consisted of the 18 general knowledge questions unrelated to 
economics, financial markets or experiments
14
. Every question had three answer alternatives, 
only one of which was right. After answering each question participants had to state how 
confident they were that the answer was right. For this purpose they could use any number in 
the range from 33%, meaning complete uncertainty, to 100% - complete certainty.  
The overconfidence (underconfidence) of each participant was measured as the bias score. 
The bias score of an individual was calculated as the difference between the mean confidence 
level across all questions and the proportion of correct answers: 
bias score = average % confidence – average % correct      (2.1) 
A positive bias score represented overconfidence, and a negative bias score represented 
underconfidence. A bias score of zero indicated accurately calibrated person (neutral person). 
This pre-experimental procedure allowed the author to obtain a large pool of students with 
their estimated bias scores in her database, and to ensure that the two stages of the experiment 
were perceived by the students as two rather non-associated experiments. Based on the pre-
experimental calibration test individuals were divided into two groups – the least and the most 
overconfident, which are further on called correspondingly rational and overconfident 
subjects. Students were addressed through the e-mails according to their overconfidence and 
invited to register for the suggested experimental sessions. All students of a specific type of 
the calibration were approached at the same time and were given several possible experiment 
days for their choice, thus subgroups participating in different experimental sessions differed 
in their average overconfidence within the two main groups (rational and overconfident).  
More than two hundred students showed interest in the forthcoming economic experiment. A 
database of the interested persons included information on 222 students’ name, age, 
nationality, direction of studies, semester and overconfidence score. Potential experimental 
subjects were undergraduate and graduate students of economics, business administration and 
other social science disciplines, aged from 19 to 43 years (M = 22.95, SD = 2.73). Of those 
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 Questions were not connected to economics, as otherwise it could cause biased results if the same 
questionnaire was used with the heterogeneous pool of subjects the experimenter had in her disposition. Deaves 
et al., (2008) also motivate their choice of non-economic questions by the attempt “to avoid giving either group 
of participants a relative advantage because of subject content”. 
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only nine percent were of non-German nationality (19 non-German, and 203 German). 
Consistent with the previous research, subjects in the database on average were prone to 
overconfidence (M = 11.78, SD = 10.58).  
Appendix 2.A presents data on the bias scores of the various (pre-)experimental subgroups: 
all participants who were in the database, all students who participated in the experimental 
sessions (a subsample of those in the database), and their subsamples – men, women, 
participants of rational, and overconfident markets. All groups seemed to be extremely 
overconfident, except for the participants of the rational market. A hypothesis of the equality 
of the average overconfidence of different subgroups was tested against the alternative that 
different subgroups varied by their overconfidence levels. The mean equality hypothesis is 
failed to be rejected for the difference between overconfidence of male versus female subjects 
both in the whole sample of pre-experimental test participants, as well as among all 
experiment participants and overconfident/ rational participants. The bias score of the 
participants of the overconfident markets is significantly higher than of those of the rational 
markets.  
2.5 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
2.5.1 PARTICIPANTS 
A set of ten experimental sessions was conducted at the Christian-Albrechts University of 
Kiel between November and May 2008-2009. For each session six participants were recruited 
from the undergraduate and graduate students in economics, business administration and other 
social science disciplines who had not previously participated in a similar asset market 
experiment
15
. Seventy four people took part in experimental sessions, of them 60 people 
actually traded in the experimental markets. Thirty five males and 25 females, aged 19 to 28 
(M = 22.73, SD = 2.06) participated in the experimental sessions. 87% of the participants 
were of German nationality. Thirty five subjects studied economics, 18 – business 
management, and 7 were students of the other social science disciplines. Approximate time 
required to conduct the experiment was 1 hour and 40 minutes. Subjects earned on average 
390.36 ECU (10.54 EUR) (SD = 197.89) on the asset market (without the reward for the 
forecasting activity). Men earned on average more ECUs than women: women 335 ECU and 
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 Inexperienced subjects were chosen, because Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) found that, when 
participants had little or no previous experience in asset markets the markets exhibited price bubbles and crashes 
rather than tracked the fundamental value.  
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men 447 ECU. This difference is significant (Mann-Whitney Z = -2.646, p < 0.01, one-sided). 
Instructions familiarized participants with the rules of the experimental market. English 
translation of instructions is included in Appendix 2.B. 
2.5.2 EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE AND THE RULES OF THE GAME 
All experimental sessions were conducted in the computer lab. Six players participated in 
each of the experimental asset markets. Subjects could take part in only one experimental 
session and only in that type of the market (rational/overconfident) to which they were 
appointed based on the results of the psychological test. The experiment was programmed 
and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
At the beginning of the typical session students were given time to read the detailed 
instructions and ask the questions. At the end of the time devoted for reading the instructions 
experimenter again repeated the most important information at which students should pay 
attention, to ensure that everyone understood the rules of the game. Two trial periods 
followed, during which students could familiarize themselves with the experimental software, 
and were allowed to ask questions if something was unclear to them. Both prior to the trial 
periods and after them subjects were informed that these periods had no impact on their 
results. 
Experimental design followed the pioneering work of Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) 
with slight changes in the price forecasting task, and was performed as a continuous 
anonymous double auction. Every experimental market consisted of the sequence of 15 
trading periods lasting at most 180 seconds during which each trader could post her bid and 
ask price of the asset unit. Therefore each participant could purchase asset units for their 
inventory by spending an amount of their working capital equal to the purchase price, or sell 
the inventory units and increase their working capital by an amount equal to the unit’s sale 
price. Prior to the start of the experiment each trader was endowed with an equal amount of 
experimental assets and cash: 300 units of experimental currency (ECU) and 3 units of the 
experimental asset. At the end of the trading period, each asset in the inventory of the 
participants paid a dividend with possible values of 0.0, 0.8, 2.8, or 6.0 ECU. Probability of 
each dividend value was 0.25. Thus on average, through many draws subjects could expect a 
2.4 ECU value dividend. Fundamental value of the stock is found according to the formula n 
× 2.4 ECUs, where n stands for the number of periods remaining to the end of the session. 
Thus in round 1, the expected fundamental value from the dividend stream was 15 × 2.4 = 36 
ECUs per each share; in every subsequent period it fell by 2.4 ECUs. 
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As the trading period was over, participants were shown market summary information from 
the past trading periods, and were asked to predict the average market price for the next 
period as well as to state how confident they were that their price forecast was correct. To 
express their confidence subjects could use any value between 0% and 100%, where 0% 
meant complete disbelief that the forecast could be true, and 100% meant complete belief that 
the forecast was correct. Participants were paid for their predictions based on their accuracy. 
Each period subjects were given feedback on their accuracy and their reward for the price 
forecasting task. Point estimation form of price prediction task, e.g. used by SSW (1988), was 
chosen over price interval estimation form due to several reasons. First, overconfidence 
measure obtained through interval estimation in the article by Kirchler and Maciejovsky 
(2002) did not vary in time and remained in the area of overconfidence; however, their point-
estimate measure varied in time and took values from overconfident, to well-calibrated, and 
underconfident. Second, this form of price prediction task enabled comparison between pre-
experimental and post experimental overconfidence measures.  
2.5.3 INCENTIVES 
A typical experiment lasted 1 hour and 40 minutes, and at the end of it subjects were paid in 
cash the amount of money that was based on their final working capital converted at the 
predefined exchange rate to Euros. Final working capital (FWC) equalled:  
FWC = (300 ECU starting capital) + (dividend earnings) + (stock sales revenue) -                             
(stock purchase cost)             (2.2) 
In order to motivate students they were offered an hourly reward, which was comparable to 
what on average an hour of the “student-job” in Germany pays16, thus the asset market offered 
participants on average 7 EUR per hour of the experiment; for the whole experiment 
participants could expect to get on average 11 EUR. 
Reward for the accuracy of predictions was constructed to be an additional income source in 
order to reduce mechanical participation and encourage conscious engagement into this 
activity. The closer the prediction was to the actual average market price, the higher was the 
reward. The reward scheme used in the experiment was similar to the suggested by Haruvy, 
Lahav, and Noussair (2007)
17
:  
                                                 
16
 To author’s knowledge in the job market students could get on average 7 to 8 EUR. 
17
 This incentive scheme instead of a quadratic scoring rule was chosen for the sake of keeping the instructions 
simple (Haruvy et al., 2007). 
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Level of Accuracy Reward 
Within 10% of actual price 3 ECU 
Within 25% of actual price 1 ECU 
Within 50% of actual price 0.5 ECU 
Both monetary reward and the feedback about their predictions’ accuracy were used for 
improving the subjects’ calibration in the price prediction task.  
2.6 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
2.6.1 NUMERICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TWO TYPES OF THE MARKET 
In this section various numerical characteristics of the two types of the market are compared. 
Each session counts as one observation. Totally ten market sessions were conducted: five 
sessions for the overconfident market, and five sessions for the rational market. If not stated 
otherwise, all data for each type of the market are ranked from the lowest to the highest. 
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Figure 2.1: Average trade prices in both types of markets 
I start by the comparison of the average contract prices in the rational and overconfident 
markets. Figure 2.1 demonstrates that on average prices in the overconfident market tend to 
be higher than in the rational market. The average market price for the rational markets was 
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33 ECUs (SD = 9.41
18
) and for the overconfident market 67 ECUs (SD = 16.02
18
). Statistical 
test of the difference between the average prices supports the initial conclusion from the 
visual analysis - average prices in the overconfident market are significantly higher than the 
rational market prices (Mann-Whitney U = 0.0, p < 0.01, one-sided). Now I turn to the 
comparison of the average prices obtained in the experiment to the average intrinsic value of 
the asset (fundamental value) 19.20 ECU. Figure 2.1 indicates that experimental average 
prices exceed the average fundamental value (from now on FV). Wilcoxon Signed Rank test 
supports that prices both in the rational and in the overconfident markets are higher than the 
fundamental value (Wilcoxon T = 1.89, p < 0.05, one-sided), i.e. prices in both types of the 
experimental market are shifted to the right from the fundamental value. 
Evolution of the Average Price 
Figure 2.2 presents the development of the joint average transaction prices for all five rational 
and all five overconfident markets. On the horizontal axis trading periods are indicated; 
vertical axis measures average price of the transaction for that period. Fundamental asset 
value, which is found as the sum of the expected dividends for the periods left till the end of 
the game, is presented alongside.  
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Figure 2.2: Development of the average market price 
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 Here aggregated average price and the standard deviation, which are based on the five average prices for each 
type of the market, are presented.  
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Visual data analysis suggests that prices deviate from the fundamental values in both types of 
the market. However prices in the rational market deviate from the fundamental value to a 
smaller extent than in the overconfident market. Although prices in both types of the market 
stay away from the fundamental value for almost the whole duration of the session, prices in 
the rational market tend to track the fundamental asset value more accurately than prices in 
the overconfident market. It can also be seen that in the aggregated overconfident market the 
bubble and burst pattern is more pronounced than in the aggregated rational market, where no 
sudden drop of the aggregated market price to the fundamental value is observed. 
Volatility  
Prior to the experiment I hypothesized that prices in the rational market would be less volatile 
than in the overconfident market. Figure 2.3 presents price variations in both types of the 
market, measured as standard deviations
19
. Initial analysis suggests that this intuition was 
right. The conducted Mann Whitney U test confirms that variation in prices in the 
overconfident markets is significantly higher than in the rational markets (Mann-Whitney U = 
4, p < 0.05, one-sided). For both types of the market, Wilcoxon Signed Rank test enabled 
rejection of the null hypothesis that the volatility of the prices was not less than the volatility 
of the fundamental value at the significance level of 0.05 (Wilcoxon T = 1.89, p < 0.05, one-
sided) in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the median volatility of rational/ 
overconfident market exceeded the volatility of the fundamental value (SD = 10.73).  
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Figure 2.3: Volatility of asset prices in both types of markets 
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 Based on all prices of that market. 
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Trading Activity 
In this subsection measure of market volume is introduced – average asset turnover rate 
(market turnover). Market turnover is obtained by dividing the number of the asset units 
traded in that market by the total number of the asset units in that market (18 units in our 
case).  
I start by testing if the propositions of the No-Trade Theorem by Milgrom and Stokey (1982) 
applied in the conducted experimental markets. This theorem states that rational agents who 
differ from each other only in terms of information and who have no reason to trade in the 
absence of information will not trade (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982). Even though one type of 
the market was constructed so as to be on average rational and there was no private 
information Figure 2.4 suggests that trading activity in neither market is zero. Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank test of the hypothesis that there was no trading activity in the 
overconfident/rational market is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the trading 
activity is significantly higher than zero (Wilcoxon T = 1.896, p < 0.05, one-sided).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Average trading activity (turnover) in both types of markets  
Trading activity in the rational market is lower than in the overconfident one: average market 
turnover in rational market sessions is 28% (5 units of asset) and 44% (8 units of asset) in 
overconfident. Mann-Whitney U Test was conducted to test if the average asset turnover rate 
in rational markets was the same as in overconfident markets, or whether alternatively market 
turnover in overconfident markets was higher. Trading in overconfident markets is found to 
be significantly higher than in rational markets (Mann-Whitney U = 1.5, p < 0.05, one-sided).  
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Evolution of the joint average market turnover for five experimental sessions of rational 
market and five overconfident markets is shown in Appendix 2.C. It can be observed that the 
joint average market turnover decreased over the trade periods in both types of markets. 
Increase in trading activity in the last period can be attributed to the so-called end-game 
effect
20
. 
2.6.2 OVERCONFIDENCE MEASURE FROM THE FORECASTING TASK 
Bias score (BS) from the price forecasting task was calculated for each session separately, as 
an average from all participants’ forecasts about the next period’s average price and their 
confidence in the answer. The score was calculated based on the “binary” methodology: if the 
average price was equal to the forecast it got a weight of 1, if not – 0. Overconfidence 
measure from the pre-experimental test is strongly correlated with the overconfidence 
measure from the forecasting task (Spearman's rho (8) = 0.65, p < 0.05, one-sided). According 
to Cohen, (1988) this correlation coefficient is considered to be large, thus I assume that both 
constructs measure the same phenomenon. This result also suggests that overconfidence is a 
robust phenomenon in our sample. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1 2 3 4 5
Observation
B
ia
s
 s
c
o
re
 (
fo
re
c
a
s
ti
n
g
)
RAT
OVE
R
 
Figure 2.5: Average overconfidence in both types of markets 
Figure 2.5 indicates that on average the bias score from the price forecasting task was higher 
in the overconfident markets than in the rational ones. On average overconfidence in price 
prediction task differed between the two types of market by 10 units (BS in rational markets 
                                                 
20
 The end-game effect occurs in repeated-round experiments, and is defined as the change in subjects’ behavior 
that is attributed to the end of the experiment rather than being a part of subjects’ behavior during the course of 
the experiment.  
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M = 50.08 (SD = 8.96); in overconfident markets M = 60.31 (SD = 5.02). BS value for the 
overconfident market is significantly higher than the BS for the rational market (Mann-
Whitney U = 4.0, p < 0.05, one-sided). 
Evolution of the Bias Score 
To check if the proposition that overconfidence reduces to the end of the game compared to 
the beginning of the game holds true in the conducted experimental sessions, data on price 
prediction task were divided into two time intervals of seven periods in each, and two 
overconfidence measures for each market were calculated: one score for the first seven 
periods BS(2-8), and the second for the last seven periods BS(9-15). Figure 2.6 demonstrates 
that for most of the markets overconfidence measures calculated from the data on the price 
prediction for the first seven periods are higher than those calculated from the seven last 
periods. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test confirms that BS(2-8) are significantly higher than 
BS(9-15) (Z = -2.429, p < 0.01, one-sided). This finding could serve as an explanation why 
bubbles burst close to the end (or in some cases middle) of the experiment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. 
Figure 2.6: Comparisons of BS(2-8) and BS(9-15): a. rational market; b. overconfident market 
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Relationship between Overconfidence and Market Parameters 
To check if the constructs that are used to measure overconfidence are related to the 
experimental results, analysis of correlation between the market parameters (specifically 
average market prices and the measure of trading activity) and the bias scores found from the 
pre-experimental overconfidence measurement and from the price prediction task is 
conducted. A positive significant linear relationship between the constructs and the average 
market price was found (pre-experimental BS: Spearman’s rho (8) = 0.75, p < 0.01, one-
tailed; forecasting BS: Spearman’s rho (8) = 0.71, p < 0.05, one-tailed). These correlation 
coefficients are considered to be large. It can be concluded that an increase in overconfidence 
is associated with an increase in average prices.  
Linear relationship between the bias scores found from the pre-experimental overconfidence 
measurement and found from price prediction, and average trade volume for the whole 
sample is found to be large (pre-experimental BS: Spearman’s rho (8) = 0.69, p < 0.05, one-
tailed; forecasting BS: Spearman’s rho (8) = 0.58, p < 0.05, one-tailed). This is in line with 
the previous research, which found that the increase in overconfidence was paired with the 
increase in the trading activity, and the decrease in overconfidence was paired with the 
decrease in trading activity.  
2.6.3 FORECASTING PRECISION 
In this section precision of the forecasting activity for the two types of markets is analyzed. I 
start by graphical comparison of the average price predictions to the average market 
transaction prices to see whether any conclusions can be drawn about which type of the 
players (rational or overconfident) was better in forecasting. Figure 2.7 indicates that the 
differences between players’ predictions and actual prices are small for both types of the 
markets, thus no clear conclusion can be drawn.  
To conduct a statistical test of which group provided more accurate forecasts, differences 
between the average forecast and the average transaction prices are taken for the each type of 
the market. Then the hypothesis is tested, that the difference between the average forecast and 
the average market price equals to zero, versus the alternative one that the difference is not 
zero, or more than zero. After conducting the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected for the rational market (Z = 1.079, p = 0.28, two-sided). In the case of the 
overconfident market it is concluded that the forecasts tend to over-predict the real market 
price significantly (Z = 1.89, p < 0.05, one-sided). 
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Figure 2.7: Average forecast and market price: a. rational market; b. overconfident market 
In a following step, a test is run if there is a linear relationship between the price prediction 
and the price. An almost one to one correspondence between the average forecast and the 
average market price is found (Spearman’s Rho (8) = 0.997, p < 0.001, one-tailed), which 
could mean that on average the convergence of beliefs occurred, alongside with the 
“anchoring” of the subjects on their predicted price values while trading in the market in order 
to make more money. 
2.6.4 BUBBLE MEASURES  
From the previous analysis I obtained some evidence, that although prices, volatility and 
turnover in rational markets are significantly lower than in overconfident markets, they are 
still much higher than I have initially hypothesized, and that rational market might also be 
prone to bubbles, but of a smaller magnitude. Thus in this section experimental treatments 
will be analyzed in terms of their effect on the bubble’s size. I use several measures of the 
magnitude of bubbles in laboratory markets that were developed by previous authors (e.g. 
King et al., 1993; Van Boening et al., 1993; Porter and Smith, 1995 as in Noussair and 
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Tucker, 2003; Dufwenberg et al., 2005). These measures are: Haessel-R2, Price Amplitude, 
Normalized Absolute Deviation, Normalized Average Deviation, and Velocity. Table 2.1 
reports the values of the measures by session and treatment. Appendix 2.D presents graphs of 
average market prices and turnover values per period in each of the ten markets. 
The Hassel-R
2
 (Haessel, 1978) measures goodness-of-fit between average market price per 
period and the intrinsic asset value. It determines how well the variation in actual market 
prices (around their mean) is accounted for by the variation in the fundamental value (around 
its mean), or, in other words, the proportion of the variation in market price which can be 
explained by variation in fundamental value. Hassel-R
2
 converges to 1 if trading prices 
converge to fundamental values
21
. It is estimated by the R
2
 associated to the regression of 
market prices on the fundamentals, where fundamental value is seen as an estimator for the 
average market price obtained from some linear model. A comparison of average contract 
prices obtained from the rational market with those obtained from the overconfident one, 
reveals that variation in the average prices in the rational market fit variation in the intrinsic 
value better in most of the sessions. Thus goodness of fit measure is significantly higher in 
rational markets (Mann-Whitney U = 3, p < 0.05, one-sided). 
The Normalized (Average) Price Deviation is calculated by summing up all deviations of 
market contract prices from fundamental value and dividing this sum by the total number of 
stocks in the market (see Equation 3). 
 
TSN
FVP
NPD
q
i tti   1                   (2.3) 
Here, Pit is the price of the ith share in period t, FVt is the fundamental value in period t, q is 
the number of contracts in period t, and TSN is the total number of shares in the market
22
. This 
measure is calculated for each period. Table 2.1 presents average value for each of the markets.  
From the analysis of the NPD it can be determined whether stocks in that period were 
overpriced or underpriced relative to the fundamental value (a value of under- or 
overvaluation per-share). Average market value of the NDP can be treated as an indicator of 
the aggregated average under- or overvaluation per-stock in that market. Figure 2.8 depicts, 
for each of the two types of asset market, normalized price deviations from fundamental value 
per period. Results from rational markets are presented in the upper part of the panel, and 
                                                 
21
 See Dufwenberg et al. (2005) for an explanation why this measure is appropriate to experimental settings with 
known to the subjects last period.  
22
 18 in each of the ten experimental markets. 
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from overconfident markets - in the lower part. From Table 2.1 one can see that prices are on 
average much more overvalued in the overconfident market than in the rational market and 
this difference is significant (Mann Whitney U = 1, p < 0.01, one-sided). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. 
Figure 2.8: Normalized price deviations from FV by trading period and overconfidence level:  
a. rational market, b. overconfident market 
The Normalized Absolute Deviation is similar to the NPD, and is found as the sum, over all 
transactions of that period, of the absolute deviations of the market prices from fundamental 
value, divided by the total number of stocks in the market (see Equation 4). This measure is 
calculated for each of the periods. Table 2.1 presents the average value of NAD for each of 
the markets. 
TSN
FVP
NAD
q
i tit   1       (2.4) 
NAD measures the dispersion of the contract prices around the fundamental value, and high 
values of NAD point out that large number of transactions are being conducted at prices 
above the fundamental value. Figure 2.9 depicts absolute price deviations from fundamental 
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value per period for each of the two types of asset market. Results from rational markets are 
presented in the upper part of the panel, and from overconfident - in the lower part. From the 
Table 2.1 one can say that on average contract prices in the overconfident market differ by 
more experimental units from the fundamental value (22.36 ECU) than in the rational market 
(4.92 ECU), and this difference is significant (Mann Whitney U = 1, p < 0.01, one-sided). 
Since there are not many cases of per-share undervaluation relative to fundamental value, 
there are no considerable differences in the values of NAD and NPD.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. 
Figure 2.9: Normalized absolute price deviations from FV by trading period: a. rational 
market, b. overconfident market  
The Price Amplitude (APL) is the maximum value of the shift of average contract price from 
the fundamental value for an experimental session. It is found as the difference between the 
maximum positive and the maximum negative deviation of the average period price from the 
fundamental value of that period, normalized by the initial fundamental value (see Equation 5). 
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Here, Pt is the average contract price and FVt is the fundamental value in period t. Initial 
fundamental value FV1 = 36 ECU.  
Higher price amplitudes imply greater bubbles, and larger swings in the market price of the 
asset relative to fundamental value, evidence that prices have grown away from their 
fundamental values. From the Table 2.1 one sees that the price amplitudes in the overconfident 
market are on average more than twice higher than the amplitudes in the rational markets, and 
this difference is highly statistically significant (Mann-Whitney U = 1.00, p < 0.01, one-sided).  
Velocity of the Asset is found by dividing the total number of transactions over the 
experimental session by the total number of stocks in the market. This is the measure of how 
many times an asset “turned over” the market. This measure is connected to the volume of 
trade: the higher is the velocity, the higher is the volume of trade, suggesting, according to 
Noussair and Tucker (2006), either heterogeneous expectations or biases in decision making 
prompting trade. From the Table 2.1 one can see that the velocity of stocks in the 
overconfident market is significantly higher than in the rational market: on average each stock 
“turned over” 6.27 times in the overconfident market, and only 4.38 times in the rational 
market. This difference is significant (Mann Whitney U = 1.50, p < 0.05, one-sided).  
Correlation coefficients between bubble measures and measures of overconfidence (pre-
experimental and forecasting bias scores) are large and significant (see Appendix 2.E). This 
provides additional evidence that overconfidence has a significant effect on pricing and trade 
behavior in experimental asset markets. 
Table 2.1: Bubble measures in each session  
Session Treatment Hassel-R2 NPD NAD Amplitude Velocity 
1 OVE 0.581 9.144 9.308 1.69 4.61 
2 OVE 0.535 24.908 24.939 2.25 5.94 
3 OVE 0.414 38.257 38.380 2.87 7.89 
4 OVE 0.288 13.008 13.196 1.32 6.50 
5 OVE 0.877 25.874 25.961 3.33 6.39 
6 RAT 0.906 5.745 6.133 1.09 4.56 
7 RAT 0.571 1.769 3.412 0.67 5.94 
8 RAT 0.944 9.593 9.924 1.67 4.28 
9 RAT 0.805 3.781 4.099 1.15 3.56 
10 RAT 0.942 0.983 1.017 0.30 3.67 
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Comparison to other experiments  
Table 2.2 presents data
23
 from several experiments which had similar structure to mine: in 
which 1) the asset market had duration of 15 periods, and 2) the fundamental value was 
declining each period. In the experiments of Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988), Porter 
and Smith (1995), Van Boening, Williams, and Le Master (1993) bubble and crash pattern in 
prices is widely observed. On the contrary, experimental sessions of Noussair and Tucker 
(2006) yield practically no bubbles. On average values of Normalized Absolute Deviation
24
 
and the Amplitude from the rational treatment are higher than the values from the “no-
bubbles” experiment of Noussar and Tucker (2006) but are much lower than those obtained 
from the other three experiments, thus there is evidence of the smaller deviations from the 
fundamental value in the rational market treatment. However the turnover value is more than 
four times higher than that of Nourssar and Tucker (2006). Measures obtained from the 
overconfident market treatment are consistent with those observed in previous studies of 
markets of this type. 
Table 2.2: Average values of some of the bubble measures from previous studies 
Average values from my experiment NAD Velocity Amplitude 
Overconfident market treatment 2.24 6.27 2.29 
Rational market treatment 0.49 4.40 0.98 
Average values from previous research    
Noussair and Tucker (2006) 0.24 0.99 0.33 
Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) 5.68 4.55 1.24 
Porter and Smith (1995) -- 5.49 1.53 
Van Boening, Williams, and Le Master (1993) 5.12 5.05 4.19 
Results presented in this section demonstrate that although bubbles in the rational markets are 
not completely eliminated, they are less severe in comparison to the bubbles in overconfident 
                                                 
23
 Data on the experiments of Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988), Porter and Smith (1995), Van Boening, 
Williams, and Le Master (1993) are taken from the paper of Noussair and Tucker (2006). 
24
 For the comparison of NAD measure from my experiment to those of the other experiments, it has to be divided by 
10. The reason is that, previous studies used an expected dividend equal to 0.24 ECU is each period; in my 
experiment it is 2.40 ECU. 
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markets: bubble measures calculated for the rational sessions are statistically significantly 
smaller than the ones obtained from the overconfident sessions. Moreover size of the bubble 
measures increases with the increase in market overconfidence. 
2.7 CONCLUSIONS  
In this paper results of the experiment, designed to investigate the role of market 
overconfidence in the occurrence of stock-prices’ bubbles, are reported. The design of the 
experiment follows Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) and is extended by a new feature, 
in which markets are constructed on the basis of subjects’ overconfidence, measured in pre-
experimental studies. In the experiment two types of the markets are conducted: rational and 
overconfident. Empirical evidence presented in this paper refines differences between market 
outcomes in the experimental treatments and suggests the existence of the connection between 
market overconfidence and market outcomes.  
When there are no asymmetries in information and all traders have identical assets’ and 
currency endowments, and all traders are “homogenous … with statistically rational dividend 
and price expectations” (Gilette et al., 1999) a theory predicts that either no trading should 
occur or some marginal trading at the prices around the fundamental value. Findings from my 
experiment contradict this assumption. I find that trading activity in rational markets is 
significantly higher than zero; however it is significantly lower than in the overconfident 
ones. In the ten sessions of this experiment, it is observed that, higher market overconfidence 
is accompanied by the higher average market prices and larger deviations of the security 
prices from fundamental value. Although average prices in both types of markets significantly 
exceed the fundamental value, prices in rational markets tend to track the fundamental asset 
value more accurately than the prices in the overconfident markets, and are significantly 
lower than the average overconfident prices. Moreover, bubble and burst pattern was 
observed in the aggregated overconfident market, whereas in the rational market no sudden 
drop of the aggregated market price to the fundamental value occurred. Volatility of the prices 
and trade volume proved to be significantly lower in the rational market, as it was 
hypothesized. 
Results show that both constructs that were used in the experiment to measure overconfidence 
(pre-experimental and price-forecasting task bias scores) are linearly strongly dependent, thus 
overconfidence is a robust phenomenon in my sample. Also it is taken as a proof that both 
constructs measure the same phenomenon. The strong positive correlation between market 
outcomes (average market price and trade volume) and overconfidence measures draws 
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conclusion, that an increase in market overconfidence is associated with the increase in 
average price and trading activity. The reduction of the aggregated average market price and 
trade volume over the experiment’s periods is observed. Thus hypothesis that overconfidence 
also reduces to the end of the game was tested. For that, based on the data from the first and 
last seven periods, two bias scores for each market were constructed. Overconfidence measure 
of the first part of the experiment is, in most markets, lower than that of the second part and 
this difference is significant. This finding could serve as an explanation why bubbles burst 
close to the end (or in some cases middle) of the experiment. Menkhoff, Schmidt, and 
Brozynski (2006) find similar results of decrease in overconfidence with experience; however 
Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) report that overconfidence increases with the experience.  
Analysis of the five bubble measures (NPD, NAD, Amplitude, Hassel-R2, and Velocity) 
revealed that in the markets formed of overconfident subjects bubbles are more likely to occur 
and that they are significantly larger in magnitude than in rational markets. Large and 
significant correlation between bubble measures and measures of overconfidence provide 
additional evidence that overconfidence has significant effect on price and trading behavior in 
experimental asset markets. Comparison of the selected bubble measures, averaged over five 
rational and overconfident markets, to the measures obtained in other experiments in which 
bubble-crash pattern was observed (e.g. Smith, Suchanek, and Williams, 1988) and the 
experiment of Noussair and Tucker (2006) in which bubbles were practically eliminated, 
suggests that there is evidence of the smaller deviations from the fundamental value in the 
rational market treatment than those observed in previous studies of markets of this type. To 
conclude, the analysis of the bubble measures demonstrates that although bubbles in the 
rational markets are not completely eliminated, they are less severe in comparison to the 
bubbles in overconfident markets. Moreover bubble measures increase with the increase in 
market overconfidence.  
Although results presented in this paper shed some light on the effect of overconfidence on 
the processes in experimental financial markets, further investigation of the topic is desirable. 
A promising direction in research is examination of what proportion of overconfident subjects 
in the market is sufficient to influence price departures from fundamental value. For this 
purpose mixed markets of overconfident and rational subjects should be introduced. It would 
also be interesting to study if the results obtained were not dependent on the other factors, e.g. 
risk aversion (if higher overconfidence is not correlated to higher risk aversion). Finally, one 
could investigate the differences in personal behavior and outcomes on the individual level of 
the two types of players (rational and overconfident).  
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APPENDIX 2.A: BIAS SCORE OF THE VARIOUS (EXPERIMENTAL) SUBGROUPS  
Pre-experimental Test 
OBS Group Mean SD Min Max 
201 All 11.78 10.57 -11.33 43.5 
93 Female 9.62 10.68 -11.33 38.89 
108 Male 13.37 10.28 -10.28 43.50 
 
Male vs. female 
diff. 
3.75                                                        
(0.57) 
-- -- -- 
Experiments 
OBS Group Mean SD Min Max 
60 All 11.20 12.08 -5.89 43.50 
25 Female 9.96 12.45 -5.89 38.89 
35 Male 12.08 11.91 -4.72 43.50 
30 Overconfident 21.33 8.26 10.17 43.50 
30 Rational 1.06 4.03 -5.89 6.78 
 
Male vs. female 
diff. 
2.13                                                 
(0.81) 
-- -- -- 
 
Overconfident vs. 
rational diff. 
20.27                                              
(0.00) 
-- -- -- 
OVE 
market 
Male vs. female 
diff. 
-0.65 
-- -- -- 
(0.64) 
RAT 
market 
Male vs. female 
diff. 
0.68                                                
(0.76) 
-- -- -- 
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APPENDIX 2.B: TRANSLATION OF INSTRUCTIONS 
INSTRUCTIONS 
In this experiment we are going to create a market in which you will trade units of a fictitious 
asset (i.e. “shares” of a “stock”) that earn a dividend over a series of trading periods. The 
instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and make appropriate decisions 
YOU MAY EARN A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF MONEY which will be PAID TO 
YOU IN CASH at the end of the experiment. 
The currency used in the market is called Gulden. All trading and earnings will be in terms of 
Guldens. At the end of experiment, the Guldens that you have accumulated will be converted 
to euros at the exchange rate of 0.27 EUR for each 10 Guldens and you will be paid in euros. 
Note that the more Guldens you earn, the more euros you get! 
Duration of the experiment 
The market will take place over a sequence of 15 trading periods. You may think of each 
trading period as a “business or trading day”. Each trading period has a maximum length of 
180 seconds at which time the market will close for that period. The remaining time left in 
each period will be shown by a clock on your computer screen.  
The market period can be ended before the trading time expires by a UNANIMOUS vote of 
all participants in the market to end trading for that period. This alternative stopping rule 
allows the group as a whole to bypass the usual 180 second stopping rule. Each participant 
can vote by pressing the key labeled VOTE. Pressing VOTE and thus voting to end that 
market period does not eliminate you from participating further in trading for that period; it 
simply says that you are ready to end trading in the current period and move on to the next 
period. 
Initial Endowments of Participants 
Each trader at the beginning of the trading game is endowed by STARTING CAPITAL equal 
to 300 Guldens and 3 units of assets. During the experiment you may purchase or sell assets. 
At the END of each trading period you will receive a DIVIDEND on EACH UNIT asset unit 
in your inventory.  
Dividend Process 
You will not know the exact value of your dividend per unit prior to the end of each trading 
period. At the end of each trading period you will be told the value of your dividend per unit 
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and your dividend earnings (dividend earnings = assets × dividend per unit). They will be 
added to your working capital. 
Your dividends are drawn randomly each period. The possible values of your dividend per 
unit and the associated probability of occurrence are given below:  
dividend 0.0 Gulden 0.8 Gulden 2.8 Gulden 6 Gulden 
probability 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4 
Thus, the average dividend over many draws is 2.4 Gulden (=0.0*1/4+0.8*1/4+2.8*1/4+6*1/4) 
Before each trading period information on potential income from holding your assets till the end 
of the experiment (15
th
 period) is provided to assist you in formulation of your market decisions. 
The following information is given to you: maximum, average and minimum possible dividends 
(the same in each period), and maximum, average and minimum earnings per inventory unit 
over the remaining experiment periods.  
Reward scheme 
Your decisions regarding the purchase and sale of asset units and your end-of-period 
inventory level (dividend earnings = dividend per unit × end-of-period inventory) should rest 
on the fact that at the end of the experiment your cash earnings are based on your final 
working capital which equals: 
(300 Gulden starting capital) + (dividend earnings) + (asset sales revenue) - (asset purchase 
cost). 
At the end of the game your assets have no value! 
The rules of the Experimental Market 
Suppose we open the market for Trading Period 1 and that you wish to enter your bid or offer. 
To enter bid (price at which you wish to buy an asset): type in the price for which you wish to 
buy an asset. Then click the box labeled “ENTER BID”. To enter offer (price at which you wish 
to sell an asset): type in the price at which you wish to sell your asset and then click on the box 
“ENTER OFFER”.  
Notice that bids are going to be ranked in the decreasing order on the right side of the screen, 
and sale offers in the increasing order on the left-hand side of the screen. 
Suppose now, that you wish to accept Seller’s offer and purchase one unit of the asset. To do 
this first click the appealing price, standing in the column named “SALES OFFERS”, and 
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then click the button labeled “ACCEPT OFFER”. If you wish to accept Buyer’s bid click on 
the appealing price, standing in the column “BIDS” and then click the button labeled 
“ACCEPT BID”. Note that after a contract has been made, all bids and offers are erased and a 
new auction begins.  
Upon buying/selling one unit of the commodity the transaction price (sales or purchase) will 
be added to (if you have sold), or subtracted from (if you have bought) your working capital 
immediately, same is valid for the assets’ inventory.  
Your inventory at the end of a trading period is carried over to the beginning of the next 
trading period. At the end of each trading period your working capital will be increased by the 
amount of your dividend earnings (dividend earnings = number of units in your inventory × 
dividend per unit). 
You can buy asset units as long as your working capital is greater than or equal to the purchase 
price. If you attempt to enter a bid or accept a seller’s offer that is greater than your working 
capital, the action will be ignored and you will receive an error message on your display screen. 
You can sell assets as long as your inventory is greater than zero. If you attempt to enter an 
offer or accept a buyer’s bid, when you have no assets in your inventory, the action will be 
ignored and you will receive an error message on your display screen. 
Market Information 
At the end of each trading period you will have the opportunity to see the market price 
summary information from the past trading periods, which will include such information as 
average market contract price, the highest, and the lowest market price, volume traded and 
dividend for that period.  
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Additional Means to Earn 
At the end of each trading period you will be asked to enter a forecast of the average contract 
price in the next trading period. Information on the current period’s mean price will be 
available for your inspection prior to entering a forecast. Information on your forecasting 
accuracy, consisting of the actual price, and your price forecast from the past periods will be 
available to your inspection after entering a forecast.  
You will be paid for your predictions, based on their accuracy. The closer the prediction is to 
the actual average market price, the higher is the reward. Reward scheme for predictions’ 
accuracy:  
Level of Accuracy  Earnings  
+/- 5% from the actual price  3 Gulden 
+/- 12.5% from the of actual price  1 Gulden  
+/- 25% from the actual price  0,5 Gulden  
Your income from “forecasting part” will be converted to euros at the same rate as mentioned 
above and paid to you at the conclusion of the experiment. 
In the gap marked “Confidence level” you have to write how confident you are that your price 
forecast is correct! You can use any number between 0% and 100% to express your 
confidence, that your forecast is correct. Thus 0% means that you completely do not believe 
that your forecast can be true, and 100% means that you are completely sure that your 
Forecast will be correct. 
This is the end of the instructions! 
If you have a question that was not fully answered by the instructions please raise your hand and 
ask the experiment monitor before proceeding. 
BEWARE! YOUR EARNINGS MAY SUFFER IF YOU PROCEED INTO THE 
MARKETPLACE WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING THE INSTRUCTIONS! 
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APPENDIX 2.C: JOINT AVERAGE TURNOVER DEVELOPMENT (a. Rational market,                          
b. Overconfident market) 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Period
T
u
rn
o
v
e
r
 
a. 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Period
T
u
rn
o
v
e
r
 
b. 
 91 
APPENDIX 2.D: DEVELOPMENT OF AVERAGE PRICE AND TRADE VOLUME IN EACH MARKET 
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Overconfident Markets 
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APPENDIX 2.E: SPEARMAN’S RHO CORRELATION COEFFICIENT BETWEEN BIAS SCORES AND 
BUBBLE MEASURES 
* - based on 9 observations 
 BS (pre-experimental) BS (forecasting) 
Hassel R2 
-0.770 
(p<0.05, one-sided) 
-0. 673 
(p<0.05, one-sided) 
NPD 
0. 745 
(p<0.01, one-sided) 
0.636 
(p<0.05, one-sided) 
NAD 
0. 745 
(p<0.01, one-sided) 
0.636 
(p<0.05, one-sided) 
Velocity 
0. 717 
(p<0.01, one-sided) 
0.550
*
 
(p < 0.1, one-sided) 
Amplitude 
0. 661 
(p<0.05, one-sided) 
0.515 
(p<0.1, one-sided) 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
By allowing psychological bias and emotion to affect their investment decisions, investors can 
do serious harm to their wealth (Baker and Nofsinger, 2002). One of such biases, inducing 
deviation from rational economic behavior, is overconfidence. Kahneman and Riepe (1998) 
emphasized the importance of overconfidence in financial decision-making and suggested that, 
combined with optimism, it would make individuals overestimate their knowledge, underestimate 
risks, and exaggerate their ability to control events. Overconfidence in investors can result in 
aggressive trade (e.g. Deaves et al., 2009), portfolio undiversification (e.g. Odean, 1999), pursuit 
of the active portfolio management strategy (e.g. De Bondt and Thaler, 1994) and suboptimal 
performance (e.g. Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2003). Another personality trait, which determines 
individual investment choices and strategy, is the degree of risk aversion. Some authors suggest 
existence of a direct link between overconfidence and risk aversion (see Russo and Shoemaker, 
1992; De Long et al., 1991), namely that greater overconfidence leads to risk underestimation and 
excessive risk-taking by investors e.g. by engagement in aggressive trade or choice of riskier 
portfolios.  
Interest in the topic of economic consequences of investors’ overconfidence (irrationality) 
generated a large body of literature. Scheinkman and Xiong (2004) point out, that an issue 
occupying attention of researchers starting with Friedman (1953) “is whether traders with 
irrational beliefs will lose money trading with rational traders and eventually disappear from the 
market?” Consequently most of the foregoing research was focused on the analysis of the 
“mixed” asset market setting, where both overconfident and rational traders interacted. 
According to a widespread opinion, in such markets rational investors will take advantage of the 
overconfident ones (noise traders) and the former will eventually incur losses and die out (e.g. 
Hirshleifer and Luo, 2001). This proposition is supported by findings from experimental markets 
of this type, which present evidence that overconfident subjects, compared to rational ones, 
engage in more trading and face reductions to their welfare. Several articles, examining the 
effect of overconfidence on variation in subjects’ trading activity and performance in the 
“mixed” market setting, which are the closest in spirit to mine are by Biais, Hilton, Mazurier, 
and Pouget (2005), Glaser and Weber (2007), Deaves, Lüders and Luo (2009), and Kirchler 
and Maciejovsky (2002). Biais et al. (2005), presented empirical evidence of the negative 
association between overconfidence and traders’ performance; yet it had a more significant 
effect on males’ than on females’ performance. Overconfidence did not lead to increase in 
trading activity in their sample. In the study of Glaser and Weber (2007) overconfidence was 
assessed both as miscalibration score and the better than average effect. The former was found 
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to be unrelated to trading volume, however investors who thought that they were above 
average traded more. Linear relationship between portfolio performance, overconfidence, and 
trade frequency was not detected. Results of Deaves et al. (2009) indicated that greater 
overconfidence has lead to increased trading activity and had a negative effect on individual 
trading performance. Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) discovered no significant difference in 
terms of risk attitude between their experimental markets, and concluded that any distinctions 
between experimental outcomes were not risk-attitude dependent.  
My experiment was created with the following assumptions in mind. First, previous studies 
have created at least two sources of exogenous heterogeneity in their experiments by: 1) 
construction of “mixed” markets, consisting of both overconfident and rational traders and by 2) 
asymmetries in the information and/or its quality, which different types of players received from 
the experimenter. Conclusions of these papers were mainly based on the antagonizing principle, 
that one group would take advantage of the other. Second, following the examination of the 
instruments, which were used by previous authors to assess subjects’ overconfidence, there 
were good reasons to suspect that overconfidence was measured inadequately and that these 
instruments did not offer comprehensive measure of individual miscalibration. And last but not 
least, to my best knowledge, there were no other experiments that tried to explore the link 
between individual risk aversion, overconfidence and market outcomes. The only experiment 
that measured both subjects’ overconfidence and risk aversion was by Kirchler and 
Maciejovsky (2002), but they rather focused on the market-level distinctions. My paper will 
differ from the foregoing research in some important fashion. In contrast to the abovementioned 
papers in present experiment subjects, based on their pre-experimental overconfidence scores, 
were assigned to the two types of markets. Individuals with the lowest score formed “rational” 
markets and individuals with the highest score “overconfident” markets. In the course of 
experiment participants have interacted only with subjects of their own “type”. Within each of 
the conducted markets, the degrees of individual overconfidence (slightly) varied. This was 
the only source of subjects’ heterogeneity, as in my experiment participants have differed 
neither in terms of their initial endowments, nor in terms of information quality and access to 
it. Subjects’ overconfidence was assessed through a specially created test, weighted for the 
inclusion of easy, hard and medium difficulty questions, which has also accounted for the 
possible gender and country biases. I have also chosen a different test format which, due to its 
simplicity, was clearer to subjects. None of the previous experiments made use of such test.  
This paper reports the results of experiments designed to investigate the influence of 
behavioral factors, namely the degree of overconfidence and risk aversion, on financial 
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decision making of economic subjects. For this purpose two kinds of experiments were 
conducted. The first one, whose design followed Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) and 
Deaves et al. (2009), was the asset market experiment. The second experiment was aimed at 
individual risk aversion measurement and followed Holt and Laury (2002) and Baker, Laury 
and Williams (2008). Hypotheses, tested in the context of the suggested experimental design, 
were formulated upon the analysis of findings from the previous research in the “mixed” 
market setting. Data, collected in the first part of the experiment from five overconfident and 
five rational markets, enabled investigation of the effect that the degree of overconfidence had 
on individual trading activity and performance. In the second part of experiment, post hoc 
assessment of risk aversion was implemented in a sample of former participants of the asset 
market experiment. These data were used for the determination of the importance of individual 
differences in risk attitude for explanation of trading behavior and outcomes. 
Main findings from my experiment can be summarized as follows. The data analysis 
confirmed the hypothesized positive impact that overconfidence had on individual engagement in 
trading activity; yet, with increase in overconfidence, females have completed more stock 
market transactions than males. Contrary to the formulated hypothesis, data suggest that 
overconfidence had positive effect on gains from trade. As it was expected, individual gains 
were negatively affected by active involvement in trade, and low turnover players have 
significantly outperformed high turnover players. However, with increase in the number of 
market transactions males incurred smaller losses compared to females. It can be concluded 
that in the suggested experimental setting, where the two “types” of subjects were separated from 
each other, performance and trading activity were overconfidence dependent and even small 
variations in miscalibration among players belonging to the same “type” were sufficient to cause 
this effect. At the completion of subsequent risk aversion measurements thirty two former 
participants of the asset market experiment were found to be on average risk averse. Inconsistent 
with the initial proposition that overconfident subjects were more risk loving, tests detected 
no statistical difference between the two types of participants in terms of the average number 
of safe choices. Also no linear relationship between the bias score and risk aversion was detected. 
The presented evidence implied that, risk aversion was not among the factors which had 
significant influence on engagement in trading activity or performance. It can be concluded, that 
in the reduced sample, experimental market outcomes were overconfidence and not risk 
aversion driven. 
Paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 gives an overview of the findings of financial 
overconfidence and risk aversion literature; along analysis of the similar experimental papers 
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and discussion of the paper’s contributions is presented. Section 3.3 lists the research 
hypotheses. Section 3.4 provides the description of experimental procedures of both 
experiments. Sections 3.5 and 3.6 present data analysis of, correspondingly, experimental 
asset market and risk aversion measurement experiment. Finally Section 3.7 concludes.  
3.2 PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS OF TRADING ACTIVITY AND 
PERFORMANCE 
3.2.1 OVERCONFIDENCE 
Interest in the topic of economic consequences of investors’ overconfidence generated a large 
body of literature. According to Fischoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1977) most people hold 
unrealistic positive beliefs about their personal skills and their knowledge. Giardini et al. 
(2008) suggest that constant overestimation of personal talents and abilities, and chances of 
positive outcomes “can have important consequences, and sometimes results in suboptimal 
decisions”. Kahneman and Riepe (1998) point out at the importance of overconfidence for 
financial decision taking, in that, overconfidence combined with optimism, produces 
overestimation of individual knowledge, exaggeration of the ability to control events, and risk 
underestimation. Barber and Odean (2000) indicate that overconfident investors “hold 
unrealistic beliefs about how high their returns will be”. Thus cognitive bias of 
overconfidence creates various distortions in the way traders perceive objective market 
reality, and this can result in trade aggressiveness, portfolio undiversification, risk 
underestimation, pursuit of the active portfolio management strategy, and suboptimal 
performance (decrease in wealth, sales of the wrong assets, etc.).  
Most of the research findings support the proposition that greater overconfidence leads to 
higher trading volume (see e.g. Deaves et al., 2009). Glaser et al (2003) showed that 
overconfident investors traded more aggressively, and the higher the degree of 
overconfidence of a trader was, the higher was her trading volume. Odean (1998) calls this 
outcome “the most robust effect of overconfidence”. Odean (1999) analyzed the trades of 
10,000 individuals with discount brokerage accounts. His results indicate that these investors 
reduced their returns by trading, and thus he concluded that their trading volume was 
excessive. Kourtidis et al., (2010) suggest that overconfidence is the fact that makes investors 
believe that they can predict the winners and thus makes them to engage in excessive trading 
activity and take too much risk. Barber and Odean (2000) analyzed a data set of trading 
activity of the 66,465 households for a period from 1991-1996, and found that the frequency 
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of trading and its cost explained the poor investment performance of the households, and that 
overconfidence was the explanation for the high trading volume of individual investors (and 
the resulting poor results). In a further study Barber and Odean (2001) showed that men, who 
according to their analysis of psychological research findings were more overconfident, 
traded 45% more than women, and that trading reduced their net returns by more percentage 
points per year than for women (2.65 vs. 1.72). 
What concerns the welfare effect of overconfidence, the evidence from research is 
contradictory. Some authors indicate that, in comparison to rational investors, the expected 
utility (De Long et al., 1991; Odean, 1998) and welfare (Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2003; Barber 
and Odean, 2002; Nöth and Weber, 2003) of overconfident traders is reduced. The results of 
Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) indicate that higher degree of overconfidence is negatively 
correlated with earnings of participants in their experiments. Deaves et al. (2009) showed that 
greater overconfidence lead to higher trading volume and earnings’ reduction. Likewise in the 
experiment of Biais et al (2004) miscalibration decreased subjects’ trading performance. 
Overconfidence was also found to have a negative impact on trading performance in the paper 
by Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2003). Barber and Odean (2000) presented evidence, that high 
turnover households underperformed low turnover households, in terms of investment returns, 
by about 7.1% annually. On the contrary, Benos (1998) reported higher earnings of 
overconfident investors. Kyle and Wang (1997) indicated that the expected returns of 
overconfident traders might outperform those of rational traders, and that this could be 
obtained through the aggressive trading. Also, Hirshleifer and Luo (2001) presented evidence 
of higher profits of overconfident traders. The third strand of literature reports no connection 
between overconfidence and individual gains. E.g. Glaser and Weber (2007) detected no 
linear relationship between gross returns (portfolio performance), trade frequency and 
overconfidence. Thus they concluded that underperformance of investors who trade more is 
transaction costs driven. 
De Bondt and Thaler (1994) suggest that overconfidence explains excessive trade of portfolio 
managers, and active portfolio management pursuit by financial economists and pension 
funds. According to Lakonishok et al. (1992) overconfident subjects choose active portfolio 
management. Also, Mullainathan and Thaler (2000) named overconfidence as the factor, 
helping to explain why, even the “most professionally managed portfolios are turned-over 
once a year or more”. They have also noticed that individual investors traded too much, and 
that assets sold by them tended to outperform the new, subsequently acquired, assets. De 
Bondt and Thaler (1994) presented evidence, that irrespective the fact that portfolio managers 
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usually underperformed index funds, most stock portfolios were still managed actively. As 
well, overconfidence makes investors choosing undiversified, thus riskier, portfolios (Odean, 
1998, 1999; Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) argue 
that investors who perceive prospects for the future dividends from the assets as more 
optimistic will “bid up the price of the asset and eventually hold the total supply” of 
inventories. 
Some authors suggest that there is direct link between overconfidence and risk aversion. 
Russo and Shoemaker (1992) note that overconfidence causes risk underestimation and 
encourage traders to take excessive risk. Odean (1998) has shown that investors with a higher 
degree of overconfidence chose in general more risky portfolios than those with a lower 
degree of overconfidence. Evidence presented by Barber and Odean (2001) implied that 
overconfident investors (men) held riskier portfolios. De Long et al. (1991), who examined 
traders that were overconfident in the sense that they underestimated risk, found that as a 
result of risk underestimation, these traders held more of the risky asset. Chuang and Lee 
(2005) presented empirical evidence in the support of the hypothesis that overconfident 
investors traded more in riskier securities, since they underestimated risk. Not only risk 
underestimation contributes to the more aggressive trade by overconfident investors, in 
comparison to rational traders, it is also boosted by the fact that they overestimate the 
expected profit from their trading strategies (Hirshleifer and Luo, 2001).  
3.2.2 RISK AVERSION  
Risk aversion is connected to the desire of individuals to avoid uncertainty. Yet, almost every 
economic decision involves some sort of risk and uncertainty. Thus analysis of individual 
differences in risk attitudes is important in a sense, that understanding these distinctions could 
help in predicting real economic behavior. A commonly used approximation for modeling 
individuals in economic theory is that of the risk neutral economic human. However, 
empirical and experimental studies suggest that most people exhibit risk aversion. In the 
experiment of Holt and Laury (2002) about two-thirds of subjects exhibited risk aversion with 
low payoffs. As payoffs grew, risk aversion tended to increase as well. Binswanger (1980), 
who conducted his experiment with low-income farmers in Bangladesh, showed that most 
farmers were significantly risk averse, and that their risk aversion increased with the increase 
in payoffs. Demographic factors such as age, gender, education, intelligence, etc., serve as 
determinants of individual differences in risk attitudes. 
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A large body of literature addresses the topic of gender differences in risk tolerance. Holt and 
Laury (2002) showed that women were more risk averse in comparison to men in low-payoff 
decisions. Brachinger et al. (1999) and Schmidt and Traub (2002) have presented evidence 
that females often had higher degree of risk and loss aversion than males. Menkhoff et al. 
(2006) found that female fund-managers showed higher degree of risk aversion. According to 
Dohmen et al., (2005) at all ages women are less willing to take risks. There is as well an 
interaction between subject’s gender and marital status. In general, married individuals are 
more risk-averse (Roszkowski, 1998), where married females comprise the least risk tolerant 
group (Yao and Hanna, 2005), and single males - the most risk tolerant; single men are 
followed correspondingly by married males, and single females. Households headed by 
females are less likely to be risk tolerant, compared to households headed by men or married 
couples (Sung and Hanna, 1996). As well, gender has influence on subjects’ investment 
choices, e.g. women would invest more often in risk-free assets (Hariharan et al., 2000). 
Compared to single men, single women tend to hold a smaller part of their wealth in the form 
of risky assets (Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998). However, an increase in knowledge in a 
financial decision making context can “create a near role reversal between men and women in 
attitudes toward uncertainty” (Gysler et al., 2002).  
The level of obtained education is importantly related to subject’s risk attitude. Grable (2000) 
pointed out that increased risk tolerance is associated with greater levels of attained education. 
The results of Sung and Hanna (1996) indicated that risk tolerance in their sample increased 
with the schooling degree, where the lowest predicted risk tolerance (43%) was in a group of 
subjects who did not graduate from high school, and the highest predicted risk tolerance (71%) 
was obtained for those subjects who had a college degree. Better education of parents also has 
an important influence on individual’s risk attitude: individuals whose parents are highly-
educated are more willing to take risk (Dohmen et al., 2005). Educational attainments are to a 
large extent determined by subjects’ cognitive ability. Results, concerning the relationship 
between cognitive ability and risk taking, are rather mixed. Frederick (2006) presented 
evidence, that cognitive ability was positively correlated with willingness to take risk in 
lotteries when outcomes included gains, and negatively – when outcomes included losses. 
Benjamin et al. (2005) suggested that students with lower math scores were less likely to be 
risk neutral. However Dohmen et al., 2007 argued that people with higher cognitive ability 
were significantly more risk loving.  
No definite conclusion regarding the relationship between experience, age and risk attitude 
can be drawn. Some studies suggest that less experienced subjects are willing to take more 
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risk (e.g. Menkhoff et al., 2006) whereas others argue that willingness to take risk increases 
with experience (e.g. Hong et al., 2000; Chevalier and Ellison, 1999). In the article by Hanna 
and Lee (1995) the predicted risk tolerance was approximately the same for all ages under 55. 
However, starting with 55, it decreased with an increase in age. The results of Dohmen et al., 
(2005) indicated that increase in subjects’ age was negatively associated with their 
willingness to take risk. Authors note that “the impact of age implies increased financial 
conservatism in ageing societies” (Dohmen et al., 2005). 
As in the case with overconfidence, there is some empirical evidence that risk attitude affects 
trading behavior. Higher propensity for risk taking manifests itself through an increase in 
trade frequency (Durand et al., 2006). Fellner and Maciejovsky (2007) in their experiment 
explored the relation between market activity and risk attitude. They concluded that higher 
degree of risk aversion was accompanied by lower market activity. As well, attitude to 
financial risk is a significant positive predictor of willingness to invest in stocks (Keller and 
Siergist, 2006). Camacho-Cuena, Requate and Waichman (2009) pointed out that risk attitude 
affected subjects’ performance in the laboratory, where the probability of engagement in 
speculative activity increased with increment in risk tolerance. In general, females engage in 
market activity less actively than males, and also are more risk averse. However, according to 
Fellner and Maciejovsky (2007), one should be cautious in connecting gender differences (in 
terms of market behavior) only to risk aversion diversity. They argue that “second order 
characteristics”, one of which is overconfidence, might influence risk attitude. Also Croson 
and Gneezy (2008) suggested, that differences in risk attitudes may be explained by 
differences in risk perception, where overconfidence can manifest itself via “reduced estimate 
of the riskiness of a given investment”.  
3.2.3 SIMILAR RESEARCH AND VALUE ADDED 
This paper builds on several previous survey and experimental articles, which investigate the 
effect of the degree of overconfidence on variation in subjects’ trading activity and 
performance (earnings), but with some new aspects in experimental design.  
The approach of Biais et al. (2005) relies on the asymmetric information trading game, and 
focuses on determining the link between subjects’ psychological characteristics and their 
earnings. For this purpose, their sample was broken in four quartiles in terms of 
overconfidence degree, and analysis of the average trading activity and profit patterns was 
conducted. Biais et al. (2005) showed that the association between subjects’ miscalibration 
and their performance (trading profits) was negative, and this relation was robust across the 
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samples. Yet the strength of the impact differed, namely overconfidence had more significant 
effect on males’ performance, than on females’. The reported results also indicated that 
overconfidence did not lead to an increase in trading activity neither in the whole sample, nor 
in the male and female sub-samples. 
Glaser and Weber (2007) empirically tested the hypothesis of theoretical models that 
overconfident investors trade more than the rational ones. They correlated overconfidence 
scores of 215 investors, who responded to their on-line questionnaire, with several measures 
of trading volume. In their study overconfidence was assessed both as miscalibration score 
and the better than average effect. Glaser and Weber (2007) discovered that miscalibration 
scores were unrelated to trading volume. Yet investors who thought that they were above 
average traded more. Although only secondary to their main interest, authors have also tested 
for the existence of the linear relationship between gross returns (portfolio performance), 
overconfidence, and trade frequency. No such connection was discovered. Also, there was no 
link between gender and trading volume.  
Experiment of Deaves et al. (2009) was aimed at finding support for the premise that 
overconfidence leads to enhanced trading activity. This hypothesis was tested both at 
individual and market levels by regressing, previously obtained, overconfidence scores on the 
measure of trading activity (assessed as executed trades). In their experiment Deaves et al. 
(2009) conducted a limited amount of sessions where subjects were assigned, based on their 
overconfidence degree, to the two “high overconfidence” and the two “low overconfidence” 
markets. In the remaining four sessions subjects were separated by gender, while roughly 
maintaining average overconfidence within the markets. The reported results indicate that 
greater overconfidence lead to increased trading activity and that overconfidence had a 
negative effect on trading performance (reduced earnings). No connection between 
overconfidence, trading activity and gender was discovered in their sample.  
Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) run a multi-period experimental asset market and 
investigate the development of overconfidence in the course of experiment. Prior to opening 
of the market sessions, subjects’ risk aversion measurement was implemented by the methods 
of certainty equivalents’ assessment and lottery pair’s choice. Overconfidence was measured 
before each trading period, through the two average market trading price forecasting tasks: 
point prediction and interval prediction. Participants of the experiment were found to be well-
calibrated in certain periods, and under- or overconfident in other periods. Higher degree of 
subjects’ overconfidence was negatively correlated with their earnings. Between the 
experimental groups there was no significant difference in terms of risk aversion, thus authors 
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concluded that any distinctions that were observed between the experimental conditions were 
not risk-attitude dependent.  
Based on the analysis of previous research, my experiment was designed with the following 
assumptions in mind:  
First of all, foregoing researchers have created at least two sources of exogenous 
heterogeneity in their experiments by: 1) construction of “mixed” markets, consisting of both 
overconfident and rational traders and by 2) asymmetries in the information and/or its quality, 
which different types of players received from the experimenter. According to Glaser et al. 
(2003), such heterogeneity between investors could have created a potential for trade.  
Overconfident or rational subjects were not the only type of players in the market in most of 
the above-mentioned papers, and their conclusions were mainly based on the antagonizing 
principle, that one group would take advantage of the other. Thus, none of the prior 
experimenters have employed such market construction principle in which miscalibrated and 
well-calibrated subjects were separated from each other. E.g. participants of the study by 
Glaser and Weber (2007) operate in real markets where one cannot control for the differences 
in traders’ endowments, information, or for the trade between overconfident and rational 
traders. Although Deaves et al. (2009) run four sessions to which subjects were assigned, 
based on their degree of overconfidence, for the analysis purposes these data were combined 
with the data obtained from another treatment (four gender-based markets). Not to mention 
that in their experiment different overconfidence measurement methodology and market 
structure were employed. In my experiment subjects were assigned to the overconfident and 
rational markets, based on their miscalibration scores, before the start of the experimental 
sessions, and in the course of experiment they interacted only with subjects of their own type. 
Subjects with the highest score comprised “overconfident” markets, and subjects with the 
lowest score - “rational” markets. 
A second source of exogenous heterogeneity in the previous experiments was created by 
supplying participants with asymmetric pieces of information, which also differed in their 
quality. E.g. in the experiment of Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) half of the participants had 
no information about the dividend distribution, and the other half had complete information. 
Subjects of Biais et al. (2005) received three different types of private signals: bullish, 
bearish, and neutral. Deaves et al. (2009) also supplied their participants with signals of 
different quality. Moreover, they tried to manipulate subjects’ beliefs and make them think 
that their signals were more accurate than these of the other subjects. In my experiment all 
traders were given the same information, and no artificial belief of possessing a better 
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information piece was created. Likewise, my participants did not differ in terms of the initial 
endowments
25
.  
Second, following the examination of the instruments, which were used in prior research to 
assess subjects’ overconfidence, there were good reasons to suspect that overconfidence was 
measured inadequately and that these instruments did not offer comprehensive measure of 
individual miscalibration
26
. Most of the afore-named researchers followed the famous work by 
Russo and Schoemaker (1992) and used confidence interval elicitation tasks to measure 
overconfidence. However, Klayman et al. (1999) argue, that interval estimation tasks are 
prone to produce extreme miscalibration. E.g. in the experiment of Deaves et al. (2009) none 
of the subjects got close to the perfect calibration measure, and even the best calibrated 
participants exhibited quite high levels of overconfidence. Findings from psychological 
research also indicate, that overconfidence is the most pronounced for hard questions (a few 
persons know the right answer), and the least pronounced for the easy questions (the right 
answer is known to many persons). However, questions’ difficulty was not assessed in the 
foregoing research, and the constructed scales were not pre-tested prior to their application for 
experimental measurements. In my experiment, a specially created test, weighted for the 
inclusion of easy, hard and medium difficulty questions, was used to estimate subjects’ 
overconfidence. This instrument has also accounted for the possible gender and country 
biases, and, compared to some authors, included more items. Unlike previous authors, I chose 
another test format, which was not inherently prone to production of extreme overconfidence 
levels and, due to its simplicity, was clearer to subjects – multiple choice discrete 
propositions’ task format. Prior to experimental use, the developed scale was pre-tested with 
students enrolled in different disciplines of social sciences. Overconfidence estimation phase 
was administered and financially rewarded, which increased reliability of the measurements.  
And last but not least, to my best knowledge, there were no other experiments before that 
tried to explore the link between subjects’ risk aversion, overconfidence and experimental 
outcomes. The only experiment that measured both subjects’ overconfidence and risk 
aversion was by Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002). However analysis of the individual 
differences among subjects in terms of risk aversion was not the aim of their research; in 
contrast, they focused on the existing group (market-level) differences. Dependence between 
                                                 
25
 However I cannot completely avoid heterogeneity of subjects as within each of the constructed rational and 
overconfident markets subjects still differ from each other (even slightly) in terms of the bias scores. 
26
 More information about the overconfidence measurement instrument is in the paper “Development of the 
Overconfidence Measurement Instrument for the Economic Experiment”.  
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experimental outcomes, overconfidence and risk aversion was also not in their focus of 
interest.  
3.3 HYPOTHESES 
Hypotheses, to be tested in this article, are built on the analysis of findings from 
overconfidence research in financial markets, and some of them were previously tested in the 
“mixed” market setting, where both types of subjects (overconfident and rational) interacted.  
To begin with, there is plenty of evidence that greater overconfidence leads individuals to 
engage in more trading activity (e.g. Odean, 1998, Deaves et al., 2009) or pursue active 
portfolio management (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). The mentioned findings 
suggest testing of the hypothesis that in my experimental setting the higher degree of subject’s 
overconfidence is also accompanied by more active engagement in trading activity.  
Hypothesis 1: Individual trading activity increases with the increase in overconfidence, 
measured as the bias score. 
Experimental findings from the “mixed” market setting suggest that overconfident traders, 
who engage in trade more actively, incur losses. In other words, they are outperformed by low 
turnover traders (e.g. Barber and Odean, 2000). These results raise a question of whether in 
my experiment, where overconfident and rational traders are separated from each other, 
excessive trading activity still has negative impact on traders’ performance.  
Hypothesis 2: High turnover traders underperform low turnover traders, i.e. there is negative 
relationship between individual gains from trade and trading activity.  
Upon analysis of the foregoing papers, it can be suspected that the final portfolio size is 
positively connected to the degree of overconfidence. E.g. model of Scheinkman and Xiong 
(2003), suggests that investors who perceive prospects for the future dividends from the assets 
as more optimistic will “bid up the price of the asset and eventually hold the total supply” of 
inventories. Likewise, some authors noted that overconfident investors chose undiversified 
portfolios (Odean, 1998, 1999; Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). In this regard, I posit 
the hypothesis that the cognitive bias of overconfidence has positive influence on the asset 
portfolio size at the end of the experiment.  
Hypothesis 3: Increase in the number of assets in trader’s final inventory is accompanied by 
growth of her bias score.  
In the experimental asset markets, where overconfident traders trade against rational traders, 
higher degree of traders’ overconfidence reduces their welfare (e.g. Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 
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2003; Biais et al., 2005; Nöth and Weber, 2003; Kirchler and Maciejovsky 2002). In line with 
these results, it is important to explore whether in the context of suggested experimental 
design, subjects’ market performance deteriorates with the increment in their miscalibration. 
Hypothesis 4: Individual gains from trade decrease with the greater degree of overconfidence.  
Foregoing research presented results, implying existence of the link between overconfidence 
and risk aversion, in the form of risk underestimation (e.g. Ruso and Schoemaker, 1992; 
Kahneman and Riepe, 1998) and increased risk taking by overconfident investors, e.g. by 
riskier portfolios choices (Odean, 1997, 1998; Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). Risk 
loving individuals also engage in trading activity more actively (Durand et al., 2006) and are 
more willing to invest in stocks (Keller and Siergist, 2006). If, on average, participants of the 
experiment had the same degree of risk aversion then, their final holdings of assets would be 
approximately the same (e.g. Lei et al., 2001). However, as dividend value changes in a 
probabilistic manner from period to period, each stock is perceived as some sort of the lottery 
by players. More risk-averse participants, who like uncertainty less, would try to sell their 
assets at the early stages of the experiment. On the contrary, more risk-loving subjects would 
try to acquire as many asset items as possible. Thus, I expect all stocks to be in the inventory 
of the more risk-loving participants at the end of experiment. 
The above discussion gives justification to test three hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5: Overconfident subjects are (more) risk loving, and therefore they make more 
risky choices in the lottery-choice experiment. 
Hypothesis 6: Trading activity is negatively dependent on the degree of risk aversion, thus 
more risk loving subjects engage more in trading activity.  
Hypothesis 7: The number of assets in the subject’s final inventory negatively depends on her 
degree of risk aversion: the more risk-averse a subject is, the fewer assets she has in her final 
portfolio.  
3.4 EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE AND THE RULES OF THE GAME  
This section first briefly describes the experimental procedure of the asset market 
experiment
27
, and then it presents the risk aversion experiment.  
                                                 
27
 For a detailed description of the experimental procedure see the working paper “Overconfidence and Bubbles 
in Experimental Asset Markets”. 
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3.4.1 ASSET MARKET EXPERIMENT 
Data analyzed in this article were obtained from 60 students, enrolled in social sciences at the 
Christian-Albrechts University of Kiel, who participated in the asset market experimental 
sessions that were conducted in the academic year 2008-2009. Totally ten experimental 
sessions were carried out, and six subjects took part in each of them. Thirty five males and 25 
females, aged 19 to 28 (M = 22.73, SD = 2.06) participated in the experimental asset market. 
On average, one session lasted 1 hour and 40 minutes, and subjects have earned 
approximately 390.36 units of experimental currency (ECU)
28
 (SD = 197.89) in the asset 
market (excluding reward for the forecasting activity). Males, on average, gained significantly 
more ECUs than women: 447 ECU vs. 335 ECU (Mann-Whitney Z = -2.646, p < 0.01, one-
sided). Descriptive statistics of the group, including age, semester, the bias score, and profit 
are presented in the Appendix 3.A.  
Prior to conducting the asset market experiment, subjects’ overconfidence was measured in 
the pre-experimental psychological test sessions. For that, students had to fill-in an 18-
questions’ general knowledge quiz ant state how confident they were that their answers were 
correct. Based on the difference between subject’s average accuracy and her confidence, 
individual overconfidence was assessed. The obtained measure is called a bias score, where 
the negative bias score indicated underconfidence, and the positive bias score indicated 
overconfidence; an equal to zero bias score denoted perfect calibration. For the participation 
in the experimental asset markets two types of subjects were invited: those who had the 
lowest bias score (rational subjects) and those who had the highest bias score (overconfident 
subjects). Of them two types of asset markets were constructed: rational and overconfident. 
Thus, in the course of the experiment, subjects interacted only with traders of their own type. 
Yet, within each of the constructed rational and overconfident markets subjects still differ 
from each other (even slightly) in terms of the individual degree of overconfidence. Appendix 
3.B presents characteristics of subjects in the different experimental (sub-) groups in terms of 
their age, duration of studies and the bias score: all participants of the experimental sessions, 
and separately overconfident and rational subjects, and male and female participants. 
Experiment was programmed and conducted in the computer lab with the software z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). Experimental design followed the pioneering work of Smith, Suchanek, 
and Williams (1988). Every experimental market consisted of the sequence of 15 trading 
periods, lasting at maximum 180 seconds, during which each trader could post her bid and ask 
                                                 
28
 10.54 EUR. 
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price of the asset unit. Prior to the start of the experiment each subject was endowed with an 
equal amount of experimental assets and cash: 300 ECU and 3 experimental asset units. At 
the end of the trading period, each asset in participants’ inventory paid a dividend with 
possible values of 0.0, 0.8, 2.8, or 6.0 ECU. Probability of each dividend value was 0.25. An 
average dividend, which subjects could expect through many draws, was 2.4 ECU. 
Fundamental value of the stock can be obtained according to the formula n × 2.4 ECU, where 
n stands for the number of periods remaining to the end of the session. In the first period of 
the experiment fundamental asset value was 36 ECU.  
At the end of each trading period subjects were asked to predict the average market price in 
the next period, as well as to state how confident they were that this forecast was correct. Any 
value between 0% and 100% could be used to express subject’s confidence, where 0% meant 
complete disbelief that the forecast was true, and 100% meant complete certainty that the 
forecast was correct. Participants were awarded for their predictions based on their accuracy: 
the closer the prediction was to the actual average market price, the higher was the reward. 
Gains from the forecasting task were not added to subjects’ working capital, but paid to them 
at the end of the experiment.  
At the termination of the experiment, each participant was paid in cash the amount of money, 
which was based on her final working capital and total gains from the forecasting activity, 
converted at the predefined exchange rate to Euros.  
3.4.2 RISK AVERSION EXPERIMENT 
A set of experimental sessions aimed at assessment of the individual degree of risk aversion 
was conducted at the Christian-Albrechts University of Kiel in January, 2010. For each 
session former participants of the asset market experiment, described in the previous section, 
were recruited. Thirty two subjects took part in the experimental sessions; 16 of them were 
overconfident and 16 rational subjects. Nineteen males and 13 females, whose average age 
was 24.34 years (SD = 1.94) and who on average studied for 5.69 semesters (SD = 2.05), took 
part in the experiment. The duration of one experimental session was approximately 20 
minutes. The part of the sessions was implemented in the computer lab; another part was 
paper-pen based. Computer-based experimental sessions were programmed and conducted 
with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Participants, on average, have earned 5.73 EUR 
(SD = 1.83), including the show-up fee of 2 EUR. Descriptive statistics of subjects in the 
various experimental (sub-)groups in terms of the number of taken safe choices, age, semester 
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and the bias score are presented in Appendix 3.C: for the whole group, and separately for 
rational and overconfident, and male and female subjects.  
Experimental design followed the work of Holt and Laury (2002) and Baker, Laury and 
Williams (2008). Instructions were sent to participants in advance, and subjects were asked to 
read them prior to arriving to the experimental session. At the beginning of the session 
students received a copy of instructions, which they were sent via E-mail. The experimenter 
repeated the most important information concerning the experiment and participants were 
given time to ask questions. Then, either on their computer screen, or on the paper form, 
students were presented with a table of ten paired lotteries - Option A and Option B. Option A 
represented a “safe” choice in comparison to Option B. Safety of the options was assessed on 
the basis of the difference between the low payoff and the high payoff outcomes, where the 
small difference between the two indicated the safe option. The ten decisions had equal 
payoffs, however, moving down the table, the probability of the high-payoff outcome has 
gradually increased in steps of 10%, until it has reached 100% for the tenth decision; 
correspondingly, probability of the low-payoff outcome has gradually decreased in steps of 
10%. Lottery payoffs in the experiment were as in the low-payoff treatment of Holt and Laury 
(2002) multiplied by 1.5. See Table 3.1 for the menu of lottery decisions that were used in the 
experiment, and the difference in their expected payoffs. 
Table 3.1: The ten paired lottery-choice decisions 
Option A Option B 
Difference in    
expected payoffs 
1/10 of 3.00 EUR,   9/10 of 2.40 EUR 1/10 of 5.78 EUR,   9/10 of 0.15 EUR 1.75 EUR 
2/10 of 3.00 EUR,   8/10 of 2.40 EUR 2/10 of 5.78 EUR,   8/10 of 0.15 EUR 1.24 EUR 
3/10 of 3.00 EUR,   7/10 of 2.40 EUR 3/10 of 5.78 EUR,   7/10 of 0.15 EUR 0.74 EUR 
4/10 of 3.00 EUR,   6/10 of 2.40 EUR 4/10 of 5.78 EUR,   6/10 of 0.15 EUR 0.24 EUR 
5/10 of 3.00 EUR,   5/10 of 2.40 EUR 5/10 of 5.78 EUR,   5/10 of 0.15 EUR -0.27 EUR 
6/10 of 3.00 EUR,   4/10 of 2.40 EUR 6/10 of 5.78 EUR,   4/10 of 0.15 EUR -0.77 EUR 
7/10 of 3.00 EUR,   3/10 of 2.40 EUR 7/10 of 5.78 EUR,   3/10 of 0.15 EUR -1.27 EUR 
8/10 of 3.00 EUR,   2/10 of 2.40 EUR 8/10 of 5.78 EUR,   2/10 of 0.15 EUR -1.77 EUR 
9/10 of 3.00 EUR,   1/10 of 2.40 EUR 9/10 of 5.78 EUR,   1/10 of 0.15 EUR -2.28 EUR 
10/10 of 3.00 EUR, 0/10 of 2.40 EUR 10/10 of 5.78 EUR, 0/10 of 0.15 EUR -2.78 EUR 
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Students were asked to make ten decisions and pick one Option for each of the lottery pairs. 
Only one decision was chosen at the end of the experiment to determine participant’s 
earnings. A random number from one to ten was generated for each player individually, either 
through the random number generator in z-Tree program, or by rolling a ten-sided dice. The 
obtained number specified the decision that was used to determine subject’s payment. Prior to 
start of the experiment, students were informed that every number had an equal probability to 
occur, and that they had to think carefully about each of their choices. The outcome of the 
selected lottery was determined by a second random number from one to ten also generated, 
either by the computer program, or by rolling a ten-sided dice. At the conclusion of the 
experiment students were paid their earnings in cash. Additionally, each of them received a 
show up fee of 2 EUR. English translation of instructions is included in Appendix 3.D. 
As in Holt and Laury (2002) and Baker, Laury, and Williams (2008) a total number of safe 
choices taken by subjects was used to assess their risk aversion. Individuals base their choice 
of lotteries on the difference in the expected values of the competing lotteries, and on the 
degree of their own risk aversion. Consequently a risk neutral person, before switching to the 
risky lottery, would make four safe choices; a risk-averse person would make more than four 
choices and a risk loving person would make less than four choices. Table 3.2, based on Holt 
and Laury (2002), classifies degrees of risk aversion, based on the number of taken safe 
choices in the lottery experiment. 
Table 3.2: Risk aversion classification based on the number of safe lottery choices 
Number of safe choices Risk preference classification 
0-1 Highly risk loving 
2 Very risk loving 
3 Risk loving 
4 Risk neutral 
5 Slightly risk averse 
6 Risk averse 
7 Very risk averse 
8 Highly risk averse 
9-10 Stay in bed 
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3.5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
In this section the above-named hypotheses about the consequences of the cognitive bias of 
overconfidence on individual trading behavior and performance are tested. First, univariate 
and bivariate analyses are carried out. Upon it, in order to investigate these questions more 
thoroughly, measures of trading activity and gains from trade are regressed on several 
explanatory variables.  
3.5.1 UNIVARIATE AND BIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
Trading activity  
Compared to other experiments where subjects had different portfolio endowments and 
actively used market-place to balance their portfolios, e.g. SSW (1988), in my experiment 
subjects had equal endowments, thus there was no need for them to use market for portfolios’ 
balancing. Yet the empirical data suggest that average trading activity (MTA), defined as the 
mean of transactions (purchases and sales) conducted by an individual summed over the 
session divided by the number of shares outstanding in that market
29
, was quite high (see 
Appendix 3.A). On average, per session, traders have transacted 0.89 times the outstanding 
stock of shares; trading activity of some subjects equaled several times the stock. To test the 
hypothesis, that overconfident investors trade more, I calculate the correlation coefficient 
between individual average trading activity and overconfidence, expressed as the bias score. 
Results imply that individuals with the higher bias score engage in trading activity more 
actively (Pearson correlation(58) = 0.350, p < 0.01, one-sided; medium correlation). Traders 
in overconfident markets engage in trading activity significantly more often than traders in 
rational markets (Mann-Whitney Z = -2.610, p < 0.01, one-sided). There is no significant 
difference in transactions’ frequency between female and male participants (Mann-Whitney Z 
= -0.105, p = 0.916, two-sided). To further analyze gender dimension in the relationship 
between trading activity and bias score, correlation coefficients were recalculated separately 
for female and male participants. No significant linear relationship between overconfidence 
and trading activity was found for males (Pearson correlation(33) = 0.118, p = 0.249, one-
sided). Yet, for females the correlation coefficient is high and significant (Pearson 
correlation(23) = 0.635, p = 0.000, one-sided), implying that female-participants engage in 
trading activity more lively with increase in their bias score.  
                                                 
29
 18 shares. 
 115 
Now I turn to testing the proposition that high turnover traders are outperformed by low 
turnover traders. Normalized profits of the participants, calculated as individual gains from 
trade scaled by the initial portfolio value (36 ECU × 3 = 106 ECU), and corresponding to 
them average trading activity are presented on Figure 3.1. Data in the graph are arranged in 
the increasing order of trading activity values and are plotted with the linear trend line. The 
trend line implies that increase in trading activity is accompanied by decrease in individual 
gains. Average normalized profits equaled 3.614 times the value of the initial portfolio (SD = 
1.83). In the total mass of individual earnings two values, namely 7.915 and 8.391 (in 
absolute value consequently 854.8 ECU and 906.2 ECU) look rather like exceptions. This 
observation will be taken in account, while conducting statistical tests.  
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Figure 3.1: Normalized profits per participant 
To verify the relationship between trading activity and gains from trade the sample is broken 
in five equal sub-samples ranked in terms of trading activity (quintiles). In Figure 3.2 
distribution of the average total profits from trade across trading activity quintiles is 
presented. One can notice the pattern of reduction in earnings with growth of trading activity 
(with an exception of the fourth quintile). Can the hypothesis that gains are equal in turnover 
quintiles be rejected? The conducted Kruskal-Wallis test cannot reject this hypothesis 
(Kruskal-Wallis(4) = 7.562, p = 0.109, two-sided). However, as mentioned above, there are 
two possible outliers in the sample of individual performance, thus the analysis is repeated 
without these observations. For the reduced sample, proposition of gains’ equality across 
quintiles is rejected (Kruskal-Wallis(4) = 9.351, p = 0.053, two-sided). This result serves as 
weak evidence that gains from trade depend on trading activity. To get more clarity on this 
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issue, correlation coefficient between trading activity and individual earnings is estimated. 
The obtained coefficient is small but significant, implying that increase in trading activity is 
paired with poorer performance (Pearson Correlation(58) = -0.292, p < 0.05, one-sided). If 
analysis is repeated without the two outlier values, strength of the linear relationship increases 
to medium (Pearson Correlation(56) = -0.456, p = 0.00, one-sided), which suggests that 
increase in trading activity is moderately associated with reduction in gains from trade.  
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of individual profits across trading activity quintiles 
As a next step, comparison between earnings in the subgroup, whose trading activity was 
lower than the median value (0.847), and subgroup, whose trading activity was higher than 
the median, was conducted. Although, on average the latter made 15.17% less in terms of 
individual earnings, a statistically significant conclusion that this group profited less from 
trade cannot be drawn (Mann-Whitney Z = -1.271, p = 0.102, one-sided). Yet, when analysis 
is repeated with the reduced sample (without the possible outliers)
30
, results suggest that the 
low trade group outperformed on average the high trade group by 23.12%, and this difference 
is significant (Mann-Whitney Z = -1.438, p < 0.10, one-sided). To explore this issue further, 
individual gains in the lowest and the highest trading activity quartiles were compared (for 
descriptive statistics see Table 3.3(a). The conducted Mann-Whitney test revealed that traders 
in the lowest quartile significantly outperformed traders in the highest quartile (Z = -1.555, p 
< 0.10, one-sided) and gained on average 38% more ECUs at the end of the experiment. 
Without the outliers this difference is even higher – 55.7% (Mann-Whitney Z = -2.095, p < 
                                                 
30
 Median equals 0.819. 
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0.05, one-sided; see Table 3.3(b). This is in line with the results of Barber and Odean (2000) 
who showed that high turnover households were outperformed by low turnover households.  
Table 3.3: Profit and trading activity in the lowest and highest trading activity quartiles  
a: The whole sample  
  1
st
 quartile 4
th
 quartile 
 Profit Trade Profit Trade 
Mean 442.69 0.363 321.13 1.515 
Median 456.6 0.389 286.6 1.389 
SD 145.73 0.129 260.5 0.347 
Min. 42.4 0.14 4.2 1.22 
Max. 726 0.56 906.2 2.25 
N 15 15 15 15 
b: Sample without outliers 
  1
st
 quartile 4
th
 quartile 
 Profit Trade Profit Trade 
Mean 442.69 0.363 284.33 1.48 
Median 456.6 0.389 286.6 1.333 
SD 145.73 0.129 205.02 0.354 
Min. 42.4 0.14 4.2 1.17 
Max. 726 0.56 612.6 2.25 
N 15 15 15 15 
Gains from Trade  
This subsection is devoted to the analysis of traders’ performance in the experimental asset 
market. Subject’s performance is assessed as her relative profit, which is calculated based on 
Hirota and Sunder (2007), as individual gains from trade (in ECUs) divided by the 
fundamental value of the initial portfolio of 3 stocks (36 ECU × 3 = 106 ECU) minus the 
cross-sectional average of this ratio. Figure 3.3 shows the cross-sectional distribution of 
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players’ relative profits in the two types of experimental market. The value of each marker 
represents one trader’s relative profit. Standard deviation of individual earnings from the 
mean value (0) in the overconfident market sessions is 2.32 and in the rational market 
sessions – 1.19. Empirical evidence suggests that overconfident sessions were characterized 
by the larger dispersion of gains from trade, compared to the rational sessions. The conducted 
Siegel-Tukey test confirmed that difference in profits’ variation within the two groups was 
statistically significant (Siegel-Tukey = 2.329, p < 0.05, two-sided).  
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Figure 3.3: The cross-sectional distribution of relative profits by treatment 
In the experiment by SSW (1988) better forecasters have also enjoyed higher gains from trade 
in the experimental market. To determine the relationship between accuracy of average price 
prediction and individual earnings and its’ direction in my experiment several statistical tests 
are performed. Forecasting precision is expressed as the Total Absolute Error (TAE) of 
prediction and/ or the Average Absolute Error (MAE) (see Appendix 3.A for sample values of 
MAE and TAE):  
Total Absolute Error (TAE)i = |Sum (Pt - Fit)| = |Sum (Pt) – Sum (Fit)|   (3.1) 
Average Absolute Error (MAE)i = Sum |(Pt - Fit)|/15    (3.2) 
Here, Fit is the forecast of subject i for the period t, and Pt is the observed average price in 
period t.  
The calculated correlation coefficient between forecasting precision and relative profits 
detected moderate and significant negative correlation (MAE: Pearson Correlation (58)= -
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0.360, p<0.01, one-sided; TAE: Pearson Correlation(58)= -0.365, p<0.01, one-sided). This is 
in line with previous research which suggests that increase in price prediction precision is 
paired with higher gains from trade in the experimental asset markets. I continue by 
comparing traders’ accuracy in both of the groups. Subjects in the rational group committed 
significantly less errors, measured both as MAE and TAE (MAE: Mann-Whitney Z = -3.512, 
p < 0.00, one-sided; TAE: Mann-Whitney Z = -2.610, p < 0.01, one-sided). Linear 
relationship between overconfidence and average absolute error (MAE) is moderate and 
significant (Pearson Correlation(58) = 0.350, p < 0.01, one-sided), and between 
overconfidence and total absolute error (TAE) is small but significant (Pearson 
Correlation(58) = 0.225, p < 0.05, one-sided). Thus, it can be concluded that increase in the 
degree of overconfidence is accompanied by (moderate) reduction in accuracy of prediction.  
Another factor that had negative impact on earnings was the number of assets in participants’ 
inventory at the end of experiment. Namely there was a weak tendency for subjects with more 
assets in their final portfolios to have lower gains. Correlation between the final asset-
holdings and relative profit is small but significant (Pearson Correlation(58) = -0.225, p < 
0.05, one-sided). An interesting fact is that, although female subjects had fewer assets in their 
inventories at the end of experiment (see below), their gains from trade were significantly 
lower than gains of male subjects (Mann-Whitney Z = -2.646, p < 0.01, one-sided). 
To test the proposition of Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) that more overconfident investors 
would hold most of the assets at the end of experiment, I first estimate the correlation between 
individual bias scores and the number of assets in players’ final inventory. The correlation 
coefficient is almost equal to zero and insignificant (Pearson Correlation (28) = -0.031, p = 
0.407, two-sided), thus providing no evidence of linear relationship between overconfidence 
and final portfolio size. The same is true for the rational and overconfident markets separately 
(overconfident: Pearson Correlation (28) = -0.097, p = 0.306, one-sided; rational: Pearson 
Correlation (28) = 0.028, p = 0.442, one-sided). To test for the differences in dispersion 
(scale) between end inventories of the two types of traders, a Siegel-Tuckey variance test was 
conducted, which revealed that rational and overconfident traders did not differ in terms of 
final portfolios’ variance (Siegel-Tukey = 0.531, p = 0.595, two-sided). See Appendix 3.E for 
distribution of the number of assets in the final inventories of all traders (a.), overconfident 
traders (b.), and rational traders (c.). There was significant difference in the final portfolio size 
of male and female players, where the latter had significantly less assets than the former at the 
end of experiment (Mann-Whitney Z = -3.121, p < 0.01, one-sided). No linear relationship 
between asset-holdings and the bias scores in none of the groups was detected (women: 
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Pearson Correlation(23) = 0.105, p = 0.309, one-sided; men: Pearson Correlation(33) = -
0.126, p = 0.235, one-sided).  
3.5.2 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
Trading activity 
This subsection presents results of cross-sectional regressions estimating the relationship 
between average trading activity of an individual (MTA) per experiment and several 
explanatory variables that might affect efficiency of financial decision making: the 
normalized bias score
31
 (NBS), gender dummy (this variable takes value 1 if subject is male), 
an interaction term between the bias score and gender (NBS*Gender), subject’s experience 
expressed as age (Age) or duration of studies in semesters (Semester), and price forecasting 
precision measured as average absolute error (MAE) or total absolute error (TAE). In 
parenthesis error terms are shown. Equations 8 and 9, instead of average trading activity use 
the measure of total trading activity. All specifications of equations (see Table 3.4) confirm 
the proposition that overconfidence has explanatory power for trading activity
32
. 
To detect which variables significantly affect the number of average stock market transactions 
per person in my experiment, I start with the simplest model specification in which average 
trading activity (MTA) is regressed on the individual degree of overconfidence, measured as 
the normalized bias score (NBS). Subsequently a range of alternative specifications are 
estimated by adding other regressors to the model. From Equation 1 it can be seen that, as 
predicted, NBS has significant positive influence on trading activity: a one standard deviation 
increase in the bias score raises trading activity by 0.35 standard deviations
33
 (p < 0.05, two-
sided).  
                                                 
31
 A sample of bias scores of the participants is normalized on an interval [0,1], where one stands for the most 
overconfident person. 
32
 Equations 10 and 11 are discussed later in the section on “Risk Aversion Analysis: Experimental Results”. 
33
 In all specifications, one of the key variables of our interest, namely the normalized bias score, is measured on 
a scale that is not easy to interpret. Thus to assess the effect that independent variables had on a dependent 
variable standardized βstd coefficients were calculated, which allowed expressing this effect not in terms of the 
original units of the variables, but in standard deviation units, i.e. to see how the dependent variable changed, if 
the independent variable grew by one standard deviation. Standardized beta coefficients were obtained by 
multiplying the original beta coefficient by the ratio of the sample standard deviation of the corresponding 
independent variable to the sample standard deviation of the dependent variable:  
 
jyjstd 
ˆˆˆˆ         for j = 1, …, k. 
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Table 3.4: Trading activity (all errors are heteroskedasticity corrected) 
 
**** 0.001;  *** 0.01;  ** 0.05;  * 0.1.      
a
 one-sided test.
 1 2 3 4 5 6 6a 7 8 9 10 11 
C 
0.660
****
 0.693
****
 0.499
****
 1.340
**
 0.734
****
 1.220
*
 1.301 1.302 1.318
****
 2.431
*
 1.815
**
 2.111
**
 
(0.085) (0.086) (0.102) (0.623) (0.117) (0.618) (0.618) (0.637) (0.171) (1.239) (0.869) (0.836) 
NBS 
0.669
**
 0.680
**
 1.286
***
 1.237
***
 1.149
***
 0.994
**
 1.052
***
 1.167
***
 1.339
**
 1.985
**
 0.859
*
 0.854
*
 
(0.266) (0.268) (0.370) (0.377) (0.371) (0.384) (0.385) (0.364) (0.530) (0.768) (0.774) (0.757) 
Gender 
 -0.063 0.301
*
 0.253
*, a
 0.253
*, a
 0.317
**, a 
0.268
**, a
 0.279
*
  0.635
**, a
 0.470 0.446 
 (0.119) (0.158) (0.160) (0.157) (0.163) (0.154) (0.160)  (0.326) (0.269) (0.243) 
NBS*Gender 
  -1.074
**
 -0.996
**
 -0.998
**
 -0.939
**, a
 -0.956
**
 -1.008
**
  -1.871
**, a
 -1.307
*, a
 -1.329
*, a
 
  (0.460) (0.481) (0.475) (0.476) (0.475) (0.480)  (0.950) (0.878) (0.857) 
Age 
   -0.036
*, a
  -0.040
*, a
 -0.041
*
 -0.038
*, a
  -0.081
*, a
 -0.060
**, a
 -0.067
**
 
   (0.026)  (0.025) (0.026) (0.027)  (0.050) (0.033) (0.029) 
Semester 
    -0.046
**
          
    (0.019)          
MAE 
     0.036
**
 0.027
**, a
   0.072
**
 0.040
**
   
     (0.015) (0.012)   (0.031) (0.017)   
TAE 
       0.002
*, a
     0.004
**
 
       (0.001)     (0.002) 
Safe choices           
-0.023 
(0.026) 
-0.033 
(0.026) 
N 60 60 60 60 54 60 59 60 60 60 32 32 
adj. R2 0.11 0.10 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.25 0.19 0.11 0.23 0.15 0.23 
SERegr 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.43 0.41 0.38 0.42 0.88 0.82 0.40 0.38 
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In Equation 2 it is also controlled for the role of traders’ gender on variation in trading 
activity, and it is detected that gender has no significant influence on trading activity. Impact 
of overconfidence remains significant and positive: a one standard deviation increase in NBS 
raises trading activity by 0.356 standard deviations (p < 0.05, two-sided).  
In Equation 3, an interaction term between overconfidence and gender is added; this increases 
the explained variation in trading activity. The regression results imply that, the strength of 
the impact of overconfidence on trade intensity varies across genders, i.e. with increase in 
overconfidence the rate of increment in trading activity is lower for males, than for females. 
For every unit increase in overconfidence when gender dummy is equal to one (i.e. a trader is 
a man) trading activity grows by only 0.212 units, whereas for a female subject this increase 
equals to 1.286 units (interaction term is significant at 5%, two-sided). This contradicts the 
result of Barber and Odean (2001) that men traded more than women. Yet, Deaves et al. 
(2009) found no interaction between gender and overconfidence in their sample. They noted 
that, after controlling for overconfidence, there was no difference in trading activity between 
genders. Also in the paper of Glaser and Weber (2007) gender was not significantly related to 
the trading volume measures. 
In addition to previous regressors, in Equation 4 it is tested for the explanatory power of 
subjects’ experience, namely age, for trading activity. Results indicate that a one standard 
deviation increment in age decreases trading activity by -0.162 standard deviations (p < 0.1, 
one-sided). Overconfidence and gender interaction term is significant at 5% level (two-sided) 
and for every unit increase in NBS for male subjects there is growth in trading activity of 0.241 
units; in contrast, for female subjects increase of 1.237 units in trading activity is observed. 
In Equation 5, I control for another subjects’ experience proxy, such as duration of studies in 
semesters. Negative impact of subjects’ experience on the number of average market 
transactions persists: a one standard deviation increase in semester variable decreases trading 
activity by -0.207 standard deviations (p < 0.05, two-sided). Interaction term between gender 
and overconfidence is negative and significant at 5% level (two-sided), and for every unit 
increase in NBS for male subjects there is growth in trading activity of 0.150 units; in 
contrast, for female subjects increase of 1.340 units in trading activity is observed. 
To test if forecasting errors boost trading activity, in Equation 6 it is controlled for individual 
average absolute error (MAE) in forecasting. Analysis reveals that the more an individual is 
mistaken about future asset prices, the more actively she engages in trading activity: a one 
standard deviation increase in MAE raises trading activity by 0.291 standard deviations (p < 
0.05, two-sided). Other significant control variables are interaction term between participants’ 
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overconfidence and gender, and age: a one standard deviation increment in age reduces 
trading activity by -0.184 standard deviations (p < 0.1, one-sided); interaction term is negative 
and significant at 5% level (one-sided), and for every unit increase in NBS for male subjects 
there is growth in trading activity of 0.055 units; in contrast, for female subjects increase of 
0.994 units in trading activity is observed. 
After analysis of the residuals, one possible outlier was detected and, after exclusion of it, the 
regression was re-run. Equation 6a indicates that increase in forecasting error by one standard 
deviation increases trading activity by 0.231 standard deviations (p < 0.1, one-sided). Increase 
in age by one standard deviation reduces trading activity by -0.201 standard deviations (p < 
0.1, two-sided). Interaction term between gender and overconfidence is negative and 
significant at 5% level (two-sided), and for every unit increase in NBS for male subjects there 
is growth in trading activity of 0.095 units; in contrast, for female subjects increase of 1.052 
units in trading activity is observed. Exclusion of the outlier resulted in increase in the 
explained variation in trading activity and reduction of the regression error, implying that 
model without the outlier better represents the data.  
In Equation 7 forecasting imprecision is assessed as total absolute error (TAE). The goodness 
of fit of the regression model deteriorates and regression error increases; the direction of the 
relationship between the variables remains as in Equation 6: a one standard deviation 
increment in age reduces trading activity by -0.173 standard deviations (p < 0.1, one-sided); a 
one standard deviation increase in forecasting error, measured as TAE, raises trading activity 
by 0.168 standard deviations (p < 0.1, one-sided); interaction term is negative and significant 
at 5% (two-sided), and for every unit increase in NBS for male subjects there is growth in 
trading activity of 0.159 units; in contrast, for female subjects increase of 1.167 units in 
trading activity is observed. 
In Equations 8 and 9 instead of average trading activity another dependent variable namely 
total trading activity (TTA) is used. Total trading activity is defined as the sum of all trade 
contracts (purchases and sales) per fifteen periods divided by the number of shares 
outstanding in that market (i.e. 18 shares in each of the markets). Replacement of the 
dependent variable does not bring about any substantial changes in relationships between 
regressors and the dependent variable. The goodness of fit of the models does not improve, 
yet the error term doubles.  
Results, presented in Table 3.4, lead to the following conclusions 1) subject’s experience has 
a significant negative effect on her engagement in trading activity, 2) impact of 
overconfidence on trade is positive, however, holding all other factors constant, with increase 
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in overconfidence men engage in stock market transactions less than women, 3) forecasting 
errors, that induce false future price expectations, force subjects to involve in trading activity 
more actively. Modest success in explaining variation in trading activity in the sample by 
means of selected models suggests that other unobserved factors that were not included in the 
regression, also have impact on the average number of market transactions by an individual 
participant. I will come back to this issue in the section on risk aversion analysis, where the 
regression model is re-estimated for a sample of participants whose risk aversion measures 
was obtained.  
Gains from Trade 
Many theoretical and empirical works predict reduction in welfare, which is faced by 
overconfident traders. In this subsection I describe the results of the cross-sectional 
regressions, estimating the relationship between subjects’ performance, assessed as relative 
profit, and several explanatory variables: the normalized bias score (NBS), gender dummy 
(this variable takes value 1 if subject is male), average trading activity (Trading activity), an 
interaction term between gender and trading activity (Gender*Trading activity), price 
forecasting precision measured as average absolute forecasting error (MAE) or total absolute 
forecasting error (TAE), subject’s experience expressed as age (Age) or duration of studies in 
semesters (Semester), and the number of assets in the final inventory (End assets). In 
parenthesis the error terms are shown. For the specifications of the estimated models see 
Table 3.5.  
I start again with the simplest model specification and, by adding other regressors to the 
model, test which variables significantly affect relative profit from trade of participants in my 
experiment. In Equation 1 it is tested for the influence of subject’s degree of overconfidence 
and gender on gains from trade. The normalized bias score has no significant effect on 
performance, while gender has significant impact on individual profit: male students enjoy 
higher earnings in comparison to their female counterparts (p < 0.01, two-sided).  
In addition to previous regressors in Equation 2 it is controlled for the impact of active trade 
engagement on variations in relative profit. From the results, one can see that this influence is 
negative and significant: a one standard deviation increase in trading activity reduces 
performance by -0.325 standard deviations (p < 0.05, two-sided). The effect of 
overconfidence on gains from trade is positive, yet insignificant. Males have earned 
significantly more ECUs compared to females (p < 0.01, two-sided).  
To analyze, whether strength of the effect that active trade engagement has on performance 
varies across female and male participants, an interaction term between gender and trading 
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activity is introduced in Equation 3. Adding this regressor increases the explained variation in 
relative profits. Results indicate that with increase in the average number of market 
transactions, the rate of decrease in gains varies across genders, and is lower for male 
subjects. For every unit increase in trading activity for male traders there is reduction in 
earnings by -0.206 units, whereas for female traders earnings decrease by -2.655 units 
(interaction term is significant at 5%, two-sided). Overconfidence is a factor that has 
significant positive effect on earnings: for a one standard deviation increase in NBS there is 
growth in relative profit by 0.210 standard deviations (p < 0.1, one-sided).  
In Equation 4, impact of forecasting errors on relative profit is analyzed. As in the work by 
SSW (1988), forecasting errors have negative and significant consequences for gains from 
trade: a one standard deviation increase in average absolute error (MAE) reduces relative 
profit by -0.221 standard deviations (p < 0.1, one-sided). Subjects’ relative profits 
significantly increase with the increment in the degree of overconfidence (p < 0.1, two-sided). 
For every unit increase in trading activity for male traders there is reduction in earnings by -
0.074 units, whereas for female subjects earnings decrease by -2.314 units (interaction term is 
significant at 5%, two-sided  
In Equation 5 forecasting imprecision is assessed as total absolute error (TAE). TAE has 
negative effect on relative profit, which is comparable to the effect obtained in Equation 4; 
however there is increase in the goodness of fit of the model and decrease in the error term. A 
one standard deviation increment in TAE reduces individual earnings by -0.277 standard 
deviations (p < 0.05, one-sided). Growth in the degree of overconfidence has positive and 
significant effect on performance: a one standard deviation increase in NBS raises gains by 
0.253 standard deviations (p < 0.1, two-sided). For every unit increase in trading activity for 
male traders there is reduction in earnings by -0.130 units, whereas for female subjects 
earnings decrease by- 2.360 units (interaction term is significant at 5%, two-sided  
In Equation 6 one more regressor is added, and it is tested for the explanatory power of 
subjects’ experience, proxied by age, for relative profit. From the estimation outcome one can 
see that age has no significant effect on individual earnings. A one standard deviation 
increment in forecasting error, measured as TAE, reduces relative profit by -0.293 standard 
deviations (p < 0.05, one-sided). Growth in the degree of overconfidence has positive and 
significant effect on performance: a one standard deviation increase in NBS raises gains by 
0.241 standard deviations (p < 0.1, two-sided). For every unit increase in trading activity for 
male traders there is reduction in earnings by -0.112 units, whereas for female subjects 
earnings decrease by -2.124 units (interaction term is significant at 5%, two-sided).  
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Table 3.5: Gains from trade (all errors are heteroskedasticity corrected) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
C 
-0.776
*
 0.108 1.159
***
 1.626
***
 1.525
***
 -1.030 -0.029 -0.035 1.790
**
 1.465
****
 1.624
****
 
(0.423) (0.539 (0.377) (0.498) (0.442) (2.881) (2.702) (2.700) (0.788) (0.417) (0.399) 
NBS 
0.065 0.932 1.577
*, a
 1.995
*
 1.896
*
 1.805
*
 1.440
*, a
 1.436
*, a
 1.549
*, a
 1.474
*, a
 1.628
*
 
(1.085) (1.037) (1.045) (1.069) (0.987) (0.957) (0.919) (0.919) (1.013) (0.936) (0.899) 
Gender 
1.293
***
 1.212
***
 -1.012 -1.064
*
 -0.950 -0.692 -0.431 -0.429 -0.695 -0.564 -0.577 
(0.442) (0.395) (0.812) (0.813) (0.770) (0.760) (0.740) (0.740) (0.820) (0.738) (0.746) 
Trading activity 
(average) 
  -1.276
**
 -2.655
****
 -2.314
****
 -2.360
****
 -2.124
***
 -2.122
****
   -2.366
****
 -2.255
****
 -2.402
****
 
  (0.520) (0.488) (0.568) (0.564) (0.661) (0.559)   (0.567) (0.469) (0.446) 
Trading 
activity*Gender 
    2.449
**
 2.240
**
 2.229
**
 2.013
**
 2.237
**
 1.120
**
 2.362
**
 2.370
**
 2.555
***
 
    (0.996) (0.986) (0.977) (0.977) (0.978) (0.489) (1.023) (0.969) (0.947) 
MAE 
     -0.108
*, a
             
     (0.069)             
TAE 
       -0.012
**, a
 -0.013
**, a
 -0.008
*, a
 -0.008
*, a
 -0.007 -0.008
*, a
 -0.011
***
 
        (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
Age 
         0.104 0.061 0.061      
         (0.118) (0.109) (0.109)      
End assets 
           -0.136
**, a
 -0.136
**, a
 -0.118
*, a
 -0.143
**
 -0.153
**
 
           (0.073) (0.073) (0.085) (0.071) (0.069) 
Semester 
              -0.067     
              (0.105)     
Trading activity 
(total) 
             -1.061
****
      
              (0.280)       
N 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 54 60 59 
adj. R2 0.09 0.17 0.26 0.28 0.32 0.32 0.38 0.38 0.32 0.39 0.47 
SERegr 1.75 1.67 1.58 1.55 1.51 1.51 1.45 1.45 1.49 1.44 1.34 
 
**** 0.001;  *** 0.01;  ** 0.05;  * 0.1.           
a 
one-sided test. 
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Equation 7 analyzes the effect of the final portfolio size on gains from trade. The number of 
assets in the final inventory is a significant determinant of reduction in relative profit: a one 
standard deviation increase in final portfolio size decreased earnings by -0.301 standard 
deviations (p < 0.1, one-sided). A one standard deviation increment in forecasting error, 
measured as TAE, reduces relative profit by -0.189 standard deviations (p < 0.05, one-sided). 
Growth in the degree of overconfidence has positive and significant effect on performance: a 
one standard deviation increase in NBS raises gains from trade by 0.192 standard deviations 
(p < 0.1, one-sided). For every unit increase in trading activity for male traders there is growth 
in earnings by 0.115 units, whereas for female subjects earnings decrease by -2.366 units 
(interaction term is significant at 5%, two-sided). 
In Equation 8, instead of average trading activity another dependent variable, namely total 
trading activity (TTA), is used. This specification, compared to Equation 7, results in no 
changes to the goodness of fit of the model and standard error of regression. A one standard 
deviation increment in forecasting error, measured as TAE, reduces earnings by -0.189 
standard deviations (p < 0.1, one-sided). Subjects’ relative profit deteriorates with growth in 
the size of their final portfolio: a one standard deviation increase in the end inventory reduces 
individual earnings by -0.301 standard deviations (p < 0.05, one-sided). Increment in the 
degree of overconfidence has positive and significant effect on performance: a one standard 
deviation increase in NBS raises gains from trade by 0.192 standard deviations (p < 0.1, one-
sided). For every unit increase in trading activity for male traders there is growth in earnings 
by 0.059 units, whereas for female subjects earnings decrease by -2.122 units (interaction 
term is significant at 5%, two-sided). 
In Equation 9, I control for another subjects’ experience proxy, such as duration of studies in 
semesters. As in the case with age variable, this relationship is also insignificant. Forecasting 
error, measured TAE, has no significant effect on gains from trade. Subjects’ relative profit 
deteriorates with growth in the size of their final portfolio: a one standard deviation increase 
in the end inventory reduces individual earnings by -0.260 standard deviations (p < 0.1, one-
sided). Increment in the degree of overconfidence has positive and significant effect on 
performance: a one standard deviation increase in NBS raises gains from trade by 0.207 
standard deviations (p < 0.1, one-sided). For every unit increase in trading activity for male 
traders there is reduction in earnings by -0.004 units, whereas for female subjects earnings 
decrease by -2.122 units (interaction term is significant at 5%, two-sided). 
The insignificant experience variables (age and semester) are removed from Equation 10. This 
specification, compared to Equations 7 and 9, is characterized by better fit of the regression 
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model and reduction of the regression error. A one standard deviation increment in 
forecasting error, measured as TAE, decreases earnings by -0.175 standard deviations (p < 
0.1, one-sided). Subjects’ gains deteriorate with growth in the size of their final portfolio: a 
one standard deviation increase in the end inventory reduces individual earnings by -0.315 
standard deviations (p < 0.05, one-sided). Increment in the degree of overconfidence has 
positive and significant effect on performance: a one standard deviation increase in NBS 
raises gains from trade by 0.197 standard deviations (p < 0.1, one-sided). For every unit 
increase in trading activity for male traders there is growth in earnings by 0.115 units, 
whereas for female subjects earnings decrease by -2.255 units (interaction term is significant 
at 5%, two-sided). 
After analysis of the residuals, one possible outlier was detected and, after exclusion of it, the 
regression was re-run. Equation 11 indicates that a one standard deviation increment in 
forecasting error, measured as TAE, decreases earnings by -0.249 standard deviations (p < 
0.01, two-sided). Subjects’ relative profit deteriorates with growth in the size of their final 
portfolio: a one standard deviation increase in the end inventory reduces individual earnings 
by -0.335 standard deviations (p < 0.05, two-sided). Increment in the degree of 
overconfidence has positive and significant effect on performance: a one standard deviation 
increase in NBS raises gains from trade by 0.218 standard deviations (p < 0.1, two-sided). For 
every unit increase in trading activity for male traders there is growth in earnings by 0.153 
units, whereas for female subjects earnings decrease by -2.402 units (interaction term is 
significant at 1%, two-sided). Exclusion of the outlier resulted in increase in the explained 
variation in relative profit and reduction of the regression error, implying that model without 
the outlier better represents the data.  
Results presented in Table 3.5 suggest that 1) overconfidence degree has a significant positive 
effect on individual earnings, 2) impact of active trade engagement on relative profit is 
negative, however, holding all other factors constant, with increase in the number of market 
transactions males incur smaller losses, or even some yield, in comparison to females, 3) 
forecasting errors, that induce false future price expectations and “cause mistakes in financial 
decision making” (Biais et al., 2005), produce losses, 4) the number of assets in the final 
inventory of the subject is a significant determinant of reduction in gains from trade. In 
general, the described specifications succeeded quite well in explaining variation in relative 
profits in the sample. Yet, the amount of unexplained variation suggests that other unobserved 
factors that were not included in the regression also were at play. 
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3.6 RISK AVERSION ANALYSIS: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Experimental results present evidence that on average subjects were risk averse with 5.66 
taken safe choices (SD = 1.82). 28.13% of the group has made six safe choices, 25% has 
made five safe choices, and 18.75% has made seven safe choices. As Table 3.2 suggests, risk 
preferences of the participants can be classified correspondingly as risk averse, slightly risk 
averse and very risk averse. In general, 71.88% of choices have fallen in the interval of [5, 7] 
safe options (see Figure 3.4). Rational subjects have taken on average 5.81 safe choices (SD = 
1.42), and overconfident subjects 5.50 safe choices (SD = 2.19). Subjects’ demographics (age, 
semester, gender) had no significant impact on their risk aversion. No linear relationship 
between participants’ age, their duration of studies (semester), and the number of safe choices 
was found (age: Spearman’s Rho(30) = 0.091, p = 0.310, one-sided; semester: Spearman’s 
Rho(26) = -0.159, p = 0.205, one-sided). Men have taken on average 5.68 safe choices (SD = 
2.00), and women 5.62 safe choices (SD = 1.61). Difference in the average number of safe 
choices taken by both genders is insignificant (Mann-Whitney Z = -0.452, p = 0.652, two-
sided). In Appendix 3.C descriptive statistics of the experiment are presented: the number of 
safe choices taken by participants, their age, semester and the bias score.  
 
Figure 3.4: Distribution of safe choices in the group 
Safe 
choices 
Percentage of 
group 
0 3.13% 
1 0.00% 
2 0.00% 
3 6.25% 
4 9.38% 
5 25.00% 
6 28.13% 
7 18.75% 
8 0.00% 
9 9.38% 
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Now, I turn to the examination of the relationship between overconfidence and risk aversion. 
It was hypothesized that overconfident subjects would be more risk loving, i.e. they would 
make less safe choices. Statistical tests detected no significant difference between two groups 
of players, neither in terms of the average number of safe choices (Mann-Whitney Z = 0.320, 
p = 0.749, two-sided), nor in their variation (Siegel Tukey test = 0.465, p = 0.642, two-sided). 
Correlation coefficient between risk aversion, measured as the number of safe choices, and 
individual bias score implies no linear relationship between them (Spearman’s Rho(30) = -
0.095, p = 0.303, one-sided). Additionally two regressions were run, where subjects’ degree 
of overconfidence was regressed on the number of safe choices they made, their gender, and 
either their age (Equation 1) or duration of their studies in semesters (Equation 2) (see 
Appendix 3.F). In Equation 1, no significant regressors were identified for predicting 
individual overconfidence; the goodness of fit measure indicates very poor fit. From 
inspection of Equation 2 it can be seen that a one standard deviation increase in duration of 
studies reduces overconfidence by -0.0064 standard deviations (p < 0.1, two-sided), however 
this impact is almost negligible. Other regressors are insignificant. The presented evidence 
implies that, in this sample, the number of safe choices has no explanatory power for subject’s 
overconfidence.  
The next step is to analyze the relationship between risk aversion and some experimental 
outcomes: the number of assets in the final inventory of the subject, intensity of the 
engagement in trading activity and gains from trade. It has been predicted that greater degree 
of subject’s risk aversion will have stronger negative effect on her trading activity and the 
number of assets in her final inventory. This prediction is based on the assumption that risk-
averse subjects would perceive each stock as a lottery and try to sell them in the initial periods 
of the game. No linear relationship was detected, neither between the final portfolio size and 
risk aversion (Spearman’s Rho(30) = -0.001, p = 0.498, one-sided), nor between gains from 
trade and risk aversion (Spearman’s Rho(30) = 0.031, p = 0.433, one-sided). The correlation 
coefficient between the number of safe choices and active trade engagement was negative, yet 
insignificant (Spearman’s Rho(30) = -0.100, p = 0.294, one-sided). To clarify more precisely 
the impact of risk aversion on trading activity, I run two regression models − Equation 10 and 
Equation 11 (see Table 3.4) – whose specifications are the same as of Equations 6 and 7, with 
the variable measuring the number of safe choices added.  
From inspection of Equation 10 it can be seen that the degree of risk aversion, measured as 
the number of safe choices, has no significant effect on the intensity of individual engagement 
in trading activity. Other relations between the variables remain similar to the observed in 
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Equation 6: 1) a one standard deviation increase in MAE raises trading activity by 0.348 
standard deviations (p < 0.05, two-sided); 2) a one standard deviation increment in age 
reduces trading activity by -0.266 standard deviations (p < 0.05, one-sided); 3) interaction 
term between gender and overconfidence indicates that for every unit increase in NBS for 
male subjects there is reduction in trading activity by -0.448 units; in contrast, for female 
subjects increase of 0.859 units in trading activity is observed (p < 0.1, one-sided). In the 
model tested in Equation 11 also no significant influence of subjects’ risk aversion on their 
engagement in trading activity was detected. Other relations between the variables remain 
similar to the observed in Equation 7: 1) a one standard deviation increase in TAE raises 
trading activity by 0.433 standard deviations (p < 0.05, two-sided); 2) a one standard 
deviation increment in age reduces trading activity by -0.300 standard deviations (p < 0.05, 
two-sided); 3) interaction term between gender and overconfidence indicates that for every 
unit increase in NBS for male subjects there is reduction in trading activity by -0.475 units; in 
contrast, for female subjects increase of 0.854 units in trading activity is observed (p < 0.1, 
one-sided). 
It can be concluded that, in this sample, differences in experimental market outcomes between 
the traders were overconfidence and not risk aversion driven.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this article was to investigate the influence of behavioral factors, namely the 
degree of overconfidence and risk aversion, on financial decision making of economic 
subjects. For this purpose two kinds of experiments were conducted. The first one, whose 
design followed Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988), was the asset market experiment, 
whereas the second was aimed at individual risk aversion measurement. Hypotheses, which 
were tested in the context of the suggested experimental design, were built on exploration of 
findings from the foregoing overconfidence research in financial markets. The presented 
evidence builds on individual traders’ decisions.  
The usual finding from experimental literature testing for the impact of overconfidence on 
variation in subjects’ trading activity and performance (earnings) in market settings where 
both overconfident and rational traders are present, is that the former engage in more trading 
activity (Odean, 1998; Deaves et al., 2009) and face welfare reductions (e.g. Biais et al., 2005; 
Kirchler and Maciejovsky, 2002) compared to the latter. In contrast to these works, in the 
present experiment subjects, based on their pre-experimental overconfidence scores, were 
assigned to the two types of markets – rational and overconfident – and in the course of 
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experiment they could interact only with participants of their own “type” (rational or 
overconfident). Within each of the conducted markets, the degree of overconfidence varied 
(even slightly) from participant to participant, and this part of experiment was built upon the 
assumption, that this was the only source of individual heterogeneity.  
The design of experimental sessions, where all participants had identical initial endowments 
and information access, did not create preconditions for the active use of market-place for 
portfolio balancing purposes; correspondingly (almost) no trade should have occurred. 
However, the empirical data suggest that average trading activity was rather high and some 
traders demonstrated trading activity that equaled several times the outstanding market 
inventory. The results of data analysis supported the hypothesis that individuals with higher 
degree of overconfidence engaged in trading activity more actively. Yet, holding all other 
factors constant, with increase in overconfidence men have completed fewer stock market 
transactions than women. This contradicts the result of Barber and Odean (2001) that men 
trade more than women. On the other hand Deaves et al. (2009) found that after controlling 
for overconfidence there was no difference in trading activity between males and females. 
Also in Glaser and Weber (2007) gender was not significantly related to the trading volume 
measures. Other control variables, which had significant effect on the number of stock market 
transactions per person, were: errors in predicting average asset market prices and subjects’ 
experience, measured as their age or duration of study. Namely, forecasting errors, inducing 
false future price expectations, forced subjects to engage in trading activity more actively, 
whereas experience had significant negative impact on their involvement in trading activity. 
Statistical data suggest that, contrary to the formulated hypothesis, overconfidence had 
positive effect on gains from trade. Other factors that significantly affected variation of 
relative profits were: trading activity, gender, forecasting errors and the final portfolio size. 
As it was expected, active engagement in trade had negative consequences on individual 
gains. High turnover players were significantly outperformed by low turnover players, namely 
participants in the lowest trading activity quartile gained on average 38% more ECUs than 
participants in the highest quartile. However, holding all other factors constant, with increase 
in the number of market transactions males incurred smaller losses, or even some yield, 
compared to females. In line with the previous research, forecasting errors, bringing about 
mistakes in financial decision making, were associated with losses. The number of assets in 
trader’s final inventory, which was found to be not overconfidence dependent, proved to be a 
significant determinant of reduction in gains from trade. A curious fact is that, although 
females held fewer assets in their portfolios than males, their gains were significantly lower.  
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Based on the above-mentioned findings, it can be concluded that also in the setting, where two 
“types” of subjects were separated from each other, performance and trading activity were 
overconfidence dependent and even small variations in miscalibration among players belonging to 
the same “type” were sufficient to evoke this effect. 
At the completion of subsequent risk aversion measurements in the reduced sample, 
consisting of sixteen rational and sixteen overconfident former asset market experiment 
participants, the collected data revealed that subjects on average were risk averse. Inconsistent 
with the proposition that overconfident subjects would be more risk loving, statistical tests 
detected no significant difference between the two types of traders in terms of the average 
number of safe choices. The presented evidence implied that, neither the number of safe 
choices, nor demographics (age, gender, and semester) had explanatory power for the 
individual degree of overconfidence. Prior to the experiment it was expected that risk aversion 
would have negative effect on participant’s trading activity and her final portfolio size. 
However, no significant relationship between these variables was detected. Other factors, 
which were found to influence trading activity in the complete sample, remained significant. 
Hence, it can be concluded that in the reduced sample, differences in experimental market 
outcomes between the traders were overconfidence and not risk aversion driven.  
For future research in the area of psychological motivation of asset market experiment 
participants’ behavior it would be beneficial to establish the origin of differences between 
rational and overconfident traders’ economic behavior. Investment decisions in this 
experiment are based on beliefs concerning the likelihood of the two kinds of independent 
uncertain events: 1) the size of the dividend at the end of the period, and 2) the probability to 
resell the asset at a higher price (finding a “greater fool”). Research is called for to examine, 
whether overconfident traders generate subjective probabilities of occurrence of these events, 
which significantly deviate from the objective ones, namely by optimistically overestimating 
probabilities of favorable to them outcomes (e.g. maximum dividend value) and almost 
neglecting unfavorable ones. Another possible extension could be the assessment and control 
of personality characteristics other than overconfidence and risk aversion. E.g. students’ 
intelligence assessed as their IQ score, their attitude towards deception and manipulation 
aimed at personal gain attainment (Machiavellianism), psychological traits such as 
extraversion, openness, neuroticism and etc. 
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APPENDIX 3.A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (ASSET MARKET EXPERIMENT). 
 
 N M SD Min. Max. 
Profit 60 390.36 197.89 4.20 906.20 
Relative profit 60 0.00 1.83 -3.58 4.78 
Profit / initial portfolio value 60 3.61 1.83 0.04 8.39 
Bias score 60 11.20 12.08 -5.89 43.50 
Age 60 22.77 2.13 19.00 28.00 
Semester 54 3.39 2.10 1.00 12.00 
End assets 60 3.00 4.04 0.00 18.00 
MAE 60 7.24 3.76 1.79 20.64 
TAE 60 55.33 42.40 5.00 202.00 
Trading activity (average) 60 0.89 0.47 0.14 2.25 
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APPENDIX 3.B: BIAS SCORE, AGE, SEMESTER FOR DIFFERENT EXPERIMENTAL SAMPLES 
Whole Sample 
  N M SD Min Max 
Bias score 60 11.20 12.08 -5.89 43.50 
Age 60 22.77 2.13 19.00 28.00 
Semester 60 3.39 2.10 1.00 12.00 
Overconfident Traders 
  N M SD Min Max 
Bias score 30 21.33 8.26 10.17 43.50 
Age 30 22.83 1.88 19.00 27.00 
Semester 30 2.96 1.37 1.00 5.00 
Rational Traders 
  N M SD Min Max 
Bias score 30 1.06 4.02 -5.89 6.78 
Age 30 22.70 2.38 19.00 28.00 
Semester 30 3.81 2.60 1.00 12.00 
Male Participants 
  N M SD Min Max 
Bias score 35 12.08 11.91 -4.72 43.50 
Age 35 22.51 1.85 19.00 27.00 
Semester 35 3.19 1.71 1.00 7.00 
Female Participants 
  N M SD Min Max 
Bias score 25 9.96 12.45 -5.89 38.89 
Age 25 23.12 2.45 19.00 28.00 
Semester 25 3.68 2.59 1.00 12.00 
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APPENDIX 3.C: RISK AVERSION EXPERIMENT SAMPLE 
Whole Sample 
  N M SD Min Max 
Safe choices 32 5.66 1.82 0.00 9.00 
Age 32 24.34 1.94 20.00 29.00 
Semester 29 5.69 2.05 3.00 9.00 
Bias score 32 11.09 10.49 -3.72 35.00 
Overconfident Traders 
  N M SD Min Max 
Safe choices 16 5.50 2.19 0.00 9.00 
Age 16 24.00 1.97 20.00 27.00 
Semester 16 4.93 1.33 3.00 7.00 
Bias score 16 20.17 6.48 10.17 35.00 
Rational Traders 
  N M SD Min Max 
Safe choices 16 5.81 1.42 3.00 9.00 
Age 16 24.69 1.92 22.00 29.00 
Semester 13 6.08 1.89 3.00 9.00 
Bias score 16 2.01 3.10 -3.72 6.06 
Male Participants 
  N M SD Min Max 
Safe choices 19 5.68 2.00 0.00 9.00 
Age 19 23.95 1.84 20.00 27.00 
Semester 17 5.47 1.62 3.00 8.00 
Bias score 19 11.95 10.02 -2.39 35.00 
Female Participants 
  N M SD Min Max 
Safe choices 13 5.62 1.61 3.00 9.00 
Age 13 24.92 2.02 21.00 29.00 
Semester 11 5.45 1.86 3.00 9.00 
Bias score 13 9.84 11.45 -3.72 30.50 
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APPENDIX 3.D: TRANSLATED INSTRUCTIONS OF THE RISK AVERSION EXPERIMENT 
INSTRUCTIONS 
In this experiment you are to make ten decisions. Each decision is a choice between 
two paired lotteries - “Option A” and “Option B” such as those presented below:  
 
Decision Option A  Option B  Your Choice 
    1 3.00 EUR with 10% chance, 
2.40 EUR with 90% chance 
 5.78 EUR with 10% chance, 
0.15 EUR with 90% chance 
 
A ○ ○ B 
…
 
…
 
 …
 
 …
 
    10 3.00 EUR with 100% chance  5.78 EUR with 100% chance 
 
A ○ ○ B 
 
You will make ten choices but only one of them will be used in the end of the 
experiment to determine your earnings. Each decision has an equal chance of being used in 
the end.  
How one of the decisions is going to be chosen? We will use a random number 
generator in the computer which will generate a number between 1 and 10. The generated 
number is the number of decision that will be used to determine your payment. Each number 
has an equal probability to occur, so you have to think carefully about EACH of the 
Decisions! 
How payment for a lottery of your choice is determined? After one of the decisions 
has been randomly selected, the computer will generate another random number. This random 
number determines your earnings for the Option (A or B) that you previously selected for the 
decision being used. E.g. if you choose Option A in the first decision row shown above, you 
will have a 10% chance of earning 3.00 EUR and a 90% chance of earning 2.40 EUR. 
Similarly Option, B offers a 10% chance of earning 5.78 EUR and a 90% chance of earning 
0.15 EUR.  
What is the sequence of your actions? For each decision row you will have to choose 
between Option A and Option B by clicking on one of the “circles” on the right side of the 
screen. You will make ten choices. You may choose A for some decision rows and B for other 
rows and you may change your decisions and make them in any order. You have 15 minutes 
 143 
make your choices. When you are finished, press the “Submit” button. After you have pressed 
this button you can no longer change your choices. Then a random number generator will 
choose a number of the decision that will be used for payment. A second random number will 
determine the outcome of the lottery you chose.  
Important: please do not talk with anyone! Raise your hand if you have a question. 
 144 
APPENDIX 3.E: FINAL INVENTORIES DISTRIBUTION IN 
a. The whole sample 
0
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Series: TOTAL_ASSET
Sample 1 60
Observations 60
Mean       3.000000
Median   1.000000
Maximum  18.00000
Minimum  0.000000
Std. Dev.   4.037956
Skewness   2.021804
Kurtosis   7.422297
Jarque-Bera  89.76867
Probability  0.000000
 
b. Overconfident markets sample 
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Mean       3.000000
Median   1.000000
Maximum  18.00000
Minimum  0.000000
Std. Dev.   4.370749
Skewness   2.071663
Kurtosis   7.164631
Jarque-Bera  43.13912
Probability  0.000000
 
c. Rational markets sample 
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Series: RAT_AS
Sample 1 30
Observations 30
Mean       3.000000
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Std. Dev.   3.750862
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Kurtosis   7.422145
Jarque-Bera  42.45892
Probability  0.000000
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APPENDIX 3.F: REGRESSION OF OVERCONFIDENCE ON RISK AVERSION AND OTHER FACTORS  
  1 2 
C 0.956
*
 0.690
***
 
 (0.522) (0.215) 
Safe choice -0.011 -0.017 
  (0.021) (0.019) 
Gender 0.021 0.067 
  (0.080) (0.084) 
AGE -0.023  
 (0.021)  
Semester  -0.051
*
 
   (0.026) 
N 32 28 
R2 0.065 0.182 
SEreg 0.22 0.21 
 
*** - 0.01, 
* - 0.1 
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